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THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AND PEACE

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THE PHILOSOPHY of WAR and PEACE

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AND PEACE

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To

Bishop Garfield Bromley Oxnam

A Prophetic Leader of the Church in War and Peace

PREFACE

THIS BOOK IS A BRIEF PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INtroduction to the problem of war and peace. As such it deals with a phase of the problem which has received comparatively little in the way of systematic treatment in recent years. It is primarily concerned with the basic question or questions as to the necessity of war and the possibility of permanent peace, and treats these questions in the light of their historical development. It is written in the interest of the peace movement, but seeks to be objective and dispassionate in its exposition and discussion of divergent views. In this respect it will satisfy neither the thoroughgoing militarist nor the absolute pacifist. But it will, I trust, prove more or less informing to all its readers, and also suggestive of a somewhat profounder basis for the hope of universal peace than appears in much of the current literature on the subject. The book is designed for class as well as individual use, and will, I hope, be found useful as a text for discussion groups and as a supplement to college and seminary courses in Christian ethics.

My special thanks are due Dr. E. S. Brightman, Dr. L. Harold DeWolf, and Dean Walter G. Muelder for reading the manuscript and giving me the benefit of their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. I am also indebted to Miss Gertrude L. Allison, librarian at Boston University School of Theology, and Dr. Jannette E. Newhall, librarian at Andover Harvard Theological Library, for valuable assistance.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

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CHAPTER I

THE APOLOGETIC FOR WAR

HUGO GROTIUS, THE EMINENT DUTCH JURIST, THEOLOGIAN, and publicist, in his celebrated work *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625) distinguished three kinds of war—private, public, and mixed. With private wars and mixed wars, that is, wars which are public on one side and private on the other, we are not here concerned. Indeed, the word "war," except in an adapted or figurative sense, is now usually limited to public wars, of which there are two kinds—international and civil. Of these the former have on the whole in recent years been so much more serious than the latter that when we speak of war we as a rule mean war between nations or states. War in the typical sense of the term is international. It is in this sense that we shall for the most part use the word.

The problem of private warfare has in principle been solved. The process by which this was brought about in medieval and modern Europe was a long one. The church, aside from preaching the gospel of peace, sought to alleviate the evils of private wars by ecclesiastical enactments. Its synods and councils proclaimed the "Peace of the Church" or the "Peace of God," prohibiting acts of violence against the property and servants of the church and against the more helpless members of the community. They also instituted the "Truce of God," forbidding all private warfare on certain days of the week, on special feast days, and during the seasons of Lent and Advent. These warless days were gradually in-

creased in number until at their greatest extent hardly one fourth of the year was left for fighting, and to this limited period the prohibitions of the Peace of the Church applied. In enforcing these regulations the church received some assistance from the temporal power, but for the most part it depended on ecclesiastical sanctions; and these were less effective in restraining the fighting spirit and military ardor of the feudal lords than might have been expected.

More effective than the influence of the church in the suppression of private warfare was the rise of the European states with their centralized authority. These states by virtue of their superior power were able to go farther than the decrees of the church and prohibit all private warfare. They were also in a position to reserve to themselves the right to employ force in the settlement of disputes. This, of course, did not mean the abolition of all crime, nor did it deny to individuals the right of self-defense. Acts of violence still persisted, but they were outlawed, and the state was under obligation to protect its citizens against them so far as possible. Under these conditions private warfare, in the sense in which it had previously existed, came to an end. It had no legal status; it was under the ban of the state. People generally in their relation to each other came to feel themselves reasonably secure. They had to a large degree acquired the art of living peaceably together as individuals. Much, it is true, remained yet to be done; and there is still abundant opportunity for improvement. But in principle the problem is solved. Man has found the solution in the state.

But when it comes to international war, the situation is quite different. Here we are confronted with an unsolved problem. The independent states have not learned how to live amicably together. They have no authority above them

comparable to that which has outlawed and suppressed private warfare. Their relation to each other is still to a large extent anarchic. The two basic national demands, that for security on the one hand and for freedom of action on the other, have not been fully adjusted to each other. The right of self-defense and the right of expansion clash with each other, and there is no final court of appeal endowed with sufficient authority to settle all the ensuing disputes. The present international organization is in an experimental stage. It has no such established place in the world as the national state, and may not have for many years to come. Multitudes of people hope it will eventually lead to an era of permanent peace; and the purpose of the present study is to encourage and strengthen this hope. But the hope under existing circumstances is admittedly a precarious one. It is dependent on the will of the individual nations, especially that of the great powers; and how long these powers will remain united in their peace aims no one can forecast. Despite the Charter of the United Nations and the invention of the atomic bomb the peril of war still hangs over the race. Behind the international scene the philosophy of war and the arbitrament of force still hold sway.

It is war on a larger and more catastrophic scale than has heretofore been known that confronts the world. Modern imperialism tends to make war global in extent, and modern science has been making weapons of war so increasingly destructive of life and property as to be a menace to our hard-won civilization itself. Never before in the history of the world has war, with or without the atomic bomb, stood out so clearly as the supreme foe of mankind. In the past it was customary to put famine and pestilence on a parity with war, the three constituting a dread trinity of human woes. But

in modern times famine and pestilence, when not caused by war, have been coming more and more under control, so that they have lost much of their earlier terrors for the race as a whole. War, however, down to the present has held its deadly grip on mankind, and is now commonly regarded as the world's greatest curse.

In view of this fact it is not strange that a growing conviction has arisen that a method must be discovered of permanently putting an end to war. The peace movement has gained enormously in strength in recent years. The two World Wars have powerfully reinforced it. Never has the desire for world peace been so widespread, so urgent, and so insistent as at present. Yet it is confronted with a deep-seated and paralyzing skepticism. Many people earnestly desire universal peace, but they live under the tyranny of the past. There has always been war; all efforts to put a permanent end to it have failed; and so, they say, it always will be. They consequently take a fatalistic attitude toward it. They wish the peace movement well, but they have no real faith in it.

Then, too, despite its horrors war still has its professional apologists and even its fanatical devotees. To them war is not simply a necessity, it is a glorious adventure of the human spirit, an essential and indispensable factor in the progress of humanity. Only dreamers or fanatics, they tell us, take seriously the idea of perpetual peace.

This militaristic type of thought reached its climax both theoretically and practically in Fascism, Nazism, and Nipponism. For a time these evil forces threatened to overwhelm the whole peace movement. But their complete defeat in war dealt a staggering blow to the extravagant militarism which they represented. It also imparted a new and powerful impetus to the cause of world peace. But it did not put

an end to the fatalistic attitude toward war. This attitude is still strong in military circles; and in a less pronounced form it is widespread among people in general, as is also the philosophy on which it is based. A fundamental change in this philosophy and personal attitude is needed. The people and their military leaders must get over the idea that war is unavoidable. So long as this idea persists in strength, it will constitute a serious—probably the most serious—obstacle to the peace movement. World peace cannot be truly established until the traditional skepticism with reference to its possibility has been overcome. Our first task in the present study is, therefore, to deal with this skepticism and more particularly with the current apologetic for war in which its logical basis has been formulated.

This apologetic[1] is directed against modern pacifism, and like the latter exists in many different forms or degrees. But it will suffice for our present purpose if we distinguish two general types of each—one extreme or absolute and the other moderate or relative. Absolute or extreme pacifism condemns all war as inherently evil. No Christian, it maintains, should "participate" in it. The true Christian attitude toward war is that of the conscientious objector. As opposed to this view the extreme militarist glorifies war as the highest and noblest expression of the national spirit, and contends that it neither can nor ought to be eliminated from human life.

The moderate, or what may be called common-sense, type of pacifism assumes the ultimate, if not early, abolition of war. It recognizes the distinction between just and unjust wars, and admits, if it does not insist, that it may be the duty of a Christian to engage in the former. But this is a

[1] Cf. S. R. Steinmetz, *Die Philosophie des Krieges* (1907); H. Gomperz, *Die Philosophie des Krieges in Umrissen* (1915).

duty only because of the hardness of men's hearts and is relative to the present imperfect development of mankind. War itself has no place in the Christian ideal, and the moderate pacifist will do everything that he intelligently and consistently can to avert it. But if war should be necessary to end war, he would concede its legitimacy. His emphatic preference, however, would always be for the use of peaceable rather than coercive measures if they would serve adequately the moral end in view.

From this widely held type of pacifism moderate or common-sense militarism differs less in principle than in its points of emphasis. It does not rule out the pacifist hope of ultimate world peace. To some extent it professes to share this hope. Admiral A. T. Mahan, for instance, a distinguished representative of this school of thought, said: "I believe, with full intensity of personal conviction, that when moral motives come to weigh heavier with mankind than do material interests there will be no war and coincidentally therewith better provision of reasonable bodily necessities to all men."[2] But while this may be the belief of moderate militarists in general, they do not emphasize it. It is with them a concession to pacifism rather than a spontaneous and positive conviction. What they are primarily interested in is immediate military necessities. To these they subordinate whatever pacifistic hope or faith they may have. Their real trust, at least for the present, is in the use or display of force rather than in arbitration and other pacific means. They endorse without hesitancy the military establishments of the past and as a rule support the legislative programs that aim at strengthening them. They do not accept the full militaristic creed, but they lean in that

[2] *Some Neglected Aspects of War*, pp. 72 f.

direction and hence are generally regarded as apologists for war. It is not, however, with their qualified apologetic that we are here directly concerned, but with the more thoroughgoing philosophy of war advocated by the more extreme and aggressive school of militarists and passively accepted by multitudes of others.

The philosophy of war had its rootage in spontaneous and uncritical reflection. People concluded from the experience of the past that wars would continue indefinitely. That which has been, they instinctively felt, is that which shall be. Their inertia and mental sluggishness made them the victims of the past. They recognized the evils of war, but a native fatalistic mood led them to resign themselves to it. This does not mean that they always entered upon war reluctantly. People in general as well as their rulers have always seen in war, despite its abhorrent evils, their greatest opportunity for noble and heroic deeds. The pages of history are full of the glorious achievements of military heroes. No other sphere of human activity has so challenged the brave and the strong. Hitler tells us in *Mein Kampf* that when he learned of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was overpowered by stormy enthusiasm and fell down on his knees thanking God from an overflowing heart for granting him the good fortune of being permitted to live at that time. Multitudes of others no doubt felt the same way during those days. And in the many other military crises of human history the same feeling was probably common. The result was that men instinctively came to look upon war not only as an inescapable fate, but as an open door to fame and glory. It is these two points of view that have constituted the basic elements in traditional popular thought respecting war. As a rule they have existed as personal attitudes or as vague feelings rather than as clearly defined prin-

ciples. But as such they have been the raw material out of which the militaristic philosophy of war has been fashioned. The latter has, consequently, always had a wide popular appeal.

The philosophical apologetic for war has not as yet taken on a fixed form. Many different lines of thought have entered into it; but these may be reduced to three main arguments: one based on the combative nature of man, a second on the dynamic nature of the state, and the third on the beneficent function of war.

The Argument from Human Nature

The argument based on human nature is complex and often vague.[3] It assumes that human nature has certain fixed and unchangeable characteristics and that one of these characteristics is an aggressive and pugnacious spirit. Man, it is said, is a warlike animal, and despite all that civilization and religion may do for him remains such. Wars are, therefore, inevitable. They result necessarily from the very structure of human nature. One might, it is true, conceive of paradisiacal conditions under which the selfish and militant spirit in man would not be evoked to such a degree as to lead to armed conflict. But such conditions do not exist on this planet and never will. Human life and, indeed, animal life as a whole is under the law of the struggle for existence. Life feeds on life. This is a law of nature—a biological law. Man is not exempt from it. The very conditions of human existence make struggle and conflict unavoidable.

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[3] See Norman Angell, *Human Nature and the Peace Problem* (1925); Gardner Murphy, ed., *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* (1945).

The same may also be said of men from the psychological standpoint. They are so constituted that they are controlled by their emotions more than by reason. They are passionate and illogical. They react to opposition with anger, and the result is violent conflict.

The conflict, to be sure, does not necessarily involve bloodshed in the relation of individuals to each other. Such conflict is forbidden in civilized society. But when it comes to the relation of independent social groups or states to each other, the situation is different. Here the growing population and expanding needs of the various nations, their passions, and their ambitions lead inevitably to aggression and bloody strife. In such strife the rights of the individual are disregarded; they are submerged in what are assumed to be the greater rights of the group. The individual is required to sacrifice his own life, if necessary, for the sake of his country. Only in this way can the national life be maintained and strengthened. Only by the slaying of life can states save their own lives. This is a universal law—the true law of nations. Through its operation the fittest survive and human progress is assured. Without it humanity could not attain its true end.

The inevitability of war has thus, we are told, both a biological and a psychological basis. It is grounded in human nature, in man's native pugnacity or predacity, in the expanding life of humanity, in the struggle for existence, and in the law of the survival of the fittest. These are all constitutive factors in man's life as an organic being, and war necessarily results from them. It is produced by the mechanism of human nature and is to be viewed as the effect of natural law rather than as the result of a perverted human will. To seek to eliminate it, therefore, is to run counter to the established order of nature. This theory is commonly known as Social

Darwinism,[4] despite the fact that Darwin would himself have repudiated it. It claims the support of modern science, but its real intellectual basis is a naturalistic and mechanistic philosophy. S. R. Steinmetz, for instance, begins his work *The Philosophy of War* by saying that "every war is a necessity, as every other phenomenon, everything that occurs, is necessary. Given the total world as it was, every individual war was unavoidable." This deterministic philosophy is not rationally grounded. It is rather assumed, but it is basic in the author's thinking, as it is in the thinking of most people who look upon war as unavoidable. It is their philosophical necessitarianism that determines their conclusion rather than purely biological, sociological, or other scientific data, though they usually lay primary emphasis on the latter.

In response to the foregoing argument it has been urged by some pacifists that in waging war man runs counter both to animal nature in general and to his own original nature. It is, for instance, pointed out that cannibalism and war are to a large extent peculiar to man. "Except man, the only creatures that wage war properly so-called among themselves, are stags, ants, bees and a few birds." [5] Very few animals devour or kill their own kind. They have no taste for each other's flesh and hence no motive for slaying each other. They are neither cannibals nor warriors. In so far as men are the latter and still to some extent the former, they represent a lower stage than most animals. Indeed, they represent a decline or "fall" from their own original state. They represent both a perverted human and a perverted animal nature. Originally they respected their own kind. "Universal brother-

[4] See George Nasmyth, *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory* (1916).

[5] G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of War* (1918), p. 17.

hood among men is older and more primitive than all combat." [6] The combative spirit owed its origin to the acquisition of property and was thus a later development. It was not and is not inherent in human nature as such.

This pacifistic and in part socialistic theory bears a manifest kinship to the mythical belief in a Golden Age at the beginning of human history. In its affirmation of an initial period of peace among primitive men it has no scientific basis. There is no anthropological evidence to support it. It is purely speculative in nature and rests on two assumptions: the natural or original goodness of man and the evil character of private property. Neither of these assumptions is historically verifiable.

There is certainly no adequate ground for the view that human pugnacity owed its origin to the rise of private property. There are many other things besides material objects that awaken human cupidity and an aggressive and militant spirit. Community of property in the various tribes and nations would not have prevented war. The fighting spirit in man has a far deeper and broader rootage than the love of material possessions.

It is an interesting fact that the lower animals in only a relatively few instances devour or kill their own kind. But it has no bearing on the question as to the original pacific or warlike nature of man. It would have such a bearing only if there were a common animal nature and if this nature were represented in its purity by the large majority of animals who do not slay their own kind. In that case it might be argued that those animals who devour and kill their own kind represent a degenerate animal nature. They are "fallen" animals. The

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

true original animal nature was pacific, and in so far as man inherited it he too was originally pacific in his relation to his own kind. It was only a later perversion of his original animal nature, a kind of fall of man, that led to his becoming a "fighting animal."

But this line of argument, if taken literally and realistically, rests on an obvious fallacy—"the fallacy of the universal." [7] There is no such thing as a common animal nature, a kind of substance or entity, that makes an animal an animal and that aside from a few degenerate variations here and there maintains its identity throughout the animal world as a whole. This whole notion of a universal animal nature is a fiction. There is no objective reality corresponding to it. The idea of a pacific animal nature, inherited by man, is an abstraction without metaphysical or anthropological justification, and to base the theory of man's originally pacific nature on it would impress most people as fanciful if not absurd.

On the other hand, it is equally unwarranted to ascribe man's fighting instincts to his animal inheritance and to conclude from this that they are ineradicable and must from time to time lead to war. Such a theory belies the fact of freedom and transforms man into a nonmoral automaton. The selfish and pugnacious elements in his nature are no doubt deep-seated and strong, but they are not fixed and immutable. They do not operate with the mechanical necessity of natural law. They do not lead necessarily to violence and armed conflict. They are subject to a large measure of control. This is clear in the case of individuals, and there is no valid reason why this control should not be exercised by nations also. Between nations and individuals there is no sharp dividing line. Na-

[7] B. P. Bowne, *The Theory of Thought and Knowledge,* pp. 244-51.

tions are made up of individuals. As the horizons of the latter are widened and their sense of moral responsibility extended so as to include all men, it follows necessarily that the moral character of the nations will undergo a corresponding change. The national transformation may be disappointingly slow and may at times meet with serious setbacks. But however that may be, there is no inherent and insuperable obstacle to it. There is no mystic pugnacity in collective human nature that bars the way to it and makes permanent international peace impossible.

Nor is there any universal law of life that renders war unavoidable. Many, it is true, find such a law in the struggle for existence among organic beings. This struggle, we are told, involves "the tragic law that life cannot unfold itself except by slaying life." And since this is so, it is said that war is a "part of the divinely appointed order" and, consequently, destined to be a permanent phase of human history. But this is to misunderstand the struggle for existence. This struggle is for the most part not a struggle with other living beings but a struggle with the hostile forces of nature. It is these forces more than anything else that threaten the lives of men and beasts, and the struggle against them is obviously war only in a rhetorical sense.

Then, too, animal warfare bears only a limited resemblance to human warfare. And even if the resemblance were closer than it is, there would be no warrant for putting both on the same level and treating human warfare as a necessary consequence of a general biological law. The struggle for existence is not a self-operating law that inevitably gives rise to war.

Nor does the law of the survival of the fittest add anything in the way of an explanation of the necessity of war. The fact is that laws cause nothing; they are simply descriptive of the

processes of nature. These processes are apparently automatic among animals. In man they are subject more or less to control. When they tend toward aggression and strife, man has the ability and duty to restrain them and guide them into new channels. But this implies a conception of human personality which is often overlooked by those who argue that human nature is such as to make war inevitable. They forget that "human nature is undoubtedly the most plastic part of the living world, the most adaptable, the most educable." [8] They conceive of it as a kind of psychical mechanism in which the rational is subordinated to the instinctive and irrational, the moral to the nonmoral, the spiritual to the physical, the human to the subhuman. In a word they are, as previously noted, consciously or unconsciously naturalistic determinists.

There is a corresponding conception of human nature in conservative Christian theology which has also been employed as a basis for a pessimistic attitude toward the peace movement. Those who hold this theological doctrine repudiate the naturalistic and mechanistic type of philosophy, but their substitute for it does not in this instance improve matters very much from the practical standpoint. They differ from naturalistic philosophers in that they believe in the divine creation of man and hence do not think of his nature as evil from the beginning. His present evil and war-breeding nature was due to sin, a sin which led not only to his own "fall" but to the "fall" of the world and to the establishment of a lower and sinful world order. This secondary and evil world order was a consequence of or penalty for human sin. It is dominated by the tragic law that life can grow and expand only through the destruction of life. God established this law, and hence it is

[8] W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 9.

a divine law. But it is nevertheless evil, and an evil that leads necessarily to war. A distinguished representative of this type of doctrine has put it in the following form: "All organic life stands in the temporal order under the tragic law that life cannot unfold itself except by slaying life; war is, therefore, not the offspring of individual sin, but a divine order of life, whose necessity is grounded in a primal fall, an over-individual and collective sin." [9]

This theory of human nature has an advantage over the naturalistic theory in that it does not ascribe war to a blind necessity and virtually exonerate mankind from moral responsibility for it. It looks upon war as in itself evil, as a penalty for human sin, and hence not as a meaningless fate to which we are subject. War from this point of view has a moral message. It is a call to repentance. But it implies the idea of the collective sin and fall of man. It is, furthermore, bound up with the theory that organic life and especially human nature are by divine appointment under the dominion of sin, and that this dominion with its inevitable consequent of war will continue as long as the world lasts. There is in this theory of war, therefore, no more basis for the hope of perpetual peace than there is in the naturalistic theory. Both theories look forward to the recurrence of wars until the end of time. The only difference is that one does so with pious resignation and the other in a nonreligious and fatalistic mood.

These two theories, naturalistic militarism and a pessimistic theological anthropology, fail to meet, as we have sought to show, the test of critical scrutiny. Human nature is fundamentally a capacity for action, not a fixed mode of conduct. It may lead either to peace or to war as the human will dictates.

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[9] Karl Heim, *Glaube und Leben*, p. 265.

The Argument from the Nature of the State

The second main argument in support of the view that war is an ineradicable phase of human life is derived from what may be called the dynamic theory of the state. According to this theory the state in its essential nature is might or power. It recognizes no authority, moral or otherwise, above itself. Its own might makes right. This, it is held, is true of the state both in its relation to its own subjects and to other states.

What gives to the state its social value within its own borders is its ability to enforce its own will against that of unruly individuals. Force lies at the basis of its administration of justice. Without it orderly and civilized life would hardly be possible. The only alternative to the sovereign state is anarchy, and people as yet are not prepared for that. It would be the end of civilization in virtually any land where it should be tried. The only adequate barrier to anarchy and barbarism is the power and authority of the state. This power and authority, it would generally be admitted, should be exercised justly. But in the case of a clash between the interests of the state and those of the individual the latter, according to the dynamic theory of the political order, must yield to the former. The rights of the state are supreme, and they are in reality made so by its superior power. Power constitutes the essence of the state.

This theory may be and often has been used to justify a despotic policy within a nation. But our concern here is with its bearing on the relation of different states to each other, and the contention of its protagonists is that the theory implies the inevitability of war. If a state is in its essence a nonmoral exercise of power, as is assumed by the theory, it follows that a state is truly a state only in so far as it is able to enforce its

will. A weak state is a contradiction in terms. There is, therefore, "an undeniably ridiculous element in the existence of a small state." [10] No state has any rights beyond its own power to protect itself; its own strength is the sole test of the legitimacy of its statehood. Statehood means self-sufficiency, and this implies that in any serious conflict between states the ultimate recourse must be to the arbitrament of force. War results necessarily from the mere fact of the existence of many states in competitive relations with each other. The only alternative would be world domination by some despotic power, and such domination would, in the opinion of most peoples, be worse than war. War, therefore, under existing conditions follows inevitably from the dynamic nature of the state.

This conception of the state was implicit in the theory and practice of the Roman Empire, but after the fall of the empire it naturally lapsed and was not effectively revived until the modern era. The feudal system and the authority of the church during the medieval period stood in the way of the development of national states, and during this period "even in England, always somewhat restive under papal interference, the idea of the omni-competence of the civil power would have been unthinkable." [11] It was the decline of feudalism and the division and weakening of the church as a political power by the Reformation that led to the rise of the modern state and its claim to absolute sovereignty.

The first distinguished representative of this modern dynamic theory of the state in all its naked immoralism or amoralism was Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). His famous book *The Prince* was written in 1513 and circulated in manuscript form for almost twenty years before it was printed. Lord

[10] H. von Treitschke, *Politics*, I, 34.
[11] J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, p. 5.

Bryce said that the work exposed its author's memory to undeserved obloquy, "because he did no more than describe and examine what was the accepted practice of his own time." [12] This statement, however, hardly brings out the true character of the book, for in it the author not only describes, he endorses the practice of his day. He sets up the infamous Cesare Borgia (1476-1507) "as a pattern for all such as rise to power by good fortune and the help of others" and says that a ruler "can find no brighter example than in the actions of this Prince." [13] He conceives of the state as devoid of moral obligations and as an end in itself. From its point of view everything is to be subordinated to prudence. "Where it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, we must admit of no considerations of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of praise or ignominy, but putting all else aside must adopt whatever course will save its existence and preserve its liberty." [14]

In view of the frankness and frequency with which Machiavelli expressed this point of view it is not surprising that his name became associated with all that is worst in public and private policy. It has been said that "no one was less Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself." But however that may be, there is no adequate ground for questioning his fundamental detachment of politics from morals. His reason for doing so seems to have been his belief in the baseness of human nature. The practical lawgiver, he held, must assume that "all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature whenever they have a good chance to do so." [15] "Anyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything, must

[12] *International Relations,* p. 15.
[13] *The Prince,* chap. vii.
[14] *Discourses on Livy,* III, 41.
[15] *Ibid.,* I, 3.

be ruined among so many who are not good." [16] A low moral standard and a selfish policy is, therefore, necessary in statecraft. "A prudent Prince neither can nor ought to keep his word when to keep it is hurtful to him." [17]

This purely secularized and nonmoral conception of the state was, as Lord Bryce said, widely current in Machiavelli's day; and since then it has been influential both in theory and practice down to the present. Among its most distinguished military representatives it has been customary to list Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712-86) and Napoleon (1769-1821), and in more recent times Hitler and Mussolini. Among its most eminent literary representatives, Jean Bodin (1530-96) with some reservations, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) may be named. Its embodiment in Prussian militarism and later in German Nazism, Italian Fascism, and Japanese militarism has been the greatest disturbing force in the world during the past century.

In criticism of this dynamic or power theory of the state two or three fundamental considerations may be urged. One is that while power is an essential element in the conception of the state, it is not the only essential element. Equally important, if not more so, is the idea of justice. What probably gave rise to the state more than anything else was the need of a just social order. To administer justice was the primary function of the state, and it still remains such. This function, it is true, can be performed only through the exercise of force. But force is secondary; it is a means to an end. Justice comes first. Without it power could never found a state. An unjust exercise of power would be a perversion of the state's function and a certain

[16] *The Prince,* chap. xv.
[17] *Ibid.,* chap. xviii.

cause of its own disintegration. Might does not and cannot make right. The reduction of the essence of the state to power runs counter both to the facts of history and to the moral convictions of mankind.

It is maintained by strict militarists that "always and everywhere" the only adequate motive for the establishment of a state has been "interest in a common struggle with external enemies." [18] Only peril from the outside has been a sufficiently strong force to weld communities and tribes into a permanent political unity. War has been "the gory nurse that trained society to cohesiveness." There has been no unifying power comparable to it, and without it there would have been no state. Hostile powers, real or potential, are essential to the origin and maintenance of the state. Its very essence, therefore, consists in its ability to cope with foreign foes. From this it follows that there can be no universal state. Such a state would be confronted by no rival human power, and hence could come into being only in the case of a real or threatened invasion of the earth by the inhabitants of Mars or some other planet! "It is war that makes nations." [19] Hence the waging of war or at least adequate preparation for it is the primary function of the state. The administration of justice is secondary, a later by-product.

But while historically there may be some truth in this theory, while in the establishment of the state conflict with an external power may have preceded the task of righting internal wrongs, this fact is not the key to the essential nature and function of the state. The true nature of any developing object is revealed more fully by its outcome than by what it came out of. Its fruitage is more self-revealing than its rootage. And

[18] Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

[19] J. Wellhausen, *Israelitische und Jüdische Geschichte*, p. 25.

so it is with the state. Defensive or aggressive power may have been its earliest outstanding characteristic, but with the growth of civilization its attention has been directed more and more to internal problems, to the maintenance of justice and the promotion of the common welfare. The present tendency, consequently, is to see in these activities of the state its true function and the chief justification of its existence. We judge it by what it has come to be, not by what it originally was. To reverse this order, as H. Gomperz, S. R. Steinmetz, and many others would have us do, and to conceive of brute strength as the basic credential of the state would be to debase it and make of it an instrument of tyranny. Power in order to create a truly rational state must be subordinated to justice. The failure to see this is the fundamental defect in the dynamic theory under consideration.

Another criticism to be passed on this theory is that it has been closely associated with the rise of a fanatical nationalism. It has given to the European state a new and absolute authority and demanded for it a new and absolute loyalty. This loyalty has, it is true, a certain kinship to and historical connection with the loyalty required of the feudal vassal to his lord and with the loyalty required of the medieval Christian to the church. But it differs from these medieval loyalties in that it is evoked by a different kind of authority. Feudal authority was largely local and dispersed, and the authority of the church involved the claim to universality and also the absolute sanctions of religion. These two kinds of political authority were reasonably well adapted to the needs of the medieval period, but toward its close they proved inadequate to grapple with the growing complexity of European life. A reaction consequently set in, and out of it grew the new kind of authority represented by the modern state, an authority that is

geographically limited, but that claims absoluteness for itself within its own domain. Many factors, geographical, racial, psychological, cultural, political, economic, and religious, contributed to its development. But the main driving force in the complex movement was a vague mystical sense that each nation had of its own unique and transcendent worth. This new national consciousness carried with it a new patriotism and a new pride of country—sentiments that became so pervasive and in some instances so intense as to be great divisive forces in the world. Religious differences were forced into the background and to a large extent lost their political significance. A fanatical nationalism displaced religious fanaticism as a disturber of the world's peace, and religious wars gave way to national wars. This change was due in no small measure to the dynamic theory of the state and its accompanying doctrine of absolute sovereignty.

Furthermore, it may be noted that this conception of the state has in its more extreme form, as for instance in Nazism, taken on a semireligious character. It has not only deprived historical religion of its earlier political significance; it has pushed it aside as an outgrown superstition, and substituted for it a species of statolatry or its racial counterpart. The nation has taken the place of Deity, and religion has thus become a degraded form of henotheism or polytheism. It has been deprived of its rational, spiritual, and ideal character and reduced to a crude naturalism. It has been made a mere emotional accessory of power politics.

But what we are here chiefly concerned with is not the defects which we have pointed out in the dynamic theory of the state—namely its immoralism, its fanaticism, and its statolatry. Our main concern is with that aspect of the theory which contains the most direct threat of war. This is its doc-

trine of absolute sovereignty with its emphasis on "national honor" and "vital interests" as matters that cannot be arbitrated. Such a doctrine makes war virtually inevitable. Treitschke was right when in speaking from its standpoint he said: "The arbitrament of force is the logical outcome of the nature of the state. The mere fact of the existence of many states involves the necessity of war." [20] This is evident if each state is by its very nature an independent and irresponsible power.

Such a theory of the state has been and still is widely held, especially in military and political circles. But it has never won the assent of the human conscience. Indeed, the whole conception of international law is a protest against it. The very conditions of international relations imply that there must be more or less restraint in a state's exercise of its power. Despite its own deep-seated selfishness the state must to some extent recognize the rights of other states. The unsophisticated conscience of mankind assumes and demands it. It was this spontaneous demand that gave rise to international law. What the latter seeks to do is simply to extend the range of the commonly recognized rights and duties of states and to reduce them to legal and systematic form.

The development of international law will thus lead to a curtailment of the sovereignty of even the most powerful state. Only in this way can world peace be achieved. But this will not impair the true function of the state; rather will it assist in its performance. An instructive parallel to what will take place is furnished by the history of religion. Religious wars grew out of the exclusive claims of different religious organizations. These claims, it was at first thought, could be adequately asserted and defended only by the use of armed force. The

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[20] *Politics*, II, 599.

failure to employ such force would have been regarded as lack of loyalty to the true faith. The result was fanatical intolerance and sanguinary conflict between opposing creeds. This continued for several centuries until it was finally discovered that the adherents of different creeds could live peaceably together without surrendering or compromising their distinctive beliefs. Religious wars thus came to an end.

So also it will be with national wars when nations give up their claims to absolute sovereignty and recognize the rights of other nations. They will soon discover that they have surrendered no part of their essential nature or their distinctive function. Instead, they will find a fuller and richer life in cooperation with other states than they previously had in conflict with them. All they will lose will be their aggressive and fanatical spirit—something which obviously has no place in the essence of the state. Only from a perverted conception of the nature of the state can the inevitability of war be logically deduced.

The Argument from the Function of War

The third of the three main arguments in the apologetic for war differs from the other two in that it centers attention on the positive value of war instead of on its causal necessity. The first argument seeks to prove that human nature is a kind of mechanism which inevitably leads to war and will always do so. The second argument endeavors to prove the same with respect to the nature of the state. According to both, war is a fatality from which there is no permanent escape. The third argument, as commonly presented, does not reject this conclusion but supplements it by contending that war, despite its many attendant evils, performs a beneficent function in human history. It maintains that war not only *cannot* be but

ought not to be eliminated. Its recurrence from time to time is a kind of moral as well as causal necessity.

Several phases of this moral or functional argument for war may be noted and briefly considered. The first has had considerable vogue during the past three quarters of a century because of its connection with the Darwinian theory of evolution. This theory is based on two biological laws, both of which have been employed in the apologetic for war. One is the struggle for existence; the other is natural selection or the survival of the fittest. The former in its application to the problem of war emphasizes its biological necessity. This has already been discussed. The latter directs attention to the biological function of war, to the contribution it makes to the development of mankind. War, we are told, "has been the chief and leading condition of human progress," [21] and it has been such because it is nature's method of providing for the survival of the fittest.

This argument, as critics have repeatedly pointed out, is an unwarranted deduction from scientific Darwinism, a deduction that Darwin himself repudiated.[22] But even if this were not so, the only real justification of the argument would be one based on facts, not on biological speculation; and the facts are against it. The argument has no empirical warrant. War does not promote the survival of the fittest, even the physically fittest or strongest. The very reverse is the case. It is those who are physically most fit, both of the victors and of the vanquished, who are sacrificed on the battlefields. Nor is the argument rendered tenable by being restricted in its application to nations. Victory in war does not necessarily enhance

[21] L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology* (1903), p. 238.

[22] *The Descent of Man,* chaps. iii-v, xxi. Cf. Nasmyth, *op. cit.,* pp. 208-302.

a nation's fitness to survive, for achievement of victory may so exhaust a country's resources as to lead to its decline as a military power and in other respects. Then, too, military success may be due, not to a nation's own prowess, but to fortunate alliances and to the uncertain fortunes of war. This is abundantly illustrated in the history of Europe, where now one great power and now another has acquired military hegemony. In no case has this hegemony been permanent, and in no instance can it be said to have made a significant contribution to human progress. Indeed, the acquisition of superior military power by one state has often been a peril to European freedom and civilization. Mommsen, the German historian, in the latter part of the past century issued this warning to his own countrymen: "Have a care lest in this country, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military State should remain." [23] How truly prophetic this warning was, we all now know. The saddest thing that has occurred in the world in the present century has been the moral and intellectual deterioration of the German people. War and the warlike spirit have done incalculable injury to this great nation and through it to the entire world.

True progress is primarily an intellectual and moral affair. War as a protection against barbarism has no doubt contributed more or less to it. It has also encouraged inventiveness along various lines. But to say with the early Greek philosopher Heraclitus that it "is the father of all things" is to glorify it far beyond its deserts. On the whole war has destroyed enormously more than it has created. It has in its origin been the

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[23] Quoted by G. D. Hicks in *Hibbert Journal,* October, 1914, p. 97.

ally of injustice far more frequently than of justice. And in so far as it finds its justification in the ruthlessness of nature it is a barrier to social reform and to human progress. "Social Darwinism" is a reactionary doctrine. Civilization is not promoted by the deification of power.

Another phase of what is claimed to be the beneficent function of war is its moral and cultural values. These values are chiefly two: the cultivation of courage and self-sacrifice, and the increased prosperity of the nation with its enlarged opportunitities for individual self-development.

The first of these has received the major emphasis. It is claimed that without occasional wars nations degenerate. They lose their virility, their readiness to endure hardship, their courage and daring in the face of danger. They lose the spirit of adventure, of enterprise, of energetic endeavor, and of progress. They become backward peoples, weak, timid, and uninspiring. Their individual members lose the spirit of heroic self-sacrifice and become selfish and materialistic. No great passion fires them. They live on a low spiritual level, seeking above all things their own security, comfort, and pleasure. This, it is said, is the inevitable tendency of a long period of peace. "The actual abolition of war would be the first symptom of [national] death." [24] The ideal of perpetual peace is, therefore, to be condemned as "not only impossible, but immoral as well." Against it the human spirit in its higher reaches eventually revolts. War results and by reviving the spirit of courage and self-sacrifice becomes a redemptive agency in the life of the nation.

It is further urged that war generates the sacrificial or social spirit not only by its direct impact on the individual but also

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[24] Steinmetz, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

indirectly through its creation of the state. "Life in the state," it is said, "brings with it the highest renunciation of egoism possible to man, and that not for a moment, but permanently, without cessation, the whole life long." [25] No voluntary union is in this respect comparable to it. Such a union, so far as the individual's emancipation from his egoism is concerned, sustains the same relation to the state as concubinage does to marriage. The latter evokes a depth and permanence of devotion that the former lacks. And so it is with the state in its relation to all merely voluntary unions. Its authority and discipline embrace the whole of life, and in war reach their climax. War is human life at its uttermost; and because it is such, it has a unique and indispensable moral worth—a moral worth that through the agency of the state diffuses itself over life as a whole.

That there is some truth in the foregoing contentions regarding the beneficent function of war can hardly be denied. War has not actually been wholly evil; it has been a very considerable source of national and personal inspiration. This is implied from the pacifist standpoint in the saying that we need a "moral equivalent for war." [26] In this expression it is conceded that war has served and still serves an important moral function, and that if or when it disappears from human life, some moral substitute will be needed.

But morally inspiring as war in some respects has been and still is, men very generally regard it as a great evil. Like a pestilence it may evoke sublime acts of courage and self-sacrifice, but this does not transform it into a moral necessity any more than it does a pestilence. Anyone who should deliberately provoke a war for its moral or disciplinary value would

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[26] W. James, *Memories and Studies* (1911), pp. 267-96.

merit the condemnation of mankind as fully as would anyone who should deliberately cause a pestilence for the same reason. Indeed, the guilty person in either case would be justly viewed as a human monster.

What gives to war its evil character is not only the suffering and death it causes both on the battlefield and on the home front. This is unspeakably great in our modern global wars. But it is not the most serious indictment to be brought against war. More serious is its deteriorating effect on moral character. It does, as we have admitted, inspire certain virtues, but this is far more than offset by the vices and lower moral standards that it encourages. Brutality, animalism, impurity, deception, hate—these are almost invariable attendants of war. And what is fundamentally worse is the cheapening of human life. Wholesale slaughter on the battlefield and elsewhere cannot but have a disintegrating effect on the profound Christian and moral belief in the sanctity of personality. War, whatever inspirational value it may have, strikes directly at the Christian moral ideal. It has no place in an ideal moral order, and the moral forces of mankind must work for its ultimate elimination. Even war itself is morally justifiable only in so far as it contributes to this end. For every "just" or purely defensive war implies a condemnation of aggressive war and the war system, and in this sense is a war to end war.

The second alleged value of war—in this case successful war—is the material benefits derived from it and the consequent enrichment of the total life of the nation. As illustrations one might cite the victories of Prussia over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1871), and the victories of Japan over China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-5). Many other instances might be drawn from the more distant past. War has often made important contributions to the na-

tional wealth and prestige. But in recent years conditions have so changed that wars in general have ceased to be profitable enterprises. They have become so enormously expensive and in the case of the great powers so vast in their scope and so destructive of life and property that it would seem no sane people would again make war a part of its national policy. War on its present mondial, or global, scale can only be a terrible calamity to the victors as well as the vanquished. The two World Wars have taught this lesson so clearly that one would think it would never be forgotten. The idea that war can in our day be made the road to prosperity and national glory is, as Norman Angell termed it, a great illusion—one with which no great people ought again to become obsessed.[27]

The most distinguished philosopher in the modern world who may be classed as an apologist for war was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). His views were akin to those embodied in the general argument we are at present considering and also to those contained in the preceding argument based on the nature of the state. But they have some distinctive features that may be noted.

Hegel conceived of the state as "the realized ethical idea or ethical spirit" and as "its own motive and absolute end." "This end," he said, "has the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state." [28] The state is realized in history. But "world-history is not a court of judgment, whose principle is force, nor is it the abstract and irrational necessity of a blind fate. It is self-caused and self-realized reason." [29] "Often it is imagined that

[27] See J. Novicow, *War and Its Alleged Benefits* (1911).
[28] *The Philosophy of Right*, tr. S. W. Dyde, p. 240.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

force holds the state together, but the binding cord is nothing else than the deep-seated feeling of order, which is possessed by all." [30] In other words it is the rationality of the state that constitutes its essential nature. In taking this position Hegel rejected the naturalistic conception of the state as power, but he retained the idea of its absolute sovereignty.

From the latter idea he deduced the necessity of war. "When the particular wills of states," he says, "can come to no agreement, the controversy can be settled only by war." [31] This conclusion follows necessarily from the fact that "as against the state there is no power to decide what is intrinsically right and to realize the decision." [32] The existence of such a power would nullify the sovereign independence of the state and destroy its essential nature. Hegel consequently concluded that war was inevitable.

He also found a basis for this belief in the individuality of the state. This individuality is God-given, and to develop it is the state's paramount duty—a duty which is not necessarily limited in the case of a great nation by the so-called natural rights of other peoples. Such a nation as the best representative of the world spirit at the time may be justified in embarking on wars of conquest. There is nothing in the divine providence to exclude such a possibility. Rather is it what we should expect in the light of history. "The state is the march of God in the world," [33] and as such it transcends the ordinary rules of morality and justifies itself. War has thus a permissible place in the divine ethic of the state, and is virtually cer-

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 256.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 336.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

tain to recur from time to time as one great nation after another seeks to develop its own individuality under the complex and conflicting conditions of human life.

So far as the salutary effects of war are concerned, Hegel accepted the common militaristic view. "Just as the movement of the ocean," he says, "prevents the corruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace." [34] "As a result of war peoples are strengthened, nations, which are involved in civil quarrels, winning repose at home by means of war abroad." [35] Hegel also emphasizes, as others do, the virtues of bravery and self-sacrifice nurtured by war; but in doing so he idealizes them. True bravery, he says, is not personal fearlessness. It is the readiness to offer oneself up in the service of the state. Its content "as a sentiment is found in the true absolute final end, the sovereignty of the state. Bravery realizes this end, and in so doing gives up personal reality." [36] In this connection Hegel dwells on the way in which war strengthens the religious consciousness of the uncertainty, vanity, and instability of temporal things. Hussars and sabers, he tells us, discourse more impressively than preachers on this phase of human life and thus impart to finite beings a realization of their true place in the world.

These observations by Hegel and his general philosophy of history and of the state tend to idealize war; and in this respect they exercised a considerable influence on political and military leaders in Germany. Their influence in the Anglo-Saxon world was much less marked, but in general it may be

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 331.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 332.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

said that they tended to give added intellectual respectability to the apologetic for war.

There is still another aspect of the functional or pragmatic argument for war that calls for consideration. It is maintained that under certain conditions the waging of war is a moral right which the human conscience will never surrender; and not only is it a moral right; it is also a moral duty. Law cannot take the place of conscience, nor can it exercise dominion over it. Laws are not infrequently unjust and at times so oppressive that armed revolt against them seems necessary in the interest of humanity. "To no law of man shall men concede authority to make them do what conscience says is wrong." [37] This is true of civil laws and would be equally true of international laws. There are, therefore, almost certain to be disputes between nations that are not and ought not to be arbitrable. "External conditions of offense amenable to settlement only by force have not changed," [38] nor will they change for an indefinite time to come. This is the reason why in the arbitration treaties of the past few generations disputes involving "national honor and vital interests" were generally excluded from consideration. The words "honor" and "vital interests," it was conceded, were not perhaps happily chosen. They are vague and variously interpreted. But when rightly understood they stand for the conscience of the state. What the state regards as its fundamental right and duty it will not arbitrate. It will not abdicate the right to go to war when the cause of justice and of conscience is at stake.

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[37] A. T. Mahan, *Some Neglected Aspects of War*, p. xv.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

The fighting spirit in man thus serves a beneficent as well as an evil purpose. It is often the result of selfishness, greed, suspicion, and unholy ambition. But it is also rooted in courage, loyalty, patriotism, and hatred of injustice. If it were not for man's readiness to fight for the right, the world would be in far worse condition than it is. Without resistance to evil, society would not progress, nor could justice be established. The door must not, therefore, be completely closed to war.

In this line of thought there is theoretically a measure of truth. The right to resist grave injustice with arms, if necessary, cannot be denied men. But a distinction needs here to be drawn between moral and legal right. Self-defense against unwarranted attack is commonly regarded as both a moral and legal right. But armed resistance to constituted authority, viewed as evil, is a different thing. No state can accord to any of its citizens under any circumstances the legal right to overthrow by violence the legally established order of society. For it to do so would be to surrender its distinctive function. As an organized government its primary duty is to preserve order and prevent rebellion within its borders. The legal right to armed revolt cannot be granted by the state no matter what the provocation may be. In a word it cannot give legal standing to the initiation of civil war under any conditions. And for the same reason no effective international security organization could make legal provision for the armed revolt of any of its member states against its authority. It must in the nature of the case outlaw all aggressive international war. Yet it is conceivable that conditions might become so evil both within a state and in international relations that the common conscience would justify armed attempts to correct them. In that case there would be a moral, though not legal, right to initiate civil or international war. This possibility cannot be wholly

excluded, but with the growth and extension of enlightened national and international government such a situation would very seldom, if ever, arise. In any case there is certainly in its abstract possibility no adequate basis for the belief in the inevitability of war as the world has hitherto known it.

Our conclusion, then, is that the traditional apologetic for war has failed to make out its case. There is nothing in human nature or in the nature of the state that makes war inevitable. There is also nothing in the nature of war that makes it indispensable from either a biological or an ethical standpoint. The rational argument for its necessity breaks down under critical analysis. Yet the belief in its essential validity still persists, especially in military and so-called "realistic" circles. The reason would seem to be that people in these circles take what William James terms "a highly mystical view of their subject." Their standard of judgment is not reason and conscience, but a vague something that transcends or defies them both. They are intoxicated with the idea of power. They talk about the fixed order of nature, the verdict of history, national honor, vital interests, and the absolute sovereignty of the state, as though these were ultimate and self-evident justifications of war. But why they should be so regarded, why they should be given precedence over the humane instincts of men, the maxims of civilized society, the noblest dictates of the moral nature, and the transparent demands of reason, is not made clear. Emotion is given the right of way, and a mystical nationalism takes the place of clear thought. Despite its parade of material gathered from the biological, sociological, political, and ethical sciences the apologetic for war is at bottom a phase of philosophical irrationalism. It is a surrender to the tyranny of the past, a passionate devotion to a fading ideal, and a blind faith in mere power arrayed against a rational and moral phi-

losophy of the state and of human life. The latter type of philosophy and the accompanying bankruptcy of naturalistic militarism do not, it is true, guarantee the ultimate end of war, but they do create a presumption in favor of it, and thus tend to dispel the widespread skepticism which has been and still is the fundamental barrier to the peace movement.

CHAPTER II

MODERN CAUSES OF WAR

IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER WE OUTLINED AND DISCUSSED the philosophy of war in so far as it seeks to justify the belief that war is inevitable, that it cannot be and ought not to be abolished. The main arguments in support of this belief were examined and found invalid or at least inconclusive.

In the present chapter we approach the problem of war from a different point of view. We inquire into its chief causes. These causes are not wholly unrelated to the apologetic for war. They may be said to presuppose it, and one might even be tempted to include it among the more important causes of war. For if war were not believed to be justified and more than justified, nations would not fight. Without such faith there would be no war. Yet it is obvious that serious wars have not resulted from the mere justification or even glorification of war in general. They have for the most part been due to intense feeling generated by conflicts of interest between independent states or rival factions within a state. It is passion, not the defense of war as an institution, that leads to armed conflict. Nevertheless, the apologetic for war has had considerable influence. It has given to the warlike spirit a theoretical right of way which has led peoples to drift or plunge into war when a less acquiescent or fatalistic attitude toward the war system might have enabled them to avert it. Indirectly the militaristic philosophy of war has thus been an influential factor in perpetuating international strife. But it is not on that account to be rated as a direct cause of war.

By the causes of war we have in mind something more concrete and dynamic.

We also distinguish the causes of war from its "occasions." By the latter we mean such minor incidents as the alteration of the Ems telegram by Bismarck, the blowing up of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana, and the assassination of the Austrian archduke in Sarajevo. These incidents in and of themselves constituted no adequate ground for war and would never have been so treated if the nations involved had been peacefully minded toward each other. The real cause of war in each of these instances was a long growing tension between the nations concerned. The incidents mentioned were simply sparks that ignited the powder kegs of pent-up national feeling; they did not really cause the wars which they occasioned. These wars would probably eventually have broken out even if their immediate historical "occasions" had not occurred. Their true causes are to be found in the deeper currents of national life.

These deeper currents have through the centuries and millenniums of human history had their source in the basic impulses or experiences of hatred, fear, greed, ambition, and frustration, stirred to warlike intensity by objective conditions that have varied more or less from age to age. The major external causes of war in our day, for instance, differ in some important respects from those of earlier times. Religious differences are no longer the causes of wars as they once were, and this is also true of conflicting dynastic claims. These factors still have their influence in political and international affairs, but wars that may properly be called religious or dynastic are now virtually things of the past. The chief sources of conflict at present both within the state and in its foreign relations are economic or distinctly political in character.

This, however, does not mean that modern wars are more materialistic than those of the past. The fact is that wars generally are rooted in idealism. Materialistic motives, to be sure, are operative to some extent in them all. But they are by no means the exclusive or necessarily dominant causes of war, as is often assumed. Winston Churchill, before Italy entered the war on the side of the Axis powers, wrote an article in which he confidently predicted that she would join the Allies, because, as he sought to show, it would be to her interest to do so. "Interest," he said, "never lies." But in the purely materialistic or mechanical sense of the term it did lie in that case. The will of one man and visions of imperial glory decided the issue by blinding the nation to its real interests. This has often occurred. Indeed, the chief dynamic in war has usually come from the ideal. It is characteristic of man, in so far as he has risen above the animal plane and is truly human, that he does not desire things or pleasures simply for their own sake. He does not desire things because they please him. It would be nearer the truth to say that they please him because he desires them. That is, they fit into his ideal of life, they satisfy his self-consciousness, and because they do so he desires them. The pleasures they give him are as truly effects as causes of his desires.

Desire, in other words, involves an ideal element. It is not simply a response to passive pleasure or to objective stimulation. It is itself to some extent creative of its own object. For instance, what a man most desires is not external things but the feeling of his own worth as a person among persons. It is the ideal of personal worth that is the real object of his desire, and out of this ideal element in human desire grows the paradoxical fact that man "does not think life worth living if

there is not something for which he is ready to lose his life." [1] At times man is represented as purely and wholly a selfish being. But this is a libel on human nature. Man is so constituted that the self tends to rise above itself. History on its higher levels everywhere gives evidence of this fact. There is something in life so sacred that we ought, if necessary, to be willing to sacrifice our lives for it.

This is a fact of profound significance for the understanding of war, and one that needs to be emphasized as a corrective of the current economic and biological theories of war, even at the risk of seeming to exaggerate its importance. Whatever may have been true of early private and tribal wars, war in the modern world is not purely materialistic or purely barbaric in its motive. It is actuated by self-sacrificing devotion to an ideal. This devotion may with many be a blind impulse leading them astray. It has often been such in the past. But it has also been a powerful influence for good. Indeed, it is essential to true progress, for nothing great and good can be achieved without it. It is this devotion that rightly or wrongly lies at the root of and inspires war. War presupposes an ideal good for which we ought to be ready to die, and for which we ought also to be willing to kill. Killing and dying in war both grow out of faith in a transcendent good. Without such an assumed good, war on a large scale would hardly be possible.

In line with this fact is the view, not infrequently expressed, that war could not be initiated and effectively prosecuted without religious sanction. Religion, it is said, supplies the dynamic for war. If it were, therefore, completely separated from war, the war system would be seriously crippled. In this there is no doubt a large element of truth, if by

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[1] Élie Halévy, *The World Crisis of 1914-18*, p. 57.

religion is meant sacrificial devotion to an ideal. But religion in this sense of the term is obviously something far deeper and more universal than organized or official religion, and is only to a very limited extent subject to ecclesiastical control. The idea that anything particularly important would be accomplished by mere formal pronouncements on the part of the churches against the war system is superficial. So long as the individual church members support war and sacrifice themselves for it, they maintain as firmly as ever the linkage between war and real religion. And under these conditions it is obvious that official affirmations of the complete dissociation of the church from war in general or from any particular war can have but little significance within the church or outside of it. To many they seem to strike a note of unreality, if not of insincerity. And some look upon them as hardly more than an expression of ecclesiastical etiquette. But however mistaken these interpretations may be, the true function of the church is manifestly something deeper than what is revealed in these abstract and negative pronouncements. Its real task is to direct the idealistic urge of men and of nations away from war and into the channels of peace. When this is effectively done, war will lose its chief dynamic and gradually cease to be. It will be displaced by a new humanitarian passion.

We have distinguished and rightly between a formal apologetic for war and the direct causes of war. But the distinction is not a hard and fast one. The theoretical defense of war may be utilized to promote the war spirit, and the causes of war may be expounded and interpreted in such a way as to justify the belief in the necessity and value of war. The apologetic for war and the study of its causes thus overlap each other. Both have a place in the philosophy of war in the broader sense of the term.

In discussing the causes of war I shall limit myself to comparatively recent times and to those causes of international friction that seem to me most serious from the standpoint of the world as a whole. In his manual on *The Causes of War and the New Evolution* (1927) T. A. Turner has listed forty-one causes of war in the modern era, and to this list others might no doubt be added.[2] Such a catalogue has a historical interest, but with most people it is likely to be more or less confusing because of its complexity. The international situation, it is true, is complex—extremely so; but there are some phases of it that are far more significant than others in their bearing on the problem of war, and it is with these that we shall here deal.

As to what these more or most significant and threatening aspects of the world situation are, there is naturally considerable difference of opinion. But most serious students of the subject would probably include in their list the following four which I have selected for special consideration: nationalism, imperialism, the assumption of race superiority, and overpopulation. These are all widespread and divisive factors in the modern world and at present hot spots of international interest. Indeed, they are so pervasive and deeply rooted that to many they seem to lead necessarily to war. In the preceding chapter we have argued that war is not necessitated by its disciplinary value nor by human nature nor by the nature of the state. But it might conceivably be rendered virtually inevitable by the political or economic organization and structure of modern society, by racial inequalities, or by the natural fertility of the race. These topics, consequently, stand in a

[2] For an exhaustive analysis of war and its causes in the light of its history see Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (1942), 2 vols. See also his lectures *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace* (1935).

close relation to those discussed in Chapter I. They involve the same basic question as to the necessity of war. But they are not directly concerned with this problem, and hence in discussing them in the present chapter this question will remain in the background. We shall here assume the theoretical possibility of avoiding war, and devote our attention for the most part to a description or exposition and appraisal of the above factors in the modern world in so far as they make for war and need to be kept in check or eliminated or modified if war is eventually to be averted.

Nationalism

Nationalism in its broader meaning has been defined as "the attitude which ascribes to national individuality a high place in the hierarchy of values." [3] In its narrower meaning it denotes the tendency to emphasize unduly the political character of the nation and to affirm its supreme value. In the latter sense of the term nationalism is a modern development. The feeling of nationality was strong among the ancient Jews and Greeks, but it was racial and cultural in character rather than political. The ideal of a nation-state is distinctively modern. Its beginnings may be traced back to the breakup of medieval feudalism, to the Reformation and the weakened political authority of the church, and to the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire. As a result of these revolutionary social, political, and religious changes the universalism of the Middle Ages lost its grip on the imagination of the European peoples. Independent nations began to be formed, with the great territorial national states, France, Great Britain, and Spain, leading the way. These states or nations, as individual

[3] M. H. Boehm in *Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, XI, 231.

and independent units, supplanted the earlier ideal of a universal empire, and each claimed for itself sovereign power within its own borders. This development in Europe as a whole, however, was slow, and not until the latter part of the eighteenth century did nationalism become a self-conscious and dynamic movement.[4] At that time Rousseau and Herder, the American and French Revolutions, and a little later the Spanish and Prussian uprisings contributed powerfully to its growth. The movement gained steadily in strength throughout the nineteenth century, swinging the governments of Japan, Germany, Italy, and many smaller nations into its orbit. And in the twentieth century its contagious influence has been extended virtually to the ends of the earth. Wendell Willkie on his return from a trip around the world in 1942 declared that he found in Russia, China, and everywhere "a growing spirit of fervid nationalism." [5] This is also the testimony of missionaries and travelers generally.

In seeking to understand this extraordinary phenomenon of the modern world it may be well to study a little further its relation to its historical antecedents, especially the feudal system and the medieval church. Feudalism was a loose-jointed system based on the relation of vassal and lord to each other and on what may be called private law. It was adapted to a primitive state of society and failed to meet the more complex social and economic needs of a later day. Under the feudal regime the baron was the central agent in the administration of justice. This, however, in the course of time proved an inadequate and otherwise unsatisfactory arrange-

[4] Cf. J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History* (1916); Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (1944), "an attempt at what is perhaps the first detailed history of nationalism in any language." P. x.

[5] *One World*, p. 22.

ment, and gradually a new professional class arose into whose hands the judiciary passed. Public law thus took the place of private law. Then, too, the increasing complexity of social and economic conditions led necessarily to a greater centralization of government. In this way the European system of independent states took its rise. It was the natural and inevitable result of the evolution and differentiation of European society.

Along with this development of independent nation-states there went a growing assertion on their part of the right of self-determination as over against papal interference in their affairs. This spirit of independence tended to consolidate national sentiment and to unify the various national governments. Much of the later medieval history revolved about the struggle between the church and the developing nation-states. The latter gradually gained the ascendancy. The national consciousness overshadowed the ecclesiastical, and the national state became dominant in its own domain. To this movement Protestantism made important contributions. Indeed, it was one of the most influential factors in its development, and is itself often described and at times stigmatized as a nationalist movement.

The decay of feudalism and the waning political power of the papacy thus prepared the way for the rise of nationalism. The nation-states were, to begin with, an experiment in more efficient government and in complete self-determination. The experiment was a relative success, but many factors besides the purely political contributed to it. The development of nationalism was a complex process involving economic, social, cultural, intellectual, religious, and other elements. Two or three general aspects of the movement may be noted.

For one thing nationalism was a strengthened expression of

tribal feeling. This feeling is mystical in nature as is that of family relationship, and like the latter it may be narrow and selfish. However, it may also be spiritualized into a sense of mission and thus have an elevating influence upon the nation as a whole. This is more likely to take place in large than in small social units. A nation as distinct from a tribe tends to broaden the outlook of its people and to give them an enlarged sense of responsibility. It is itself a great moral school. Citizenship in it is a spiritual asset to all who have eyes to see and ears to hear. It expands and enriches life and yet cements it into a firmer unity. Nationalism thus marks a moral advance. It sublimates tribal feeling and by so doing makes it a more constructive factor in human life.

Another characteristic of the early national states was the new sense of security which they brought with them. There are two basic fears that confront organized society: one is the fear of crime and anarchy within its borders, and the other is the fear of aggression from without. These fears are not unreasonable, and a strong centralized government such as that of the modern state seems best qualified to allay them. It was probably this fact more than any other that gave rise to European nationalism and stimulated its development.

Another significant feature of modern nationalism is its tendency to become religious or at least semireligious in character. This is something different from tribal feeling. It is not a spontaneous and unpremeditated attitude of reverence for or mystical union with the nation as a whole. The state is a more or less artificial creation, and so also is the religious attitude toward it. This attitude is generated by formal instructions, by appeals to patriotism, by the glorification of the nation's past, by visions of its future grandeur, and by the numerous techniques of mass psychology. Mythology, fiction,

and fanaticism play their part. The result is the transformation of the nation not only into an external Providence but also into a semispiritual entity to which the individual ought to be ready to sacrifice all that he has and all that he is. This deification or semideification of the state has been gaining ground during the past century and a half. Back in the eighteenth century G. E. Lessing (1729-81) expressed the feeling of many intellectuals when he said, "I have no conception of the love of country, and it seems to me at best a heroic feeling, which I am well content to be without." [6] Such an attitude would today seem almost sacrilegious, for in virtually all civilized lands love of country now ranks high in the list of virtues—if not at the very top. It is regarded as a sacred duty and calls for the highest degree of sacrifice from the individual if the country's need requires it. This fact is of immense significance to the state. It contributes greatly to its strength, and within proper limits is an essential factor in the development and maintenance of a high type of civilization. Both the individual and the nation need the inspiration of true patriotism, for without it neither could acquire the strength of character required for the performance of his or its full duty in the world.

From this general point of view nationalism may be said to be a natural development. It is grounded in a normal tribal feeling, in a normal need of personal and communal security, and in a normal sense of obligation to one's own country and people. Its appearance in modern European history was not abnormal or unnatural. The causes of its rise are fairly clear. But it is not a "natural" phenomenon in the sense that it is a necessary result of the operation of natural laws or in the

[6] Quoted by Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

sense that it is absolute, inherent in the nature of things, and essential to a mature political structure. At least it is not such in its distinctive modern form, in its demand that supreme loyalty be accorded the state. In this respect it may be said to be a historical "accident," which in the course of time may be discarded. Its origin and growth were due to special causes, and under altered circumstances other causes may bring about its decline.

Nationalism in its present form cannot, therefore, claim a permanent place for itself in human society on the ground that it is natural to man. It is not a mere extension of natural tribal feeling. It is rather, as C. J. H. Hayes puts it, "a more or less purposeful effort to revive primitive tribalism on an enlarged and more artificial scale." [7] Conscious and deliberate purpose and planning have played an essential part in its formation. In other words, it is largely man-made. And what man has made, he can unmake. This is a very important truth to bear in mind in this day when nationalism is weaving its magic spell over the peoples of the earth.

Thus far we have dealt with modern nationalism as though it were a single and uniform movement. And as compared with earlier forms of nationalism it has exhibited a warmth of feeling and degree of loyalty to the state that may be regarded as distinctive of the movement as a whole. But within this common framework there have been significant differences. Hayes [8] distinguishes five different kinds of modern nationalism. The first and for some time only kind was "humanitarian nationalism," a nationalism that was devoid of jingoism and intolerance, considerate of the rights of other nationalities, and concerned for the welfare of the whole hu-

[7] *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism,* p. 12.
[8] *Ibid.,* chaps. ii-vi.

man race. It was represented by such men as Bolingbroke (1678-1751), Rousseau (1712-78), and Herder (1744-1803). These three men differed to some extent from each other—Bolingbroke was aristocratic in his sympathies, Rousseau democratic, and Herder was primarily cultural rather than political in his interests. But they were all agreed in their pronounced national feeling.

The second type of modern nationalism was represented by the Jacobin Club, which was in political ascendancy in France from 1791 to 1794, and from this fact has come to be known as Jacobin nationalism. It was theoretically based on the humanitarian democratic nationalism of Rousseau and took as its motto "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." But in practice it carried its theories to such fanatical and revolutionary extremes that it was confronted with domestic rebellion and foreign wars. As a result its nationalism lost its humanitarian character. It became intolerant in its attitude both at home and abroad, appealed to military force to attain its ends, and thus paved the way for a despotic empire. Its tendency was to make the state absolutely paramount in human affairs.

The third form of modern nationalism is characterized as "traditional." It was represented by such men as Edmund Burke (1729-97), Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), and Vicomte de Bonald (1754-1840). It continued the aristocratic trend in Bolingbroke's humanitarian nationalism, but it took on a more clearly defined and aggressive character by way of opposition to Jacobinism. It laid primary stress on history and tradition. It stood strongly for orderly government, but it rejected the absolute sovereignty of the state. It held to what we would call "political pluralism," according independent rights to other loyalties besides that due the national state. It

was international in spirit and in its later period favored a European federation of states.

The fourth kind of modern nationalism, which also had its origin in the eighteenth century, is called "liberal nationalism." It occupied a position midway between Jacobin and traditional nationalism. Its chief representative in England was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder of philosophical utilitarianism. In accordance with the principles of this philosophy liberal nationalism tended to ignore natural rights emphasized by Rousseau and historic rights emphasized by traditional nationalists. In its conception of government it laid stress on utility, on the greatest good of the greatest number, and, consequently, on individualism and democracy. Bentham's theory was that enlightened self-interest is the basic principle of ethics and that in practice it promotes the greatest happiness of others. This principle he applied also to international relations. It was he, by the way, who coined the word "international." He was himself a nationalist and believed that each nation should be guided by enlightened self-interest, but he also believed that such a policy would promote the welfare of other nations. He thus combined a pronounced internationalism with nationalism. Indeed, he worked out a "Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace," which attracted wide attention. This union of national and international interests was also characteristic of later liberal nationalists such as Guizot (1787-1874) in France, and Mazzini (1805-72) in Italy.

The fifth and last type of modern nationalism, according to Hayes, is what he, following Charles Maurras, calls "integral nationalism," but what we would call "totalitarian nationalism." This form of nationalism had its precursors among the Jacobins and also among the German idealists. Of the latter

there were two in particular, J. G. Fichte and G. W. F. Hegel, who contributed to the development of the nationalistic and militaristic spirit in Germany. Fichte (1762-1814), who was eight years older than Hegel, may be said to have been the prophet of the new movement, and Hegel its philosopher.

As we have already considered Hegel's theory of the state and of war, we shall here confine ourselves to Fichte. He stands out in European history as the prophetic champion of the Prussian uprising against Napoleon. His *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808) is one of the classics of German nationalism. How much influence these addresses had at the time of their delivery and during the years immediately following is a question on which scholars are not agreed. The traditional view is that they were "a powerful factor in the creation of that national spirit which appeared for the first time in the War of Liberation of 1813-1815." [9] At present, however, the tendency seems to be to discredit this view and to treat it as "wholly legendary." [10] Not until after 1840, and especially after the centenary of 1862, it is said, did Fichte come to be regarded as chiefly "a national hero and prophet." [11] From that time on his *Addresses* became more and more "the political book of devotion of the Germans," as his son called them in the new editions he edited in 1859 and 1870. In them Pan-Germanism found a source of inspiration as did also National Socialism later.

It was, however, only by fixing attention on certain special aspects of Fichte's political teaching and overlooking others that the extreme nationalists in Germany were able to utilize him for their purposes. Actually he was a liberal, a republican,

[9] Introduction to Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*, p. xix.
[10] H. C. Engelbrecht, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte* (1933), p. 132.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

a cosmopolitan, a socialist, and an advocate of a league of nations to insure permanent peace. But these facts were conveniently forgotten, and those emphasized were such things as his fervid patriotism, his glorification of the German nation, and his advocacy of German unity. These and other kindred features of the *Addresses* were originally calculated to arouse the nation to resistance against the foreign invader of that time. But they also, when detached from their immediate background, admitted of being used as the basis for and stimulant to such an aggressive type of nationalism as later developed under the German Empire.

Fichte, for instance, in his patriotic fervor virtually deified the nation. "The natural impulse of man," he said, "is to find heaven on earth, and to endow his daily work on earth with permanence and eternity." But this can be achieved only through "the promise of a life on earth extending beyond the period of life here on earth." It is this promise that alone "can inspire men even unto death for the fatherland." And the promise is itself made possible only through the "eternal continuance" of the nation. The fatherland is thus the "support and guarantee of eternity on earth," and as such it has "infinite value." It is "the vesture of eternity, for which the noble minded man joyfully sacrifices himself."[12] It is life's chief good and supreme authority. In ascribing these high predicates to the nation Fichte had in mind ideal rather than real Germany, but this distinction between ideal and real was overlooked by the later secularized nationalism, as was also his moral passion. Attention, instead, was focused on the fact that Fichte was an admirer of Machiavelli, that he accepted his dynamic or power theory of the state, that he in-

[12] *Addresses to the German Nation,* pp. 132, 138, 141, 155.

sisted on its absolute sovereignty, and that he assented to the view that self-preservation is still the supreme law in foreign relations. In this way his idealism, like that of Hegel but with less justice, came to be linked with totalitarian nationalism as one of its chief historical sources. Only to a limited extent is this linkage justified.

Totalitarian nationalism had a closer connection with the spirit of the Jacobin movement. It may indeed be described as a revival of the worst traits of Jacobin nationalism. These traits, however, were carried to such an extreme by its exponents in the Axis powers and woven together by them into such a systematic and dynamic whole as the world had hardly seen before. Aggression abroad, tyranny at home, boasted reliance on brute force, fanaticism, and statolatry were its conspicuous characteristics.

Of the five different kinds of modern nationalism that we have passed in review it may be noted that three were international in spirit, recognizing no necessary conflict between national interests and the interests of the individual and of humanity. These three were humanitarian, traditional, and liberal nationalism. The other two, Jacobin and totalitarian nationalism, took the opposite view and transformed nationalism into an enemy of individual liberty and of international peace.

In discussing the foregoing types of nationalism we have thus far assumed that despite their differences they held essentially the same conception of the nation. But as a matter of fact there is at this point a significant difference between the nationalism of the present century and that of most of the nineteenth century.

Three partly overlapping periods in the history of European nationalism have been distinguished by E. H. Carr in his

suggestive book *Nationalism and After* (1945). The first preceded what we have called modern nationalism. During this period the nation was identified with the person of the sovereign or with the aristocracy. This period extended down to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Rousseau broke sharply with its conception of the nation by boldly identifying "nation" and "people." He thus inaugurated the second period and became the founder of modern nationalism. By "people," however, he did not mean what we do by "the common people" or "the masses." He limited the term to the middle classes, as did virtually all the political writers of his time. This was also the sense in which it was commonly understood in political circles for a century or more. The franchise was extended from time to time to include wider social areas, but the *bourgeoisie* remained the ruling power. They were the "people" in the political sense of the term and so the "nation." The workers, as Marx and Engels put it, had no fatherland.

During this second period nationalism was in principle democratized. Emphasis was placed on the rights of man, on individualism and freedom, and also on the rights of property. The older "mercantilism" with its strict governmental control of trade was renounced, and the effort was made to divorce economics from politics. National feeling at the same time grew in strength, but a remarkable balance was maintained between it and internationalism, largely through the influence of the British Empire. The result was a long period of comparative freedom from large-scale wars.

Toward the close of the past century this period began to show signs of coming to an end, and the third period came into view. Nationalism now entered upon an abnormal growth which upset the preceding balance in international relations.

The nation was expanded to include the entire populace; new social strata were incorporated in its effective membership; mass democracy took the place of middle-class democracy; political interest in economic matters was renewed. The nation was gradually socialized; and socialism, which had begun as a harbinger of world peace, gradually lost its international fervor and became nationalized.

To begin with, socialism was an ideal—and an untested ideal. It was strongly international in its spirit and yet an ardent advocate of a planned economy with no apparent consciousness of any conflict between them. It was "firmly riveted to the abolition of inequality, of oppression, and of nationalism." But when this ideal came to be translated into reality, when it was brought face to face with war and with political responsibility, its internationalism to a large extent faded away, and socialism became "a thing which [idealistic] socialists would never be prepared to own." [13] The failure to recognize this distinction between socialism as an ideal and socialism as a political reality and the failure to take into account the transformation which the former has undergone in becoming the latter have led to much confusion and misunderstanding. The fact is that socialism has won its political successes chiefly through its emphasis on a planned economy, and such an economy under existing conditions of international trade almost necessarily becomes nationalistic. Within limits it may be said that the more socialistic the present divided world is, the more nationalistic does it become.

Nationalism and socialism thus joined hands, giving rise after 1914 to "the most powerful combination yet achieved—the modern socialized nation." [14] Great totalitarian states now

[13] F. Borkenau, *Socialism, National or International* (1942), p. 95.
[14] Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

emerged which felt themselves strong enough to defy international conventions. They each exhibited a rugged individualism far more threatening to world peace than the rugged individualism of private enterprise ever was. The result was two world wars in a single generation.

What to do with this latest phase of nationalism, how to curb its aggressive and unscrupulous power and re-establish a satisfactory balance between nationalism and internationalism, is now the most serious political problem facing mankind. In solving this problem the mere military defeat of the totalitarian nations will not suffice. The forces that produced totalitarian nationalism will eventually revive it unless some way is found of fitting the rebellious nations into an international order and making them voluntary and useful members of it.

Nationalism itself, it is obvious, cannot be and ought not to be eliminated. In its humanitarian and liberal forms it has for the most part exercised a wholesome international influence. No doubt here and there it has inspired revolutions, secessions, and wars, but this has been in the interest of a more just and more humane type of government and has on the whole contributed to human progress. Nor can "socialized nationalism" be spirited out of the world. The social welfare state with its varying degrees of planned economy has come to stay. As compared with what Lassalle sarcastically called "the night-watchman state" of the nineteenth century, it has values that cannot be dispensed with. Although these values are chiefly domestic, they may have a serious bearing on international relations. "No sickness insurance without Sedan," as a recent writer has phrased it, was the German doctrine under Bismarck.[15] And under Hitler the linkage of the welfare state with military aggression was carried to a catastrophic

[15] Borkenau, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

extreme. Socialism was made the abettor of a fanatical and barbarous nationalism. There is, of course, nothing in socialism that renders this political relationship necessary or inherently probable. But it is worthy of note in this connection that the socialized nation is so powerful a political unity that it is always in danger of being utilized by designing men for evil purposes. This is also true in only a lesser degree of the nationalistic movement in general. It is an instrument of evil as well as good.

There is what may be called a normal peace-loving nationalism, and there is also a perverted belligerent nationalism. Neither a "socialized" nor a "capitalistic" nationalism is necessarily a breeder of war. But in so far as either type of nationalism endorses the theory of the absolute sovereignty or "sacred egoism" of the state and pursues a policy of aggression, it almost inevitably paves the way for war. World peace can be securely established only through a regenerated nationalism, only through the suppression of international lawlessness. And the latter can be accomplished only through "government on a new and higher level." [16]

That the world is ready for such a supernational or international government, no one can say. But there is ground for hope in the parallel often drawn between the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the nationalistic wars of the twentieth century. As the former because of their disastrous consequences were followed by a period of growing religious toleration, so the latter because of their destructiveness may give rise to an effective movement for permanent national toleration and international co-operation. The invention of the atomic bomb may also make a powerful contribution to this end. It may then be that nation-

[16] A phrase used by Governor Stassen.

alism has reached its climax and that its decline has already set in. This is not only possible but probable.[17] In any case there is no valid reason for regarding modern belligerent nationalism as an unchangeable and insuperable barrier to world peace.

Imperialism

Next to nationalism as a major cause of modern wars it is customary to put what is known as imperialism. Many see in this phase of world politics "the most impressive achievement and the most momentous world problem of our age" and regard it as the chief single factor in bringing on World War I.[18] By the term "imperialism" in its common and unfavorable sense is meant a policy which leads a state to extend and maintain its authority by force over other states or territories or peoples and thus to bind them into more or less of political and economic unity. The resulting union of diverse national or tribal groups subject to a single centralized will is commonly though not necessarily known as an empire. The chracteristic feature of such an imperial union is the fact that it is not a voluntary association. It is imposed upon unwilling peoples. In so far as the union is voluntary, it is not an empire in the derogatory sense of the term. It is rather a commonwealth of nations. The British Empire is in considerable part such. It is a union of free nations. But it is also a union in which there are many dependent and subject nations or peoples. The result is that the words "empire" and "imperialism" have acquired different connotations in different parts

[17] According to F. Borkenau, Hitler owed his successes not to his extreme nationalism but to "his shrewd judgment of the decay of nationalism among his neighbors." *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

[18] P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1927), pp. 1, 4.

of the British Empire and in the world generally. They have also come to be differentiated to some extent from each other. Empire has become a more neutral term than imperialism. It is used less commonly in a derogatory sense. This is probably due in part to the inherited prestige of the term and in part to the fact that empires do not have a uniform foreign policy. They have not all been imperialistic in the ordinary sense of the word. Imperialism has, consequently, become more or less detached from the idea of empire and is now attributed to republics as well as empires. It denotes at present with most people an expansionist policy and a tyrannical exercise of power. Imperialism, it is often said, is the antithesis of democracy.

This exclusively derogatory use of the term, however, is hardly justified by history. For while the great powers have in the past often been thoroughly despotic, some of them, such as Britain, the United States, and France, have in more recent times done much to disseminate democratic ideas and to develop democratic institutions throughout the world. It could not well have been otherwise in view of the democratic doctrines preached and practiced at home. The fact is that imperialism is a chameleon, taking its political color from its immediate environment. There is both good and evil in it. It is not, therefore, to be roundly condemned as a whole. It is governed by mixed motives. Cupidity and ambition have played an important role in it. But along with these motives there has been "a perfectly genuine desire to help the subject populations, by maintaining law and order and promoting the material welfare of the people." [19] This fact should not be overlooked; nor should it be cynically explained away

[19] R. G. Hawtrey, *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty* (1930), p. 152.

as hypocritical. There is a better side to imperialism, and this better side is on the whole growing stronger under the influence of public criticism and changing world sentiment.

In the history of modern imperialism there are no such definite stages as we noted in the case of modern nationalism. But there are different phases or types of the movement aside from its good and evil aspects to which it may be well to direct attention. Moritz J. Bonn in a careful critical study entitled "Imperialism—A Sketch"[20] has distinguished six of these different phases: political imperialism, agrarian imperialism, commercial imperialism, managerial imperialism, financial imperialism, and economic imperialism.

By political imperialism is meant the type of expansionism that is inspired by military ambition. It is illustrated in the career of Alexander the Great, who may have been the first to combine it with the idea of a cultural mission. This association of a military with a cultural imperialism was a pronounced feature of Spain's crusading colonization in America. It figured prominently at various times in imperialist propaganda in France and the United States and achieved its greatest success in Soviet Russia. In some instances political imperialism has had no definite propagandist purpose. It has been precautionary or defensive, as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine and various British military enterprises in Africa and India. It has also at times resulted "from almost accidental causes." For instance, it has been said that the British Empire was acquired "in a fit of absence of mind." This absent-mindedness was probably more apparent than real. But it would, I think, be safe to say that there has been much that was opportunist and haphazard in the development not

[20] Published in *Approaches to National Unity* (1945), ed. Lyman Bryson and others, pp. 92-131.

only of British but of modern political imperialism in general.

Agrarian imperialism has resulted from the land hunger of planters and peasants who have sought to improve their condition by moving into richer or more thinly inhabited regions. It has been both democratic and aristocratic in its attitude toward the displaced natives. It has taken the form of colonial expansion and in the mother country has served as "the alternative to industrialization." This type of imperialism has relieved the population pressure. Its aims have been territorial, and its economy often anticapitalistic. *Commercial* imperialism grew up out of the exigencies created by European trading in distant lands, where a show of military or naval force was found to be necessary as a protection against untrustworthy native rulers and equally untrustworthy European rivals. In this way preferential duties came to be imposed and monopolies built up which were often unfair to the native population. *Managerial* imperialism has to do with foreign control exercised over a country's natural resources and industries. To develop these resources and to industrialize a country is not in itself imperialistic; it becomes such only when forced native labor is employed or when exorbitant profits are made through monopolist concessions, excessive interest rates, and other unfair practices. Evils such as these have unfortunately not been uncommon. *Financial* imperialism has manifested itself in connection with loans made to unstable governments for political purposes. These loans have often saved the governments from insolvency, but in other instances pressure, sometimes of a military character, has been brought to bear upon them to secure concessions or to force payment when obligations have not been met.

The four kinds of imperialism described in the preceding paragraph might be and in popular speech are included under

the general head of "economic imperialism." Imperialism of this type denotes any form of economic exploitation of one country by another. But the term also has its own distinctive meaning. It denotes domination through the exclusive use of economic measures, such as embargoes and sanctions. Woodrow Wilson had the idea that military warfare could be eliminated by purely economic warfare waged by peace-loving nations against an aggressor. But this idea has since been generally given up. The fact seems to be that economic weapons can achieve their end only when they are supported by military power.

The foregoing analysis of imperialism brings out its complexity and diversity of form. But it also implies an underlying unity and along with this a dualistic structure. Both of these are significant.

First, it is characteristic of imperialism in all its forms—and so an evidence of its basic unity—that it presupposes the inequality of nations or peoples. It always assumes "the relation of at least two distinct and diverse population groups, one dominant, the other more or less subject." [21] This characteristic runs counter to the principle of national sovereignty. Consequently, there has been more or less of conflict between nationalism and imperialism. The rise of the modern nation-states was, as we have seen, both a cause and an effect of the decline of medieval universalism. On the other hand, modern imperialism owed its origin to the ambition and aggressive policy of rival states and nationalities. The great nations sought to strengthen their own position by imperialistic enterprises, but in so doing they suppressed the national aspirations of other peoples. In both respects they awakened hostile feelings and sowed the seeds of war.

[21] Bonn, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

The second and dualistic element in imperialism, as analyzed by Moritz Bonn, appears in the relation of the political and economic factors to each other. While he distinguishes six different phases of imperialism, five are economic in character, so that there are really only two distinct ingredients of imperialism—the political and the economic. Imperialism is thus dualistic in its structure. Yet its two ingredients to no small extent overlap each other. This has manifested itself in the increased concern of politics with economic matters during the past half century or more. It used to be said that trade follows the flag. But in more recent times the reverse has been equally, if not more frequently, the case. The flag has followed trade. At any rate economic interests have assumed new importance in foreign policy. This has also been true of theoretical as well as practical politics. The basic problems at present most debated in connection with imperialism and war have had to do with their relation to capitalism and to other economic systems and policies. It is to these problems that chief attention will here be devoted.

One of the most influential politico-economic theories of our day, for instance, attributes modern imperialism and all modern wars—that is, wars since 1870 or 1880—to the capitalistic system. Other subordinate causes are admitted, but the chief and decisive cause is laid at the door of capitalism. This is the Marxian theory of which there are two main forms. According to one, represented by Rosa Luxemburg [22] in Germany and in less rigorous fashion by J. A. Hobson [23] in England, the basic defect in the capitalistic system is underconsumption, due to maldistribution of income. The result is that too much money is saved for investment. This

[22] *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (1913).
[23] *Imperialism* (1902; 3rd ed., 1938).

makes necessary foreign markets and a noncapitalist world alongside of the capitalistic. Consequently, there is a scramble among the capitalistic powers for the noncapitalistic parts of the world. This brings the rival powers into conflict with each other and also with the natives of the noncapitalistic lands. Wars ensue, and the defeated native populations are incorporated in the victorious empire or capitalistic state. Both imperialism and war thus grow out of the capitalistic economy.

According to the other and at present orthodox form of the Marxian theory, represented by Nikolai Lenin,[24] it is "finance capital" or monopoly finance, that is the chief agency in breeding war. Production, it is argued, is so organized under capitalism that it eventually falls into the hands of monopolies. These monopolies gain control of the various state governments, and then because of the economic interdependence of the different states and territories extend their activities far beyond their own borders. They do so not because of underconsumption in the homeland nor because of the need of a noncapitalistic world to be exploited, but because of the expansive nature of capitalistic enterprise. Expansion is necessary to prevent a falling rate of profit and to secure the needed raw materials. Only in this way can the capitalistic system be kept in operation. What is called finance capital with its close connection between banking and monopolistic industry requires such expansion. But this expansionist policy adopted by one country leads to friction with rival monopolies

[24] *Imperialism, the Latest Stage in the Development of Capitalism* (1924). For a good exposition and criticism of both forms of the theory see L. Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War* (1939), pp. 19-54. M. Bonn declares that Lenin perverted the term "imperialism" by identifying it with "a particular stage in the development of the capitalist system." *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

and investment agencies in other countries, with their governments, and also often with the local or native authorities. The result is increasing tension and eventually in many cases armed conflict. This, we are told, is the way wars as a rule arise in the modern world. The financial interests are primarily responsible for them. It is their league with government that creates imperialism and leads to international strife. There are thus several respects in which Lenin's theory differs from that of Rosa Luxemburg, and each has also its own complications and refinements. But in general the two agree in maintaining that the capitalistic system is largely responsible for the conquest and exploitation of the "backward" peoples and for the international rivalries in trade and finance that eventuate in war.

For this theory there is some basis in fact. Investment interests have at times been international troublemakers. But that they have been the chief source of diplomatic friction and international conflict in modern times is, it would seem, a conclusion derived from doctrinaire rather than factual considerations. Thorough and unbiased research in this field does not support it. "Private investments seeking purely business advantage," says Eugene Staley, "have rarely of themselves brought great powers into serious political clashes." [25] "There is no convincing evidence," says Lionel Robbins, "that it was the struggles of finance capital or the machinations of general investors which were responsible for the outbreak of the Great War." [26] After a careful study of "International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, 1880-1914" Jacob Viner concludes by saying that "bankers rarely favor an aggressive policy towards powerful adversaries. . . . In the

[25] *War and the Private Investor* (1935), p. 360.

[26] Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

diplomacy of the great powers they are a pacific influence. . . . For the claim sometimes made that they exercised a controlling influence over pre-war diplomacy, the available source material offers not the slightest degree of support." [27] In an oft-quoted statement Wolff-Metternich said in a confidential dispatch to von Bülow: "High finance shakes its knees whenever any kind of complications crop up." No doubt some special financial interests, looking forward to war profits, have supported the war party in virtually every country where such a party has existed. But the Marxian theory that this is true of big business and the great banking houses in general, and that they control the foreign policy of a country and are as a rule militaristic in their attitude, would seem to be the reverse of the truth. Trade and commerce on the whole favor peace. Neither the capitalistic system nor any special phase of it is the major or ultimate cause of war.

Economic considerations no doubt enter into all wars, and at times they are the decisive factors. But the considerations of this kind that matter most are not those that distinguish a capitalistic from a socialistic economy. Of course by the latter no particular form of socialism, Marxian or otherwise, is meant. A socialistic or communistic economy is a planned economy under state control, and as such differs from a capitalistic economy, which lays special emphasis on free or private enterprise. In the light of this commonly accepted distinction it is evident that socialistic or communistic countries would be as likely to go to war as those that are capitalistic, if not more so. For it is national rivalries that are the source of international wars, and these rivalries may well become more acute among nations with a centralized and politically

[27] *The Southwestern Political and Social Quarterly,* March, 1929, p. 451.

controlled economy than among nations with a free economy. The socialized nation, as we have noted, is the strongest socio-political organization yet achieved by man, and as such possesses such obvious military advantages that there would almost inevitably be a temptation to utilize it as a preparation for war. In their regimentation of society, war and socialism have a manifest affinity. In the light of European history since 1914 it might even be said with a measure of truth that total war is a breeder of socialism, and national socialism a breeder of war. Certainly during this period socialism has been so largely divested of its earlier internationalism that to regard it as a remedy for war would seem quite baseless. Furthermore, its linkage in Germany with extreme nationalism, militarism, and imperialism has been so close that a lover of world peace might conceivably view its continued spread throughout the world with deep concern.

But this, too, would be a mistake. The economic conditions that make for war are not peculiar to either capitalism or socialism. They inhere in all economic systems and grow out of scarcity of resources. These resources are unequally divided among the different nations, unavoidably so, and this awakens envy and resentment on the part of the less fortunate. But even if this were not so, even if the division of economic resources were substantially equal, some nations would be more ambitious and greedy than others and would seek to improve their own condition at the expense of their neighbors. This would be true regardless of the national economic system in vogue.

In order to curb this aggressive spirit it has, consequently, been argued in recent years that wars of aggression do not pay. Whatever may have been true in the past, they have at present lost their economic value. This was the burden of the

sensational book by Norman Angell entitled *The Great Illusion.* It was Angell's contention that people almost universally believe that successful wars of conquest are economically and socially profitable and that this belief lies at the root of war and the preparation for it. This view, he argued, is in fact a great illusion. Wars of conquest, though victorious, are actually a tremendous liability. Territorial expansion, thus acquired, does not yield increased income, because the native population must still derive its support from the land. And if coercive and oppressive measures are employed against the natives, a rebellious spirit is generated that interferes with economic production and involves the victors in heavy expenditures and serious losses.

The foregoing line of argumentation has its value as over against the type of aggression represented by Germany, Italy, and Japan during the past decade or two. But it is hardly true that people generally believe that victorious wars are economically profitable. No doubt this belief was cultivated by the German Nazis, the Italian Fascists, and the Japanese militarists. That there is some historical basis for it need not be questioned. Especially influential, for instance, in shaping public opinion in Germany were the three successful wars of the nineteenth century that led to the creation of the German Empire. It was the impetus gained by these military successes more than anything else that gave popular currency to the glorification of war and the grandiose schemes of conquest that had their birth in military circles. But in democratic countries in general the tendency in recent times has been to look upon war as so destructive of property and life that even the victors emerge from it as losers. Whatever may have been true in earlier times, the free peoples of the world no longer see in war a normal pathway to national

prosperity. The reverse has been the common conviction for a generation or more, and this conviction has been enormously strengthened by the invention of the atomic bomb.

Territorial expansion brought about by minor wars has at times yielded economic advantages and it has to some extent furnished a market for surplus goods, a field for the investment of surplus capital, and direct access to raw materials. This is evident from the history of Great Britain and France during the past sixty or seventy years. But the value of colonies and dependencies from these points of view has been greatly exaggerated. Political control does not necessarily mean economic control. Andrew Carnegie, for instance, put the matter in this way: "One of the purest fallacies is that trade follows the flag. Trade follows the lowest price current. If a dealer in any colony wished to buy Union Jacks, he would order them from Britain's worst foe if he could save a sixpence. Trade knows no flag." [28] This is, of course, an exaggeration. Statistics show that ownership of a colony does give the mother country a larger share of the colonial market than would otherwise be hers. Political possession, in other words, does to some extent increase trade with a colony,[29] but the increase is as a rule far less than is commonly supposed and in many cases is effected through high tariffs and other monopolistic and restrictive measures that occasion colonial discontent and international ill will.

In the light of these facts the economic advantages of colonialism or imperialism are at least open to question. But whatever advantages or disadvantages imperialism may have from the economic standpoint, the decisive question with reference to it in our day is the one as to its bearing on world

[28] *The Gospel of Wealth* (1900), p. 290.
[29] Cf. Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 526 ff.

peace. And in this connection it is important in the interest of clarity and in order to avoid misunderstanding to bear in mind the distinction previously noted between the two uses of the word "imperialism." Most people, as above stated, employ the word in a derogatory sense. They treat it as a term of reproach. It denotes with them a selfish, aggressive, despotic, expansionism; and hence they look upon it as violating the principles of justice and freedom, of democracy and self-determination. It may profess a democratic goal; but its method of operation, they say, has often been that of "shooting men into self-government." This coercive method, they insist, is inherent in the nature of imperialism, and consequently they hold that it is inevitably a breeder of wars. It could not be otherwise unless there were a universal empire strong enough to prevent rebellion and civil strife.

Along with this conception of imperialism as essentially evil there is the broader use of the term which takes account of the more benevolent and progressive type of colonial or imperial rule that has been developing during the past half century or more, and which recognizes a good as well as an evil side to imperialism. The good side has been given the name of "co-operative" as distinguished from "coercive" imperialism. It is formally at least linked with freedom and democracy. It is energetic and expansive, but not despotic. It emphasizes consent not control, co-operation not domination. The co-operation takes place on two levels: on the higher level it is a voluntary co-operation between equals; on the lower level it is a partially voluntary co-operation between the mother country or central power and its colonies or dependencies, whose inhabitants are not yet deemed adequately prepared for complete self-government. In this last case the mother country or dominant power in the imperial union exercises a kind of

trusteeship. It rules its colonies or dependencies for their benefit as well as its own and with at least the professed aim of instructing and training them for complete independence or for full membership in a commonwealth of nations. This is the ideal set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

The two uses of the word "imperialism" have a sound historical basis; and so long as they are distinguished by the adjectives "coercive" and "co-operative," no confusion or misunderstanding need result. But the derogatory conception of imperialism is so common that some prefer to substitute for "co-operative imperialism" such expressions as "trusteeship" and "the good neighbor policy." These terms have perhaps the advantage of bringing out more definitely the changed emphases in the progressive foreign policy of our day, but they express practically the same idea as that conveyed by the word "co-operative."

Although revolutions and wars would almost certainly be greatly reduced in number if the ideal of trusteeship or co-operative imperialism were fully realized, they would probably not be altogether eliminated. Friction and differences of opinion would still arise between the central power and its dependencies over the methods by which and the time when the goal of democracy and independence should be attained. Furthermore, the growing peace and prosperity within a great union of free nations would awaken envy among other great but less fortunate powers, and this would prepare the way for another world conflict. A double peril would thus continue as a potential threat to the peace of the world—one from discontented peoples within a larger imperial unity and the other from envious rivals without.

"Imperialism has made the modern world," [30] and is to

[30] Bonn, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

a large degree inherent in its present structure. The slate cannot be suddenly washed clean of it as though it had never existed. Nor would it be wise to attempt such an act. Within limits the expansive spirit still has its value. The world needs its enterprise, its missionary zeal, and its unifying agency. It needs the control exercised by the great powers over business at home and abroad. Without such control the backward peoples would be at the mercy of private adventurers and unscrupulous corporations; and this would mean a worse fate for them than what they now suffer at the hands of their political overlords. If a balance sheet of profit and loss due to imperialism could be drawn up, it is quite possible that there would turn out to be a net gain, material and otherwise, to the subject peoples of the world.

But however that may be, the present status of imperialism is far from what it ought to be. A change for the better is in process, but it is too slow to satisfy the demands of the natives. They want at once less coercion and more co-operation, and most of them want also before long complete independence or voluntary partnership. These goals are being promised them in the form of a temporary trusteeship or a co-operative imperialism. And it is to be hoped that there will be a sincere and sustained effort on the part of the great powers to fulfill these promises. Such an effort would do much to take the sting out of present-day imperialism. It would tend to quiet the unrest among dependent nations, and would probably also moderate to some extent the more dangerous rivalry between the great powers. But even under the most favorable circumstances the actual results would not likely be such as to assure world peace without a supernational or superimperial organization powerful enough to enforce its pacific decrees.

Race Superiority

The claim to race superiority is closely associated with modern imperialism. Indeed, imperialism is at times defined as the domination of the white races over the colored races. This domination has been achieved during the past century. Nearly a billion of the nonwhite and materially backward peoples have been conquered by the more powerful and advanced white peoples of Europe and North America. The only colored people who during this period successfully resisted the encroachments of the great powers and established their own independence were the Japanese. Apart from them practically all of Africa, Asia, and the insular territories have come under the control of the white races.

This political overlordship might conceivably have been achieved without a claim to native racial superiority. It might have been regarded as due to certain accidental and temporary advantages. But the tendency among peoples to account for their own favored position in the world by referring it to some unique native endowment is so strong that it was inevitable that the belief in the native superiority of the white races should accompany their conquest of the world. Any people, colored or white, would under similar circumstances have developed a similar belief with respect to themselves. Indeed, there is a tendency among all great nations to regard themselves as the chosen people. And even apart from extraordinary achievements nationalism and racialism tend to create a feeling of superiority.

The sense of race superiority has not, then, been limited to the white races in their relation to the colored races, though this is at present its most massive and menacing form. We find it among both white and colored peoples irrespective of the

color line. Among whites the two most significant expressions of it have been Anglo-Saxonism and Teutonism. These two claims to race superiority had a common theoretical background in the Aryan and Nordic myths. According to the Aryan theory there was an original pure Aryan race. It was the supreme race among men, a conquering race, the creator of civilization, and the source of all true progress. At first the original home of this race was supposed to have been central Asia. But later it was transferred to Europe by a considerable body of learned opinion, and the first Aryans were identified as Nordics. The Nordic race or races were, consequently, accorded the supreme place in human history, and the Aryan theory was in wide circles transmuted into the Nordic theory.

The outstanding representatives of the Nordic race in modern times are, of course, the Germans and the Anglo-Saxons. It was, therefore, only natural that Nordicism should have more or less vogue among both of these peoples and that it should take on a more or less distinctive form in Germany, on the one hand, and England and the United States, on the other. In this way there arose the two Nordic doctrines of Teutonism and Anglo-Saxonism.

Of these two the latter has on the whole been more pacific, more benevolent, and far less extravagant in its claims than the former. Two reasons for this may be given. One is the satisfaction of the Anglo-Saxons with their present achievements. Napoleon once said of the French Republic that it "needs recognition as little as the sun requires to be recognized." [31] And so it is with the British Empire and the United States. They have "arrived"; they have attained a relatively assured place in the world, and hence do not need to cultivate an aggressive spirit and an air of superiority. They do so suffi-

[31] Quoted by Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 337.

ciently without artificial cultivation. Then, too, religion and morals have had a greater influence on political life and thought in Great Britain and America than in Germany. The popular Anglo-Saxon emphasis on the brotherhood of man and on the principles of justice, freedom, and independence has created an atmosphere unfavorable to the more extreme metaphysically grounded theories of race supremacy.

Nevertheless, there has been no dearth of national self-glorification in either Britain or America nor any lack of self-assurance based on a mystic faith in the native genius of the British and American people and in their "manifest destiny." Toward the close of the past century there was in America a marked upsurge of this Anglo-Saxon creed represented by such men as John W. Burgess, John Fiske, Homer Lea, Theodore Roosevelt, and Josiah Strong. According to Burgess political capacity is not a gift of all peoples but limited to a few. "The Teuton," he said, "really dominates the world by his superior political genius." "The Teutonic nations can never regard the exercise of political power as a right of man. With them this power must be based upon capacity to discharge political duty, and they themselves are the best organs which have as yet appeared to determine when and where this capacity lies." [32] Albert Beveridge declared in the United States Senate in 1899 that God "has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savages and senile peoples." [33] There was much of this blatant national egotism toward the turn of the century, and the Nordic theory, on which it was based, has continued to be promulgated. This

[32] *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (1890), I, 4, 45.

[33] Quoted by R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (1944), p. 155.

theory has been made not only a basis of racial and national pride but also a ground of warning to the American people because of the influx of non-Nordic immigrants in later years.[34] The hope of the world, it is urged, lies in the political supremacy of the Nordic races and especially the Anglo-Saxon. This supremacy has for the most part been conceived of in pacific terms, as a political authority to be exercised in the interest of peace, freedom, and independence. In a general way both America and Britain have at least professedly tried to conform their foreign policy to this ideal, so far as conditions permitted. Neither country has fallen a prey to the theory or myth of their own race superiority to such an extent as seriously to affect their international relations.

In Germany, however, the situation has been different. The Nordic myth in its "Teutonic" form was there taken seriously and made the basis of foreign policy. The result was a degree of national megalomania, the like of which had not previously appeared in European history. Nazism with its doctrines of race, blood, and soil became the most extreme example of racial and national fanaticism known to the Western World. Such fanaticism could not but lead to war. Indeed, it was, as now seems clear, artificially generated for this very purpose. Success in war was its one decisive test of national greatness; hence the nation devoted its supreme energies toward this end. Despite this the "Master Race" went down in defeat. But whether this will mean the end of the demonic doctrine of Teutonic supremacy remains yet to be seen. Nazism in any case will certainly stand for generations to come as a symbol of

[34] See Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race;* T. Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy.*

despotism and brutality and as a warning to the free and peace-loving peoples of the world.[35]

The peril, however, to world peace from the doctrine of racial supremacy does not come from Germany alone. Nazism has its parallel in Nipponism. Indeed, if anything, the official Japanese conception of the state was even more thoroughgoing in its totalitarianism than the Nazi theory. The same may also be said of the Japanese claim to racial superiority and of their belief in the eventual universality of their own rule. "The Whole World Under One Roof" was with them an official slogan. What gave to Japanese nationalism a greater degree of fanaticism than that of Nazism was its religious foundation. Since 1868 government and religion had been united, and all the sanctions of the traditional religious faith were employed to bring the individual into complete subjection to the military rule and political ambitions of the empire. It is doubtful if another such extreme case of religio-political regimentation on so large a scale is to be found in human history.[36] There was, however, one serious weakness in it: its theoretical foundation was so distinctly mythological that it could have had no assured future in the modern scientific world. Then, too, there is the complete defeat of Japan. This may not spell the doom of Nipponism any more than the defeat of Germany will necessarily eradicate Nazism, but both movements have certainly been so weakened by military defeat that it is not likely they will threaten the peace of the world for a long time to come.

Viewing the immediate future, therefore, we see no serious

[35] For an excellent exposition and critique of Aryanism, Teutonism, and Anglo-Saxonism see F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (1926), pp. 3-100, 159-253.

[36] See D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (1943).

menace to international peace in the claim to racial superiority put forth by any one nation. The peril at present lies in the general assumption of superiority by the white races. Against this there has been for some time a rising tide of resentment on the part of the colored and so-called backward peoples the world over. These peoples have become increasingly race conscious and have begun to demand their rights. And not only have their rights as races and nations been thus brought into the foreground, but their rights as individuals have come to be asserted. The sacredness of personality and the right to freedom are truths that they insist are applicable to themselves as well as to other human beings. And the enlightened, not to say Christian, conscience of the world can hardly say them nay at this point. Under these circumstances the kind of white domination that has grown up in Africa and Asia during the past century obviously cannot continue without serious social unrest and eventual rebellion.

It is true that many of the subject peoples are not ready for self-government. They still need a long period of tutelage. In Africa and elsewhere the Western powers have a civilizing mission to perform. This is the kernel of truth in Kipling's rather unfortunate phrase "the white man's burden." The obligation to serve and to share one's blessings with others should not be treated as a burden; it is rather a privilege. But it is nevertheless an obligation—a duty imposed in this case upon the white man by his privileged position in the world. It is a duty akin to that which underlies Christian and educational missionary work.[37] It is a humanitarian service. This is the excuse commonly given for imperialism, and in theory there is a valid basis for it. Our industrial civilization does have in it

[37] See E. D. Soper, *The Philosophy of the Christian World Mission* (1943), pp. 91 ff., 235 ff.

immense values for the "backward" peoples of the world, and to share these values with them has a philanthropic side to it. But the dominant motive, it will have to be admitted, has as a rule been economic and selfish rather than ethical. There has also been so much of arrogance and tyranny and cruelty in connection with the "sharing" process that in many instances it is a question whether the evil has not outweighed the good. In any case there has been in sentiment if not in action an almost world-wide revolt against the white man's assumption of superiority and its imperialistic implications. In this revolt there lie the seeds of war.

It is conceivable that the "civilizing mission" of Europe and America might have been carried out in such a way as to lead to mutual understanding and co-operation with the native races of Africa and Asia. But this end has not been achieved. There is a widening rift between East and West, and one of the most momentous problems confronting the human race is that of bridging the chasm between them. Without a solution of this problem there can be no permanent world peace. But to solve it is no easy task. It has been said that the white man in his relation to his colored subjects faces a dilemma. He is like a man riding a tiger—he does not want to stay on, but he is afraid to get off. Neither continued domination nor complete withdrawal would be wise or safe for the white rulers of the world. Yet it must, we are told, be one or the other.[38] This, however, is hardly the case. There is a more excellent way. It consists in pursuing a middle course. This course would mean the transformation of a selfish imperialism into a moral trusteeship and the gradual establishment of self-government in the colonies or dependencies until finally they are granted their

[38] Cf. Nathaniel Peffer, *The White Man's Dilemma: Climax of the Age of Imperialism,* pp. 304 f.

complete independence or their relationship to the mother country or empire becomes a voluntary one.

In the concrete this general change of policy would lead to such reforms as these: (1) the recognition and protection of native land rights, (2) the abolition of compulsory labor, (3) the discontinuance of exclusive colonial tariffs and the adoption of the principle of the "open door," (4) the renunciation of attempts to achieve imperial economic self-sufficiency, (5) release of the colonies from the imposition of the mother country's language and culture, and (6) the establishment of more adequate educational facilities. Reforms such as these are being instituted; and if they are continued and promoted with sufficient zeal and good will, the peril of serious conflicts between the dominant races of the West and the subject races of Africa and Asia may be avoided. But unless the traditional imperialism is moralized and the assumption of white supremacy is supplanted by the principle of human brotherhood in international as well as personal relations, the conflict of races may eventually take on a catastrophic character.[39]

Overpopulation

Another phase of the international situation that involves serious danger of war if it does not lead inevitably to it is overpopulation. The increase and pressure of population have through the ages been potent sources of strife, but they have become a more serious menace to peace in the modern world. In 1630 the total population of the world was about 445,000,000, and it had probably never been more than that at any time in the previous history of the race. The density was a little over eight persons for each square mile of land surface.

[39] See M. F. Ashley Montagu, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (1942).

Since then there has been "a relatively tremendous spurt of growth." The present population of the world is over two billion—more than four times as many as it was three centuries ago; and the density is forty to the square mile—five times as great as it was in 1630. This enormous increase has been due to the discovery of new continents, to improved means of transportation, to the invention of machinery and the introduction of the factory system, and in general to the development of applied science.

But the distribution of the increased population has been very uneven. Eighty-one per cent of the people live in regions where the density of population is less than the average of forty to the square mile in the world as a whole, while fourteen per cent live in regions where the density is six hundred or more. In the latter case there is only one acre or less of arable land for each person, whereas two and a half acres are estimated by competent authorities to be needed for the support of one human being. This unevenness is due chiefly to urbanization, the preference of people for city life, and to the indisposition of large numbers to move far from where they were born. The result has been overpopulation in many regions.[40] Then, too, on what may be called the natural plane the law of Malthus seems to hold true. According to this law population tends to increase faster than the food supply. Or, as Southey put it, "God makes men and women faster than he can feed them." [41] In physiological terms the human womb and the human stomach are at war with each other.

In trying to offset this tendency toward overpopulation and its evil consequences European nations have resorted to vari-

[40] For the above data I am indebted to Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population* (1939), pp. 261-77.

[41] Quoted by James Bonar, *Malthus and His Work*, p. 4.

ous expedients such as industrialization, emigration, and more intensive forms of agriculture. These have had their value, but they are limited in their possibilities; and none of them nor all of them together can afford permanent relief from the pressure of population.

When a country turns its main attention from agriculture to industry, it does make provision for a larger population. But at the same time it increases the demand for food and raw materials. These goods it must now import in considerable quantities. And not only that, there is also need of a largely increased export trade, for the goods now manufactured under the industrial system far exceed the domestic demand. Then, too, the disposal of this excess production leads to competition with other countries, and the result in many instances is bitter economic rivalry. So industrialism in seeking to relieve the pressure of population at home sows the seeds of strife abroad. Furthermore, the relief it brings to the domestic situation is far from complete. The tendency to overpopulation still persists. All that a normally successful industrial regime does is to abate it; it does not solve the population problem.

Next to industrialism, emigration to the Americas, Australia, and Africa has done much to relieve the situation in the overpopulated regions of Europe. But since the first World War restrictive immigration laws have been enacted that have greatly reduced its availability. And it is not improbable that this change had quite a little to do with bringing on the second World War. In any case, emigration has had a very considerable influence on European history and has opened up questions that have seriously affected international relations.

Some emigrants, for instance, have moved to less populous foreign lands where they have been absorbed in the native population and permanently lost to the mother country. Oth-

ers have migrated to colonies controlled by their own government and there continued their political, commercial, and personal relations with the homeland. The latter is what the European states have naturally preferred. The consequence has been a long struggle between them for colonies or colonial expansion.

There is, it is true, considerable difference of opinion as to whether the desire for colonies and the struggle for them have actually been due to the need of relief from overpopulation. Many have maintained or conceded the validity of this need in the case of such countries as Germany, Italy, and Japan, while others have vigorously disputed it and attributed the professed need to militaristic propaganda. On both sides of this debate there has probably been some truth. But whether overpopulation and the need of territorial expansion are real or feigned in any particular instance, they are serious factors in awakening and promoting an aggressive and warlike spirit. *Lebensraum* (living space) is a battle cry to which ambitious nations readily respond.

Especially is this true when there is such gross inequality as has existed and still exists in the size and population of the colonies or dependencies ruled over by the different independent states. There were, for example, according to a table revised up to 1935, nine nations (Russia, United States, England including Scotland and Wales, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal) whose combined population was 23 per cent of that of the entire world, and who lived on only 14 per cent of its land surface. Yet they controlled 66 per cent of the latter and exercised more or less political authority over 57 per cent of the world's population. If Russia and the United States be omitted from the table referred to, the disparity represented by the remaining seven nations becomes con-

siderably more glaring. Their combined population amounted to less than 11 per cent of that of the world, and they themselves occupied less than 1¼ per cent of its land area. Yet they controlled "approximately 42 per cent of all the lands and all the people of the globe." [42] Such figures as these are calculated to stir the emotions of the less favored nations, and as a matter of fact did much to encourage the Axis powers in their revolt against the *status quo*.

As compared with industrialization and emigration new and improved methods of agriculture have offered a less disturbing and on the whole less ambitious program of relief from overpopulation. A few scientists have held out the hope of such a vast increase in food production through scientific discovery and invention that the race need have no serious concern at this point for a long time to come.[43] And there are many others who on vague religious grounds or on the basis of an unrealistic humanitarian sentimentalism take a similar optimistic view. There will always, they say, be food enough for all people on earth, no matter how numerous they may be; nature and Providence will take care of that with the aid of modern science. But so far as science is concerned, its possibilities in this field are conceded by most agricultural specialists to be quite limited. During the past fifty years an increase in production per acre of about 50 per cent has been effected in the United States through scientific farming. But this has been largely offset by deterioration of the natural soil fertility and in other ways. The same tendency has been observed in other

[42] Pearl, *op. cit.*, pp. 274 ff.

[43] O. W. Willcox, for instance, tells us in his *Nations Can Live at Home* (1935), p. 27, that when the business of food production has been put into the hands of competent agrobiologists the earth will support thirty-six times the 1,700,000,000 inhabitants it had in 1925.

countries, in some of which a larger yield per acre has been obtained. But this has been due largely to more intensive cultivation and to less production by each man, which, of course, carries with it a lower standard of living.

There is, therefore, no substantial basis for the easy-going assumption that agricultural science will solve the food problem, and that the peoples of the world will be able to provide for themselves, regardless of their number. The situation is not so simple as this. The facts do not warrant such a lighthearted and thoughtless attitude toward the population question. Overpopulation exists in many regions, and unless corrected may eventually have an adverse effect on international peace. To thrust the problem aside as a bogey is to fall a prey to a shallow and misguided optimism.

The method of dealing with the problem that seems to give greatest promise for the future is one that we have not thus far mentioned. It is the artificial reduction of the birth rate. "Most of the European countries have reduced their birth rates during the past fifty years from over thirty per thousand to less than twenty per thousand," [44] and this they have done despite the fact that both theology and biology have been invoked against it. It has been argued by belated theologians that the sex life has no intrinsic worth, that its only legitimate function is procreation, and that artificial birth control is a violation of both the divine law and the law of nature. This is the official teaching of the largest communion in Christendom, propagated partly with the idea of increasing its own membership.

Militarists, on the other hand, such as Hitler and Mussolini, have urged large families, primarily no doubt because this would mean for them more soldiers and larger armies, but also

[44] Karl Sax, *The Scientific Monthly*, January, 1944, p. 66.

on the ground that fecundity is an evidence of racial and national virility. A low birth rate, they say, means biological decay. Consequently, rewards have been offered by the state for the raising of large families, and in Nazi Germany even the bearing of children out of wedlock received official sanction and encouragement.

These reactionary political and ecclesiastical forces have no doubt discouraged to some extent the practice of birth control, especially among the poor and ignorant. But they have only exercised a delaying influence. The control of the birth rate in the Western World has already become so general that it may be considered "an established feature of Occidental civilization." [45] In continental Asia, however, the situation is different. There the Malthusian law still operates with little restraint and is likely to continue to do so for a long time to come because of traditional religious beliefs and social conditions. No appreciable relief in the near future seems possible in Asia from emigration or industrialization or more intensive cultivation of the soil. Population without birth control will there continue to increase faster than the food supply, and this, despite the ravages of famine, pestilence, and natural catastrophes or possibly because of them, may lead to aggression and another world war.

The preceding causes of war in modern times, which we have briefly outlined, do not make war necessary. Although they add nothing that is new in principle to the apologetic for war discussed in Chapter I, they do bring out the extreme difficulty of maintaining the peace of the world under existing conditions. Nationalism, imperialism, the assumption of race superiority, and here and there the excessve growth of population are so deeply rooted in the structure of modern society

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

that there is no easy cure for the evils and perils involved in them. Indeed, no purely mechanical remedy for them is possible. A political and economic reorganization of society may have some value, but only if it is accompanied by a change of heart. Nationalism and imperialism in the broader sense of these terms are not evil in and of themselves; they become such only through selfish excess and willful disregard of the rights of others. The assumption of race superiority and overpopulation may have less of the deliberate element in them, but they, too, are subject in large measure to rational control.

The chief responsibility for war and peace is, therefore, to be found in the control or lack of control exercised by the human spirit over the forces that make for conflict between the nations.

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.

It is not fate nor impersonal things but human wills that are the direct causes of war. They are, it is true, stirred to action by unfavorable external conditions. But what direction their response to these conditions will take depends to a large extent upon themselves.

It is often said that economic rivalry is "the most potent cause of war in the modern world." [46] This may be true. But economic rivalry derives its potency from nationalism, imperialism, overpopulation, and to some extent race prejudice. It is itself no simple entity, viewed psychologically or otherwise. Nor is it concerned simply with material objects. Its objective is power rather than physical satisfaction. This is true also of war. War is a quest of power not of mere welfare. Hence it has been said by R. G. Hawtrey that "the principal cause of

[46] Cf. John Bakeless, *The Economic Causes of Modern Wars* (1921).

war is war itself." [47] In saying this he did not have in mind the familiar idea that war breeds war; he meant "that the aim for which war is judged worth while is most often something which itself affects military power." [48] In other words, what is sought in war is power and prestige. It is this quest that constitutes the essence of war, and so understood war is itself the principal cause of war. But here, too, there is danger of oversimplification. The quest of military power as well as the quest of material welfare is a complex activity. It is implicit in the four causes of modern wars that we have discussed and owes its specific character and direction to this relationship. Neither it nor the quest of economic goods is an independent cause of war, though both are obviously influential factors in the development of the war spirit. Whether either quest should be regarded as the predominant cause of modern wars depends on one's general philosophical or psychological point of view and has no significant bearing on the conclusions reached in the present chapter.

We have emphasized the view that the causes of war are not to be regarded as forces that operate mechanically. They are more or less subject to human control. If they were not, the whole peace movement would be a farce. Fatalism would be the only rational attitude to take toward the curse of war. But while a measure of moral responsibility for war must be attributed to men, there are times when conditions seem to transcend the powers of human resistance and to make war inevitable. That this is so, said Fénelon, is "the disgrace of the human race." And such it may be. But it is a moral disgrace only in so far as men are responsible for the war-producing

[47] Hawtrey, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

conditions of human life and for their own limited powers of resistance.

At this point there is a great deal of confusion in current theological thought. By reviving the doctrine of original sin the effort is made to conceive of sin as necessary or inevitable and yet as something for which we are morally responsible. The logical absurdity of this position is frankly admitted though somewhat obscured by a mystifying use of paradoxes. The chief sources or representatives of this theological procedure have been Sören Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Applied to war their doctrine of sin seems in the eyes of many to ground the moral causes of war more deeply in human nature and history than a consistent freedomism permits. But, on the other hand, it clearly opens the door to social pessimism and to a more or less fatalistic attitude toward war. We need, to be sure, to realize the enormous difficulty of uprooting the war system. But still greater is the need of believing in the possibility of its eradication. And here the subvolitional conception of sin offers no help. It eliminates the moral element in sin, and thus logically tends to paralyze rather than inspire moral endeavor.

According to the Marxian theory the basic cause of modern wars, as we have seen, is to be found in the capitalistic system. So long as this system prevails, war is inevitable. The only way to eradicate it is, therefore, to put an end to capitalism. Socialism or communism is the one key to a warless world. The more than dubious grounds of this theory have already been pointed out. Here it may be worth noting that an economic system serves about the same function in the Marxian theory that a doctrine of sin does in the foregoing theological theory. Capitalism and original sin are both impersonal, and as basic factors in causing war limit human responsibility for

it. In this respect the two theories are out of tune with the modern peace movement and inclined to be skeptical of its success. The one essential philosophical presupposition of the struggle for world peace is the confident belief in such a degree of human freedom and moral responsibility as will make possible a permanent triumph over those forces that make for international strife.

CHAPTER III

GROWTH OF THE ARGUMENT FOR WORLD PEACE

THUS FAR WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE PHILOSOPHY of war. We have considered the fundamental arguments offered in support of the view that war is unavoidable and cannot be completely abolished. We have also discussed the chief causes of modern wars and their bearing on the basic question as to the inevitability of international strife. We now turn to the philosophy of peace. Here we shall first concern ourselves with its historical development, a field of study to which educated people generally, despite their interest in the cause of peace, seem to have devoted comparatively little attention.

War dates back to prehistoric times and apparently to the very beginnings of the human race. Some, it is true, have argued that men were at first by nature pacific, and that strife between them arose later through the advent of the demon of private property. It was conflict over property rights that inaugurated the reign of war, and that has maintained it in power down to the present. But this theory of the origin of war, as we have previously pointed out, has no truly psychological, sociological, or archaeological basis. It is purely speculative in character. So far as we know, primitive men were belligerent. Tribal wars were common; they were taken for granted as a matter of course and were subject to few, if any, restraints of conscience. There was no intertribal law applicable to them. War was a law unto itself.

Out of this anarchic and barbarous situation civilization gradually emerged. Nations began to take the place of tribes. Reason and conscience began to be applied to intertribal and international affairs. This rationalizing and moralizing process was slow. Primitive savagery persisted to a large extent in the initiation and conduct of war. But in the course of time moral convictions asserted themselves, and two significant advances were made.

The Moralizing of War

Of these two the first and more fundamental was the distinction between just and unjust wars. This distinction appeared in the higher religions of the East and was impressed upon the princes of China and India. It was recognized by the Greeks and Romans and emphasized by the classical moralists. It was assumed by the Old Testament writers and by the Hebrews generally. They condemned the brutal wars of conquest by the arrogant Asiatic empires, and looked upon the wars of defense and liberation waged by their judges and good kings as having had the divine approval. The same point of view was later adopted by the Christian Church, that is, after its union with the empire. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin all endorsed the distinction between just and unjust wars, and their views were generally accepted by Roman Catholics and Protestants.

This distinction has been one of immense significance in the history of mankind. It put war, theoretically at least, under the dominion of conscience, and in so doing inaugurated the transition from savagery to civilization. Among primitive men, fighting was considered a perfectly natural and proper means of acquiring wealth, servants, and other goods of life. The only question they raised with reference to a warlike adventure had

to do with the probability of its success. Might was with them the one consideration. But all this was changed when men began to distinguish between just and unjust wars. Right was now in principle put above might. War required moral sanction, and the way in which belligerents have more and more sought and claimed for themselves such sanction is convincing evidence of the increasing potency of the ethical factor in the prosecution of war.

The distinction between just and unjust wars is, however, often not easy of application to concrete cases. Virtually every nation that goes to war claims that it is morally justified in so doing. The question of right and wrong cannot, therefore, be decided by an appeal to the consciences of the belligerents any more than disputes between individuals can be thus settled. The belligerents might all agree that wars of aggression are unjust, and that only defensive wars are just. Yet each belligerent nation would be likely to insist that its going to war was in self-defense and that its enemy or enemies were the aggressors. In each instance the claim might be made in good faith, for a war may from one point of view be defensive and from another aggressive on the theory that offense is the best defense.

Then, too, the situation is further complicated by the fact that theoretically at least just wars are not necessarily restricted to wars of self-defense. They may have the purpose of redressing wrongs committed by a government against other nations or against its own people. They may, in a word, be punitive as well as defensive. Furthermore, it is held by many that even wars of conquest may in extreme cases be justifiable. If a country is inexcusably backward and by its policies stubbornly resists true progress both within and without its own borders, it may justly be regarded as having forfeited its right

to complete independence. Another more enlightened nation may in the interest of civilization be justified in compelling such a recalcitrant government by armed force to alter its course of action and submit to foreign control.

The same may be said of civil war. The right of rebellion against constituted authority has been absolutely denied, as for instance by Luther and Kant. But on a democratic theory of the state it would seem obvious that if a government may be justly punished by a foreign power for the mistreatment of its own people, rebellion on the part of its own subjects would also be justifiable on the same ground. In both cases, however, there would as a rule be wide differences of opinion as to whether the actual situation warranted armed intervention.

It is, consequently, maintained by some that the distinction between just and unjust wars contains no objective standard by which to guide people in their attitude toward war. Whether a war is just or not is in reality determined by one's national or other prejudices. The unbiased moral judgment has very little to do with it.

But while there is considerable empirical support for this skeptical attitude and while it is often difficult to decide whether a nation's participation in a particular war is just or unjust, the moral distinction between wars has nevertheless been of great historical significance. It has in theory at least placed a moral ban on most wars, for wars as a rule have originated in aggression of some kind, and aggressive wars have been commonly branded as unjust. This popular moral judgment has, to be sure, often been ineffective and at times scandalously disregarded. Hugo Grotius, for instance, described the conditions that led to the writing of his great work *The Rights of War and Peace* as follows:

I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse being had to arms for slight reasons or no reason; and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, just as if men were henceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint.[1]

But while there is this discouraging phase of the history of war in civilized, not to say Christian, lands, the very fact that Grotius indicted the practice of his own time in such terms as he did is itself evidence that his own higher ethical point of view was not without considerable support in contemporary thought. Indeed, it was the traditional attitude of the church and of philosophical idealists in general, and since his day it has become increasingly influential throughout the world. In it lay the germ of international law. The whole conception of international law and its entire development rest upon the conviction that wars and international relations in general do not lie beyond the reach of moral law.

This conviction has affected to no small extent the course of history, independently of its embodiment in formal law. Take, for instance, the small independent states of Europe. Why were they not overrun by the great powers during the latter part of the past century as were the smaller and backward nations of Africa and Asia? Why were they not engulfed by the rising tide of imperialism as were the African and Asiatic countries? To some extent their immunity was no doubt due to the intense rivalry of the great powers. But in considerable measure it was also due to the fact that these small countries were most of them highly civilized, and hence no moral excuse could be found for subjugating them. The

[1] Translation by Whewell, p. xxxi.

great powers could claim no "civilizing mission" in their case, nor could they find a moral equivalent for "the white man's burden" on the basis of which they would be justified in subjecting them to their own imperial rule. So far as their moral, religious, and cultural standing was concerned, the small nations had as good a right to independence as the larger states. This right served as a shield against foreign attack, or in the event of such an attack brought to their side powerful help from other nations. In a word, the smaller European states have to a considerable extent been protected in their rights by the moral law as represented by the distinction between just and unjust wars.

A distinction is at times drawn between a "just" war and a "holy" war. The latter carries with it the idea of a crusade. It is a war waged in the interest of religion or of an ideal held sacred—a war that God "wills." It is a war in which the religious or semireligious motive dominates. As such it may be simply an intensified form of a just war. In theory this is what it professes to be, but in practice it has tended to degenerate into a blind fanaticism. The religious motive has become sectarian and disregardful of the moral ideal. It may have stimulated the warlike spirit, but it has done so at the expense of justice and humanity. The holy war or crusade has thus tended to sink to a lower moral level than the just war, and hence has come to be looked upon with more or less aversion by many. But in so far as the word "holy" retains its full ethical meaning, a holy war properly designates a war in which the moral and ideal element is more completely dominant than in what is commonly called a just war. In principle there is no difference between them. Such difference as exists is simply one of degree, and in view of the growing abhorrence and dread of war the present tendency is to apply the word

"just" instead of the loftier and more sacred word "holy" to a war which we regard as deserving of our support.[2]

In addition to the fruitful and significant distinction between just and unjust wars another consequence of the application of moral principles to war has been the effort to make its actual conduct less barbarous. This effort began in ancient times. It received its most striking expression in the chivalry of the Middle Ages, and from that time on has, despite serious reverses, gained in moral vigor. This gain has been embodied in the rules of what is called civilized warfare. Underlying this type of warfare is a recognition of the fact that war is largely impersonal. It is a conflict between impersonal states—human groups rather than individuals. Hence personal animosity does not properly apply to one's enemies in war. Such enemies may as individuals be in every way worthy of one's respect. And because of this fact, when captured, there is no reason why they should not receive considerate treatment. As prisoners of war they have moral rights; they are not or ought not to be at the mercy of their captors. This moral insight and its embodiment in international law constitute the chief difference between barbarous and civilized warfare. Along with it goes the recognition of the rights of noncombatants. To spare the lives of women and children and of civilians in general, so far as possible, is a duty recognized by all civilized belligerents. Much has thus been done in the way of humanizing and moralizing war despite the fact that at bottom war is a barbarous method of settling disputes and despite the fact that total war and modern weapons of destruction have made extremely difficult, indeed impossible, a sharp distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

[2] See R. H. Bainton, "The Churches and War," in *Social Action*, January 15, 1945, pp. 6 ff.

The application of ethical restraints to the conduct of war has had two serious obstacles with which to contend: the recrudescence from time to time of the spirit of savagery, and the invention of new and deadlier weapons. Both of these appeared on a mammoth scale during the second World War. But they did not weaken, rather did they strengthen the determination of mankind to bring the conduct of war under moral control, so far as possible. War criminals have been brought to trial in international courts of law as never before, and a new international code applicable to war is being created. So in spite of the monstrous evils of modern warfare the interest in humanizing war still persists.

With respect to the application of this interest to the new weapons of war, however, the situation is not so clear. What to do with the atomic bomb, for instance, is perhaps the most difficult problem which the nations of the world have ever had to face. There is a general conviction that it must be brought under international control, but just how this is to be done remains yet to be decided. There is also no agreement as to whether greater ethical restraints can be imposed on indiscriminate bombings and other barbarous practices in recent warfare and how these restraints shall be applied. Indeed, public sensitiveness to these questions seems to have deteriorated of late. The massacre of noncombatants does not now apparently awaken the revulsion of feeling it once did. This, however, does not necessarily imply a decline of interest in the moral issues of war. It is rather to be ascribed to intellectual perplexity caused by the newer methods of warfare. Current discussions make it clear that the moral aspects of war are at present the subject of wider and profounder study and concern than at any time heretofore.

Since early times there have been those who have held that

war lies wholly beyond the moral sphere and is not subject to moral judgments. It was against this barbaric theory that Grotius and others interested in the humanizing of war contended. But despite their criticism and rejection of the theory it has persisted in various forms down to the present. A distinguished physician recently said that "no state takes up arms unless its people are convinced they have honor on their side. I do not believe there is any right or wrong in war. The phenomenon is as devoid of ethics as typhoid, but equally unpleasant," and hence should be treated as "a social disease." [3] This view or views akin to it are common in naturalistic circles. And occasionally they find a place among religious thinkers.

It is, for instance, argued by a leading journal of religion that

> war, once begun, is the abdication of reason and morality in favor of brute force and cunning; it is a denial and overthrow of every ethical code, whether Christian or secular; this overthrow is so radical, comprehensive and complete that the essential activities which war involves and imposes upon all citizens of the warring state cannot be called right or good; nevertheless, these activities are necessary, in the sense of inescapable, and hence cannot be called right or wrong.
>
> War [it is further said] has no moral character. When a nation commits its destiny to the arbitrament of sheer might, it abandons all moral constraints. Its essential acts are judged, not by standards of right and wrong, but by military necessity.[4]

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[3] Stephen Taylor in *Doctors in Shirt Sleeves* (ed. H. Bashford), pp. 214 f.

[4] *The Christian Century,* January 24, 1945, p. 103; September 26, 1945, p. 1087.

If the foregoing quotations be taken literally, they would seem to justify or at least condone a return to savage warfare if this should be necessary to victory. They would eliminate the distinction between just and unjust wars and deny moral value to the attempted humanizing of war. If war is the negation of all morality and if we must decide on which side and how we shall fight regardless of moral considerations, it is obvious that we have a bifurcation of human life and an isolation of the moral nature which opens the door to pure barbarism. The fact is that the moral nature has a universal mission. Its function is to moralize all of life, strengthening what is morally weak and eliminating what is irremediably evil. This applies to war as well as to other aspects of human life; and the resulting process is necessarily gradual, passing from one stage of relative right to another and higher level.

The military necessity, which is supposed to exclude war from the moral sphere, is really a specification under the general idea of utility in the field of ethics, and like the latter is an ambiguous term. Utility may help us to determine whether a particular line of conduct is morally right or not, and the same may be true of military necessity in war. On the other hand, utility may be looked upon as the very essence of moral conduct, in which case morality is denied a distinctive character and reduced to mere expediency. In a similar way military necessity may be declared to be the very essence of all acts of war, in which case such acts are withdrawn from the moral realm. This theory is historically known as Machiavellianism, and logically it is a deduction from naturalistic utilitarianism.

If we arbitrarily limit war to its essential activities and to acts motivated by military necessity, and if we arbitrarily make the moral codes of peacetime normative for all morality, we may, it is true, formally "de-moralize" war without throwing

the gates open to atrocities and to savagery in general. But we do so only by consciously or unconsciously interpreting the essentials of war and military necessity in the light of the moral standards set up in the past by those who like Grotius have tried to humanize war as much as possible. In its practical application the nonmoral theory of war under consideration does not, consequently, differ so very much from the traditional Christian theory. The difference between the two is largely verbal, and this difference is one in which the advantage in point of clarity and forthrightness lies plainly with the older view. Military necessity or expediency, if accepted as the supreme principle in the conduct of war, seems clearly to exclude in the last analysis and as a final court of appeal all moral restraints, implicit as well as explicit. And this is a position which "the church dare not approve, . . . no matter what the provocation, however great the extremity of peril, even to the imminence of military defeat." [5]

The Medieval Church and the Peace Movement

The transition from savagery to "civilized" warfare was effected, as we have noted, by a partial moralizing of war. This moralizing process consisted in drawing a distinction between just and unjust wars and in humanizing in some respects the conduct of war. These developments were and still are of great importance. But they left the ultimate problem of war, the question of its abolition, unsolved. The evils of war were recognized, and there were prophetic dreams of a time when men would "beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks," when nation would not "lift up

[5] "The Relation of the Church to the War in the Light of the Christian Faith," in *Social Action,* Dec. 15, 1944, p. 68. A report prepared by twenty-six representative American theologians.

sword against nation," and they would "learn war no more." But these dreams were offset by apocalyptic predictions that "wars and rumors of wars" would persist till the end of time. The profounder ethical teaching of the New Testament with respect to the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God pointed, to be sure, to universal and perpetual peace as the goal of human history. But it was only very slowly and gradually that this idea entered seriously into human thought as a practical goal—as something realizable and to be striven for.

In the early church the belief was expressed that if the nations of the world were to become Christian, wars would cease. This was a natural expectation in view of the Christian ideal. But actual conditions in the early church, the rivalry and intolerance of the various sects or churches in their relation to each other, did not lend much support to the belief in the immediate pacifying influence of Christianity on the warring nations of the world. In any case this expectation was not realized in the relation of Christian nations to each other, and it has not been realized down to the present. Their common Christian faith did for a time unite them in a struggle against the Turks, but it did not serve as an abiding basis for peace in Europe. Still, although wars continued, the Christian church did keep alive the ideal of universal peace. Furthermore, it sought, in a measure at least, to translate the ideal into reality through the agency of the pope as an arbitrator of disputes between princes and nations and as claimant to the spiritual headship of universal Christendom and of heathen states as well.

The actual achievements of the church along this line fell far short of its ideals, and often it became itself enmeshed in the toils of international strife. But in spite of its own selfish quest of power, its own worldly ambitions, and its alliances with the forces of aggression, it was on the whole the most

important contributor to the cause of peace in the medieval period. Indeed, it was the great creative agency in the whole peace movement. The Greek Amphictyonic Council, it is true, is often cited as a significant pre-Christian contribution to this movement, but whatever significance it may have had in its own time it exercised no traceable influence on modern international law and peace.

In the pre-Christian world the conditions for a true internationalism did not exist. There was too much mutual distrust and too little cultural and religious unity to make this possible. Domination, not discussion, was the order of the day. There was no room for an established diplomacy and for representative international assemblies. Such assemblies could be held only where there was a common faith and mutual good will. These conditions were first introduced by Christianity. Its universalism and its doctrine of the brotherhood of man laid the foundations for diplomacy and for friendly international relations. A new international spirit thus grew up within Christianty. Assemblies or councils of the church were held that became more and more representative of the civilized nations and even of uncivilized parts of the earth. The Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325 "can claim to be the first truly international assembly in history." [6] And in the Middle Ages "the Ecumenical Councils had become a tribunal, before which were discussed the principal international affairs of Christendom, not only articles of faith and matters of religion, but the conduct of princes, their trial and punishment, the precedency and rank of nations, and the disputed successions to kingdoms." [7] The medieval church thus served as the voice of what may be called the international conscience of its day. Its sov-

[6] R. F. Wright, *Mediaeval Internationalism*, p. 52.
[7] R. Phillimore, *Commentary on International Law*, II, 380.

ereignty was a powerful contributor to international peace, and even the arrogant claims of the papacy to universal rule embodied a high and noble ideal. However much we may deplore the political character of the medieval church and the corrupt practices that resulted from it, we cannot deny that it made real and vital in the Western World the idea of a supreme moral and spiritual authority to which even the mightiest princes and empires must bow. It made impossible such a thing as the modern totalitarian conception of the state. All states from the medieval point of view stood under the authority of a law higher than any laws of their own making. This conviction was so deep-seated as to be self-evident to the medieval mind, and in it the cause of international law and peace had a firm theoretical and practical foundation. It was out of this conviction that the modern peace movement gradually took its rise.

It is, therefore, not surprising that international law, as we know it, owed its origin and development to the Christian nations. "No other nations had part or lot in it till the Great Powers admitted Turkey in 1856 by the Treaty of Paris, and Japan later, in 1889, when these Powers abolished Consular jurisdiction in that country." [8] As modern natural science had its roots in the medieval conception of the rationality of the universe, so modern international law had its rootage in the medieval conception of the moral government of the world.

Hugo Grotius

It is customary to speak of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) as the founder of international law. And if by international law we mean its systematic exposition and its practical application to the numerous problems of war and peace, this appraisal is

[8] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

historically justified. His work *The Rights of War and Peace* was "the real foundation of the modern science of international law." [9] But it was not only an extremely significant work from the scientific or theoretical point of view; it exercised a profound influence in the way of humanizing war and promoting the cause of world peace. So influential was it in these practical respects that Andrew D. White characterizes it as "the most beneficient of all volumes ever written not claiming divine inspiration." [10] This praise may be unduly eulogistic, but it illustrates the very high estimate placed by representative thinkers on Grotius' work as a contribution to the peace movement as well as to the science of international law.

If we understand by international law simply the general concept and its essential principles, Grotius was not its author or founder. It would be more correct to say with Dr. Figgis that international law in this sense of the term was "a sort of legacy of the Middle Ages." [11] Grotius did not create it; he inherited it.

It is at times said that international law presupposes independent nations, and that on the medieval papal theory there were no such states. All nations were regarded as subject to the authority of the pope, and hence on this basis there could be no international law in the proper sense of the term. But this objection is verbal rather than real. The canon law of the Middle Ages and the conditions under which the councils of the church were assembled and the authority of the pope exercised assumed the existence of duties and rights on the part of nations as truly as a formal code of international law would

[9] Andrew D. White, *Seven Great Statesmen*, p. 92.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[11] *Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius* (2nd ed.; 1916), p. 247.

have done.[12] But while this is true, it does not detract from the great service rendered by Grotius to the cause of world peace. No one before his time, as he himself says, had treated the subject of international law "as a whole in an orderly manner," and those who had treated parts of it had done so in a way that "left much to the industry of others." [13] His *Rights of War and Peace* marked a new epoch in the scientific and philosophical treatment of the subject, and rendered a unique service in curbing the warlike instincts of nations and rulers and in moderating the savagery of war.

Grotius did not, however, advocate the complete abolition of war. This goal lay beyond the horizon of his own practical interest and that of his age. But this does not mean that he regarded war as a necessary phase of human life. A warless world was with him an eventual possibility. There would, he said, be such a world, "if all nations should receive and fulfill the law of Christ." The prediction in Isa. 2:4 about men beating their swords into plowshares and learning war no more he accepted as trustworthy. But "its fulfilment, like the conversion of the Jews," he said, "is still to be looked for." [14] This, however, he thought of as so remote that he did not introduce it into his practical program. His interest was concentrated on reducing the number and length of wars and on eliminating as much of the savagery of war as possible. "It is a ferine force," he said, "which is prominent in war, and must be tempered with humanity, that we may not cease to be men, by imitating brutes." [15] In achieving this end he declared that

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[12] See T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law* (1911), p. 33.

[13] *Op. cit.*, pp. xxiii, xxxii.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 453.

"it would be useful, and indeed it is almost necessary, that certain Congresses of Christian Powers should be held, in which the controversies which arise among some of them may be decided by others who are not interested; and in which measures may be taken to compel the parties to accept peace on equitable terms." [16]

The holding of such congresses, however, was not a primary concern with Grotius. He endorsed the idea, but did so only incidentally. He did not enlarge upon it. He devoted himself for the most part to arguing that moral principles are applicable to war and to applying these principles to the numerous concrete problems that arise in connection with war. He rejects the view "that in war all rights cease," and maintains "that war is never to be undertaken except to assert rights, and when undertaken, is never to be carried on except within the limits of rights and good faith." [17] The distinction between just and unjust wars is, therefore, valid. The extreme pacifist position, which declares "arms forbidden to the Christian," he dismisses as doing harm, "because the excess which it involves is easily detected, and, then, detracts from the authority of what is said, even within the limits of truth." [18]

Grotius believed war inevitable under existing conditions, and hence as a lover of peace and a practical-minded man confined his efforts largely to the task of humanizing, civilizing, and moralizing war. This was the theme of *The Rights of War and Peace,* and from this point of view it was a powerful peace document. It had in its own day a rich fruitage. This is evident from its influence on such men as Gustavus Adolphus and Cardinal Richelieu and on the statesmen who

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 275.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. xxx.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. xxxi.

framed the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, three years after Grotius' death.

This instrument embodied principles which Grotius had really been the first to bring into the thought of the world. At its base was his conception of the essential independence and equality of all sovereign states,—all the parts were riveted together by his conception of eternal justice,—the whole structure was permeated by his hatred of cruelty and love of mercy.[19]

The influence of Grotius' work, however, was not confined to its immediate future or to its own century; it is still the classical work in its field. Nor was it wholly limited in its influence to its own special field—that of humanizing war. It did not, as we have said, directly advocate the total abolition of war. But the passion for peace that pervades its pages and its emphatic proposal that "Congresses of the Christian Powers" be held—congresses which would compel belligerent parties in their own number to accept peace on equitable terms—must have suggested to its readers the possibility of eradicating war altogether and awakened within some of them the hope of attaining this end in a reasonable period of time. The book thus pointed forward beyond itself to a new era in the history of the peace movement—an era in which perpetual peace would be sought as a practical goal.

Peace Plans from 1300 to 1700

But while universal peace seemed to Grotius and most of his contemporaries at the best a remote possibility, there were a few in his own century and before his time who took a more optimistic view, and who formulated more or less realistic plans for a general peace in their own day or the near future.

[19] White, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

Six of these plans between 1300 and 1700 may be briefly outlined. Two belong to the early part of the fourteenth century, one to the middle of the fifteenth century, and three to the seventeenth century. The two from the fourteenth century came from the poet Dante and a French lawyer by the name of Pierre Dubois. The latter's peace plan was expounded in his chief work, *The Recovery of the Holy Land,* which was written between 1305 and 1307 and first published in 1611. Dante's plan for world peace was developed in his *De Monarchia,* the exact date of which is uncertain. Some have put it previous to Dante's exile, January 27, 1302, others between 1309 and 1314, and still others toward the close of his life between 1318 and 1321. Of these three dates the second seems the more likely, and in that case *De Monarchia* was composed a few years later than the book by Dubois. But it differed from the latter and subsequent peace plans in that it looked to the past as well as to the future for its ideal, and hence we may begin our survey of the present period with it.

1. *De Monarchia* has been interpreted by some as a direct reply by Dante to the Bull *Unam Sanctam,* issued by Pope Boniface in 1302, in which the papal claim to supreme temporal and spiritual authority over all men was set forth. But whether this interpretation be correct or not, Dante was a Ghibelline and as such rejected the medieval ideal of a universal theocracy. He denied that the state derives its authority from the church. Both, he held, had a common and direct source in the divine will. Neither was subject to the other. But while Dante repudiated the medieval ideal of a united and universal temporal and spiritual authority, he retained the medieval ideal of a world state. As there is one God, Lord of all men, so, he argued, there should be one supreme monarch

to effect their political union. Only in this way could universal peace be established.

The need of universal peace was grounded by Dante in the unity of mankind and in the nature of man. Since the human race is a unified whole, it must have a single and ultimate goal. This was implied in the universal teleology of contemporary philosophy; it needed no proof. The goal must be something which man is to be or do. Contemplation is the supreme function for which he was created. So "the differentiating characteristic of humanity is a distinctive capacity or power of intellect." [20] To develop this capacity, first by speculation and then by action, is, therefore, the proper work of the race. And to fulfill this task requires the quiet and calm of peace. Universal peace is, consequently, the chief good of mankind. This is confirmed by Scripture.[21]

The monarchy Dante had in mind was modeled on that of the Roman Empire in the reign of Augustus, "under whom," as he said, "a perfect monarchy existed and the world was everywhere quiet." This ideal was kept alive by the Holy Roman Empire, and according to some scholars Dante entertained the hope that it would again be translated into reality by Henry VII, who entered Italy in 1310 and possessed himself of the imperial crown in 1312. It was Dante's belief that it was the divinely appointed role of Italy to establish political unity in its borders and then throughout the world under one supreme monarch. But his *De Monarchia* turned out to be, as James Bryce put it, "an epitaph instead of a prophecy," [22] an epitaph of the Holy Roman Empire. The history of the empire in Italy ended with the death of Henry VII in 1313.

[20] *De Monarchia* (tr. A. Henry), p. 13.
[21] Luke 2:14; 24:36. Rom. 1:7.
[22] *The Holy Roman Empire* (8th ed.), p. 221.

By that time the medieval ideal of a world state had also largely lost its power of appeal to the European imagination. Dante's book was thus an attempt to revive what in its outward framework belonged to a dead past.

Nevertheless, Dante's ideal was a noble one and not without significance for the future. He envisioned a world state ruled by a monarch who was to be an embodiment of justice and wisdom, "the servant of all," and so powerful that he could suppress all tyrannies and establish universal peace. In the abstract much could be said for such a world-wide monarchy, and Dante's argument in favor of it was logical and impressive. The fatal defect in it was the impossibility of finding a ruler and much less a succession of rulers who would measure up to the requirements. This must, of course, have been clear to Dante himself, and hence it has been argued by some of his interpreters that his essay was a prose poem in which "Monarch" and "Emperor" did not denote a particular individual but was a symbol of universal justice and law. Monarchy with Dante stood for a higher and better type of government than that represented by the papacy and by the tyrannical democracies and autocracies with which he was acquainted in Italy. So he employed the term "Monarch" or "Emperor" as opposed to "Pope" and "Tyrant" to typify the kind of political rule needed in the world as a whole. Thus interpreted, his book, it is said, was "the first powerfully reasoned legal argument in Europe, based on premises that are irrefutable and eternally true, in defence of International Government," and he himself was "the first poet-prophet of the World State—the League of Nations." [23]

But even if the literal and common interpretation of the book he retained, it may still be urged that the primary em-

[23] Elizabeth York, *Leagues of Nations* (1919), pp. 69 f.

phasis in it falls on the character of the sole monarch or emperor, not on the absoluteness of his authority. In so far as the book emphasized the latter, it was an epitaph of a dead or dying past. But in so far as it stressed the former and placed the major emphasis on the unselfishness and justice of the ruler, it was a notable prophecy of a new and better age—an age of universal peace. In its external framework it marked the end of one era, and in its inner spirit the beginning of another. This fact gives to it a unique place in the history of the peace movement.

2. Dante's French contemporary, Pierre Dubois, was a legal adviser to Philip the Fair. The title of his book, *The Recovery of the Holy Land,* would naturally suggest a summons to a new crusade. But the central theme of the book is peace. Peace among the Christian nations, it is true, was regarded by the author as essential to a successful military undertaking against the Turks. But his main interest seems clearly to have been the general problem of international relations among the European states. At any rate it is the solution of this problem by a plan for general peace that gives to the book its present interest and significance.

Dubois agreed with Dante in his hatred of war and in the religious and philosophical foundations of his love of peace. Although both drew their inspiration from the Gospels and the Christianized Aristotelianism of their day, they differed sharply in their peace plans. Dubois repudiated the idea of a universal monarchy, saying:

> No sane man could really believe that at this period of the world's history one individual could rule the whole world as a temporal monarch, with all men obeying him as their superior. If a tendency in this direction did appear, there would be wars and revolutions without end. No man could put them down be-

cause of the huge populations involved, the distance and diversity of the countries, and the natural propensity of human beings to quarrel.[24]

Whether in this passage Dubois had Dante in mind, we do not know; but in any case it would obviously apply to him.

Instead of a world state Dubois proposed a federation of independent Christian states. This federation, he held, could be created by the establishment of a council of nations which would have the authority to settle all disputes by arbitration and, if necessary, to enforce its decisions by concerted military action against any offending nation. Dubois was a realist and emphasized the necessity of employing force. He said:

> Since it is proved that neither the Scriptures, nor the elegant lamentations and exhortations of preachers have been sufficient to stop frequent wars and the temporal and eternal death of so many human beings which have resulted, why should there not be found at last a new remedy for militarism, as for example a judiciary backed by force? [25]

Although arbitration was in common use in Dubois' time, he seems to have been the first seriously to propose an international court of arbitration and to lay down specific plans for its organization.

In the proposed federation Dubois naturally expected his own king to play the leading role. He did, it is true, give a certain precedency to the pope by providing for a final appeal to him from the decisions of the court of arbitration. But at that time the Babylonish captivity had begun, and there was

[24] Quoted by F. M. Stawell, *The Growth of International Thought*, p. 63.

[25] Quoted by C. Delisle Burns, "A Mediaeval Internationalist," in *The Monist* (1917), p. 107.

little danger that the pope would be at odds with the French king. This primacy of France would no doubt have led to trouble if the proposed federation had been adopted and put into operation. But no serious effort in this direction was made. Dubois was himself timid about the matter, and asked both Edward I of England and his own King Philip the Fair, to whom he communicated his ideas, to treat them as more or less private for fear that if they became too public he might himself suffer physical violence from those who disagreed with him. So his peace plan proved to be "a prophecy rather than a program" of action.[26]

3. Our third peace plan in the period under consideration takes us into the latter half of the fifteenth century. It resembled the preceding plan in that it proposed a federation of states, not a universal empire. It is associated with the name of George of Poděbrad, king of Bohemia, though it was probably his chancellor and adviser, Antoine Marini, who was chiefly responsible for it. The plan was submitted to the pope in 1461 by Marini, and in 1462 the king of Poland approved it. Other princes, including Louis XI of France, also looked upon it with favor. Besides seeking to establish permanent peace among the Christian nations the project urged a united European front against the Turks, to whom Constantinople had fallen only a few years before, in 1453. This endorsement of a crusade against the infidels was a popular feature of the project and was calculated to win the favor of the papacy. But King George was a Hussite, and this brought him into conflict with the pope. Then, too, this peace plan gave fuller recog-

[26] F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers,* p. 147. See also E. V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France,* pp. 2-19; and Ernst Zeck, *Der Publizist Pierre Dubois.*

nition to the new and growing principle of nationality than was pleasing to either the papal or imperial party. Opposition from these quarters was, consequently, encountered. This is reflected in the later form of the project (1464) in which the emperor was assigned a position below that of the French king, and the pope was denied membership in the federation.

The plan called for an assembly organized on a nationalistic basis, and went so far as to stipulate that the right to declare war was to be delegated by the different powers to the federation. It also provided for a tribunal or court of justice, but its status was subordinate to that of the assembly. The specifications of the plan were more complete and exact than those of earlier plans, and it also differed from them in that it was actually submitted in treaty form to the governments of several countries for ratification. But despite its royal support nothing came of it. No concerted action was taken, and the plan remained in a blueprint stage.[27]

4. The fourth peace plan in our present list carries us down into the seventeenth century. But on the way note should be taken of *The Complaint of Peace* (1517) and other writings by Erasmus, one of the great apostles of peace in the modern world. He did not formulate a detailed plan for organizing peace, nor did he advocate the complete abolition of war. There were, he held, "just and necessary" wars. As for a general peace plan he favored that of a federation.

There is no doubt that a unified Empire would be best if we could have a sovereign made in the image of God, but, men be-

[27] See W. E. Darby, "Some European Leagues of Peace," *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, IV, 169-79; V. J. Lewis, "The Bohemian Project of 1464," *The New Commonwealth*, December, 1933, p. 10.

ing what they are, there is more safety among kingdoms of moderate power united in a Christian League.[28]

He emphasized the value of arbitration, and denounced war as a violation of the law of nature.

From nature, man receives a mild and gentle disposition. . . . God made man unarmed. But anger and revenge have mended the work of God and furnished his hands with weapons invented in hell. Christians attack Christians with engines of destruction, fabricated by the Devil.[29]

Nothing is either more wicked, or more wretched, . . . or more horrible, and . . . nothing doth worse become a man (I will not say a Christian man) than war.

Peace is the mother and nurse of all good things.[30]

There is scarcely any peace so unjust, but it is preferable upon the whole to the justest war.[31]

In this vein Erasmus dealt with the evils of war and the blessings of peace. He wrote as a preacher rather than as a statesman. He inspired to action without working out a definite plan of action.

It was about a century later that the fourth peace plan referred to appeared. It was the work of Emeric Crucé, concerning whose life little is known. He was born in Paris about 1590 and died in 1648. For a long time his correct name was unknown. It was generally thought to be Emeric de La Croix. Not till 1890 was the mistake discovered and his true name restored. A contemporary German writer refers to him

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[28] *Treatise on War with Turkey* (Latin text), pp. 87 f.
[29] *The Complaint of Peace*, p. 39.
[30] *Against War*, pp. 4, 26.
[31] *The Complaint of Peace*, p. 49.

as "a monk and pedagogue" in a college in Paris. But his ecclesiastical status had no appreciable effect on his peace plan, except that it may have led him to give the highest rank in his proposed international congress to the pope. He was himself a broad-minded person, an ardent advocate of religious tolerance, and a firm opponent of religious wars.

His work on peace was published in 1623, two years before Grotius' *Rights of War and Peace,* and was entitled *The New Cyneas, or Discourse of the Occasions and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce Throughout the Whole World.* The name "Cyneas" refers to the minister of Pyrrhus by that name, who, according to Plutarch, sought to convince his royal master of the futility of war. As a "new Cyneas" Crucé thought of himself as having a similar mission "to the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of the present time," to whom he addressed his book. He urged upon them the establishment of an international assembly or congress to serve as an international court and to enforce peace in the world. For democracies he had little respect. He believed in the divine right of kings and in the perpetuity of the monarchical type of government. "It is not," he said, "in the power of mankind to break an order divinely established, like that of monarchies." [32] A point of special interest with regard to his peace project is that it was "the earliest completed plan for a world-wide organization which embraced both Christian and non-Christian nations." [33] The project assigned to the emperor of Turkey a rank second only to that of the pope and ahead of both the Holy Roman emperor and the French king. Another distinctive feature of the project was its emphasis on inter-

[32] *Op. cit.,* p. 40.

[33] S. J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries,* p. 30.

national commerce and domestic prosperity as peace agencies. The merchant, it asserted, is far more useful to human society than the soldier.

5. In 1638, fifteen years after the publication of *The New Cyneas,* there appeared another and more famous but less original peace plan, the fifth in our present list. This plan is commonly known as the "Grand Design" of Henry IV of France, who was assassinated in 1610. It was incorporated in the *Memoirs* of the Duke of Sully, published twenty-eight years after the king's death. As Sully was a minister and close friend of the king, he had every opportunity to know his mind. Nevertheless, it is the prevailing opinion among scholars that the Design was Sully's own work and that he attributed it to the king in order to give it prestige. If this be true, the pious fraud served its purpose well. For the Grand Design owed its high standing and abiding influence largely to its supposed royal authorship. It served about the same purpose in the history of the peace movement as the "False Decretals" did in the history of the papacy.

So far as its own provisions were concerned, they were both less pacific and less inclusive than those in Crucé's plan. Sully proposed a redrawing of the map of Europe in such a way as would inevitably have led to war with the House of Austria. After this war should have been won, he looked forward to a permanent European peace. But war with the Turks was almost certain since they were to be thrust out of Europe. War was also not improbable with other nations who were not members of the new "Christian Republic." This republic was to include Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, but not, to begin with, the Russians and other members of the Greek Orthodox Church. They might be admitted later on their own application. If the Russians refused to enter the association

after it was proposed to them, they were, like the Turks, to be deprived of their European possessions and confined to Asia. In general the purpose of the Grand Design was to establish under the predominant influence of France a union of European states, which would be "always pacific with all Christians, always militant with all infidels." The union was to be constituted by a general council, assisted by six local councils. The general council was to serve as a court of arbitration, and in order to enforce its decisions and maintain peace was to have at its disposal an international armed force supplied by the allied powers.

6. A sixth representative peace project in the period anterior to the eighteenth century was that of William Penn, published in 1693 in *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*.[34] In its main outlines this plan does not differ materially from the schemes of federation that preceded it. Penn acknowledged its kinship to the Grand Design of Henry IV; indeed he emphasized this fact as one that ought to commend it to people in general. The plan calls for the establishment of a European diet, parliament, or league to be convened by the sovereign princes of Europe. "Wars," according to Penn, "are the duels of princes," and hence the initiative in ending wars would naturally come from them. Such a league as he proposed might be entered by the Russians and Turks, but this suggestion in the case of the latter he hardly took seriously. His idea was that the other European powers would enter the league voluntarily, but if any of them refused to do so, coercion would be employed. Penn, though a Quaker, also recognized that military force might for a while be needed to compel obedience to the decrees of the European

[34] For the text see York, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-53.

parliament. Eventually, however, he looked forward to virtual disarmament.

In reply to the charge that the "disuse of the trade of soldiery" would lead to effeminacy, he urged the value of peacetime instruction of youth "in mechanical knowledge and in natural philosophy." "This," he said, "will make them men: neither women nor lions." Among the advantages of permanent peace in Europe he cited "the great security it will be to Christians against the inroads of the Turk," and the "manifest" fact that " the reputation of Christianity will in some degree be recovered in the sight of infidels." In advocating this "peaceable expedient" he confessed to a passionate desire "that the honor of proposing and effecting so great and good a design might be owing to England." But this desire carried with it no political favoritism. England in William Penn's project did not play a role comparable to that of France in the earlier plans of Dubois and Sully.

The six peace proposals which we have briefly outlined were for the most part practical in character. They were concerned with more or less specific plans for organizing peace in the world, particularly in Europe. They had comparatively little to say about the underlying philosophy of peace. The latter was assumed rather than systematically expounded. The only exception, as we have noted, was in the case of Dante. His general standpoint was that of the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of his day. To this the other five, in so far as they had any definite ideas on the subject, would probably have raised no serious objections except at one point: they repudiated the idea of a universal monarchy and with it, of course, the philosophical grounds on which it was based. They all substituted for Dante's world state a European or world federation of states. Otherwise they seem to have assumed es-

sentially the same optimistic view as he with respect to peace as the ultimate goal of mankind.

So far, however, as the near future was concerned, none of these peace plans made an appeal to the conscience and intelligence of its day sufficiently strong to lead politically responsible men to adopt it as a feasible plan of action. The most serious movement in this direction was made by George of Poděbrad, but nothing, as we have seen, came of it. Sully's ascription of a similar movement to Henry IV, cut short by his untimely death, was, as we have said, probably unhistorical. The consensus of opinion was that these plans were at the best prophetic of a distant future. For the immediate present they were mere dreams. Crucé admitted as much with respect to his own plan at the close of his *New Cyneas,* and the authors of the other peace proposals during this period were probably at heart no more optimistic than he. The leaders of political and ethical philosophy in their day took little, if any, account of their peace plans. Influential thought in this field down to 1700 marked no real advance beyond that of Hugo Grotius.

But the foregoing peace plans nevertheless had a significant place in the history of the peace movement. This movement, as we have seen, had its chief historical source in the internationalism of the medieval church. It was the idea of a supernational and supernatural authority that gave birth to it. And this idea in a diluted form continued to exercise more or less influence after the collapse of medieval universalism. But it was not on this foundation that the above peace plans, with the exception of the one formulated by Dante, were erected. Their authors were not concerned with speculative problems. They constructed no theoretical justification of their pacifism. But this does not mean that their peace proposals did not have

back of them a definite world view. They assumed in a general way the validity of the moral and religious teaching of the New Testament and were inspired by it. They found in it a spiritual and authoritative basis for their peace programs, and were led by it to adopt a more optimistic view of human nature and history than had previously been current. Indirectly at least they thus contributed a kind of practical philosophy to the peace movement, and in this respect they represent a distinct stage in its development. Though their peace plans had very little political influence in their own time, they sowed the seeds of a rich harvest in subsequent centuries.

Saint-Pierre and Rousseau

As we now turn to the period from 1700 to 1800 we observe a significant change. During this period the belief in the possibility of universal and permanent peace gradually acquired what may be called intellectual respectability. This change was due largely to the influence of three men: Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). As Rousseau's work in this field was closely linked to that of Saint-Pierre, the two are here treated in conjunction with each other.

Saint-Pierre was the son of a nobleman and inherited sufficient means to make possible an independent life. Educated by the Jesuits he at one time had a rather strong desire to become a monk, but this "attack of the smallpox of the spirit," he later said, left no marks. He was ordained a priest, but to what extent he accepted the teaching of the church is uncertain. He characterized theological disputes as "at the same time the most ridiculous farce and the most horrible scourge

in the world, next to war, pestilence, famine and smallpox." [35] He had the good fortune to be appointed chaplain to the Duchess of Orleans, and through her influence was presented to the benefice of the Abbey of Tiron, a post which considerably increased his annual income and from which he derived the title of *abbé*. Through the good offices of another influential friend he was elected a member of the French Academy in 1695, but in 1718 was expelled from this august body because of his criticisms of Louis XIV, who had died three years before.

His membership in the Academy and his personal friends and ecclesiastical connections gave him access to the court and brought him into contact with the leaders of both church and state. He thus had the opportunity to study the political and social problems of his day at close range and to discuss them with the best minds in Europe. One of these problems, and the most important from Saint-Pierre's point of view, was that of peace. When, therefore, the terms of peace for the War of the Spanish Succession were to be formulated at Utrecht, it was only natural that he should be selected to accompany one of the French plenipotentiaries, Cardinal de Polignac, as his secretary. He spent over a year in Holland, and in 1713 his *Project for Perpetual Peace* was published in Utrecht in two volumes. A third volume was added in 1717, and in 1729 there was issued an *Abstract of the Project for Perpetual Peace,* which appeared in a second edition in 1738. An English abridged edition of the first two volumes was published in 1714 with the following title: *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe, First Proposed by Henry IV of France, and Approved by Queen Elizabeth, and Most of the*

[35] Quoted by M. Roustan, *The Pioneers of the French Revolution* (tr. F. Whyte; 1926), p. 274.

Then Princes of Europe, and Now Discussed at Large, and Made Practicable. Selections from the second edition of the *Abstract* appeared in an English translation in 1927.

Two important contributions to the peace movement may be credited to Saint-Pierre. One is to be found in his thoroughgoing utilitarianism, and the other in the missionary zeal with which he sought throughout his long life to convince the European world, especially its sovereigns, of the desirability and feasibility of creating such a federation of Christian nations as he proposed.

By his utilitarianism is meant the almost exclusive emphasis which he placed upon the material and other advantages of a permanent peace. It was his conviction that these advantages could be made so obvious to the rulers and peoples of Europe that self-interest would dictate their acceptance of his peace plan. This, however, does not imply that his utilitarianism was selfish in its basis. It was grounded in the Golden Rule and in this respect was fundamentally Christian in character.[36]

In his *Project for Perpetual Peace* the Abbé first argues that "the means hitherto used for the maintenance of peace are utterly ineffectual." This, he said, is true of treaties based on promises and also of treaties based on the principle of "the equilibrium of power." Both kinds of treaties are insecure. This is evident from the history of Europe. Princes, whatever their promises may have been, change their minds; and the balance of power loses its efficacy through altered conditions. Hence "the present constitution of Europe can never produce anything else but almost continual wars, because it

[36] Rather oddly Miss Souleyman declares that Saint-Pierre did not approach his peace ideal from the Christian point of view, but "took for the foundation of his structure the Golden Rule," which, she says, is "the basis of the doctrine of utilitarianism." *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

can never procure any sufficient security for the execution of treaties." [37]

What Europe, therefore, needs is to get rid of the "vain idol" and "wretched system" of the equilibrium and substitute for it a society or federation of states, "permanent and sufficiently powerful" to prevent aggression and to suppress rebellion. Such a federation would be of incalculable value. Not only would it insure "the Christian princes a sufficient security both without and within their dominions"; but it would protect commerce, increase trade, save the nations from the devouring expenses of war, make possible a more general education of the people, and promote the development of the arts and the sciences. These and numerous other advantages Saint-Pierre dwells on. He discusses them not only in general but in considerable detail, pointing out the particular benefits that would accrue to the various sovereigns and their dominions from the adoption of his peace plan.

He also devotes special attention to the constitution of the proposed federation. He limits the union to Europe, not because of any personal objection to its extension to the whole world, but because of the fear that its all-inclusiveness "would cast an air of impossibility upon the whole Project." [38] In determining membership in the federation he not only begins with the *status quo,* but makes provision for its permanence. This obviously runs counter to the law of change, but it was a feature of the plan that would naturally commend it to the rulers of his day. In this respect the plan may be said to have been realistic as well as utilitarian.

It was this realistic and utilitarian character of his project that led to its author's implicit faith in its practicability and

[37] *Op. cit.,* p. 2 (Eng. tr.).
[38] *Ibid.,* p. viii.

to his own missionary zeal in advocating it. "I myself," he said, "formed it in full expectation to see it one day executed." [39] Its execution or adoption as the law of Europe was not to be accomplished by the use of force, as was Sully's Grand Design, but rather through sweet reasonableness. All that Saint-Pierre thought necessary was to secure the signatures of the European sovereigns to the twelve "fundamental articles" in his project or to others equivalent to them. This he believed could be done with almost automatic certainty in view of the benefits the rulers would derive from it both in time and in eternity. He, for instance, said:

> It seems to me that . . . it is almost impossible but that if this project comes to the knowledge of the four and twenty principal sovereigns of Europe, there will be at least two who will sign it; that it is almost impossible but in time those two will persuade a third; that it is almost impossible but in time those three will persuade a fourth; that thus it is almost impossible but this Society must in time increase, and at last in less than half an age arrive at its whole accretion and its entire settlement.[40]

This hope, so confidently affirmed and reaffirmed, was doomed to disappointment. For the most part it called forth ridicule and expressions of complete skepticism from both philosophers and political leaders. "It reminds me," said Leibnitz, "of a motto on a grave, *pax perpetua;* for the dead fight not; but the living are of another temper, and the most powerful have little respect for courts." [41] "The thing is very practicable," said Frederick the Great; "it only needs, in order to succeed, the consent of Europe and several similar baga-

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[41] Quoted by Hemleben, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

telles." [42] Cardinal Fleury suggested sarcastically the need of first sending missionaries to the princes of Europe to prepare the way for the new creed. And Voltaire characterized the project as a "chimera" "unquestionably more fantastic than the idea of a world-language." One might as well try, he said, to convert wolves from eating lambs as attempt to persuade men not to engage in war.

But despite the chorus of dissent and contempt with which Saint-Pierre's plan for perpetual peace was greeted, it was he who really introduced the problem of world peace into political literature and gave it, if not intellectual respectability, at least such standing as to command the attention of the intellectual leaders of his day. This achievement was due in part to the thoroughness with which he expounded and defended his peace plan and still more perhaps to the long sustained and wide-spread publicity that he gave it. Virtually every chancellery in Europe was bombarded for decades with literature on the subject. Down to the close of his long life of eighty-five years he continued the advocacy of his project with apostolic zeal and truly religious fervor. There is nothing comparable to it in the entire history of the peace movement.

But a more important factor in winning a measure of support for Saint-Pierre's project in intellectual circles was its endorsement by Rousseau. After the Abbé's death some of his friends asked Rousseau to put his ideas into more concise and attractive form. This Rousseau did in a summary of his project, published in 1761, a summary in which, aside from the mere kernel of the project, there is "much more of Rousseau than of Saint-Pierre." [43] Later he wrote a brief criticism

[42] Quoted by York, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[43] *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau* (ed. C. E. Vaughan), I, 360.

of the plan which was published posthumously in 1782.

Rousseau heartily endorsed the idea of a European federation. It was, he held, the one sure and certain road to peace. He commended highly the essential principles on which Saint-Pierre's plan was based, the arguments by which it was supported, and the unselfish zeal of the author in advocating it.

> It would seem that his well-balanced spirit, intent solely on the public good, led him to measure his devotion to a cause purely by its utility, never letting himself be daunted by difficulties, never thinking of his own personal interest. If ever moral truth were demonstrated, I should say it is the utility, national no less than international, of this project. The advantages which its realization would bring to each prince, to each nation, to the whole of Europe, are immense, manifest, incontestable; and nothing could be more solid or more precise than the arguments which the author employs to prove them.[44]

The Abbé's project, Rousseau insisted, was not "an empty dream." It was "a work of solid judgment." If it is never executed, it will not be because it is utopian. "It will be because men are utterly unreasonable. And a sane man among lunatics is nothing but a fool." [45]

There was, however, according to Rousseau, one fundamental defect in the project. This had to do not with the project itself but with the proposed method of its realization. Saint-Pierre, as we have previously noted, thought it sufficient simply to have the project signed by the European monarchs —a thing they would do out of self-interest. But this Rousseau regarded as a childish fancy. We must, he insisted, distinguish between real and apparent interest. The former would be

[44] *A Lasting Peace* (tr. C. E. Vaughan), pp. 92 f.
[45] Cf. Stawell, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

secured by an abiding peace; that is proved by the Abbé. But what determines the policies of most monarchs and their ministers is apparent interest. And this leads to frequent wars, as all history attests. To suppose that it would be otherwise in the case of his peace project was the Abbé's one great delusion. "Planning for his contemporaries," said Rousseau, "the Abbé, if we speak frankly, was working for imaginary beings and designing the top of a building, the foundation of which was still to be laid." [46] The real monarchs of Europe, Rousseau argued, were quite different from what the Abbé thought they were. They would never assent to his peace plan. Only a revolution could establish a European federation; and this "would perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages." With this dubious and rather pessimistic forecast Rousseau concludes his appraisal of Saint-Pierre's project.

It would, however, be a mistake to see in these concluding words the key to the author's attitude toward world peace. He was, it is true, less optimistic of its attainment than Saint-Pierre. He had no confidence in its establishment through a federation of monarchs. Such a federation based on the independent and arbitrary wills of individual rulers seemed to him an idle dream. But he had a substitute for it—a federation that would be the outgrowth of "the general will." By the general will he did not mean the will of the majority but the capacity of man to rise above his own individual interests and consider the interests of all men taken together. It was this native human capacity that led to local self-government, to the formation of states, and to the rise of religions and other bonds of union that have sought to curb the selfishness of men. To instruct and guide this native social capacity, this

[46] Quoted by Souleyman, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

law-making power inherent in man's nature, is no easy thing. But in its normal development and extension to international relations Rousseau saw a rational basis for the hope of universal peace. When, if at all, this hope would be realized, he was too irrationalistic and too realistic in his conception of human nature to predict. What he contended for was that the hope was reasonable, feasible, and profoundly ethical.

Immanuel Kant

Saint-Pierre and Rousseau did much to commend the idea of world peace to the sober intelligence of the eighteenth century and to transform it from an impracticable vision to a rational faith. But more influential than the work of either of these men in bringing about this change was the treatise on *Perpetual Peace* by Immanuel Kant, the greatest of modern philosophers. No philosopher of first rank before his time had entered the lists in support of a plan for establishing universal peace. His treatise on the subject was published in 1795, the year in which the Treaty of Basel, ending temporarily the war between Prussia and France, was signed. The title of the treatise and also its content make it clear that in writing it Kant had in mind both Saint-Pierre and Rousseau and that he was to some extent influenced by them. He was obviously in sympathy with their fundamental aim, but he treated the whole subject more systematically and profoundly than either of the other men. He also differed from one or the other or both of them in certain important respects. And these differences constitute the most significant contributions that he made to the philosophy of peace. Three of these may be singled out for special attention. One has to do with the principle of right, another with the republican type of government, and the third with nature as a peace agency.

1. "We must desire perpetual peace," says Kant, "not only as a material good, but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty." [47] This truth was, of course, assumed by Saint-Pierre and Rousseau and by other early pacifists of a utilitarian turn of mind. But it received from Kant a unique emphasis which made it virtually new. In conformity with his ethics the concept of right was fundamental in his approach to the problem of perpetual peace. "Seek ye first," he said, "the Kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of Perpetual Peace, be added unto you." [48] The saying that "honesty is the best policy" is unhappily often contradicted in practice; but that "honesty is better than policy," that it is, indeed, "the indispensable condition of all true policy," is morally indisputable. This is true also of right in general. Right comes first. It justifies itself and casts the mantle of its own authority over whatever is directly deducible from itself. This is the relation in which perpetual peace stands to right. It is the social or political embodiment of the moral principles of freedom and equality as applied both to states and individuals. These principles are inherent in the concept of right and receive their highest expression in the ideal of perpetual peace. This ideal is, therefore, founded not on prudence but on duty. It is an ideal which *ought* to be achieved; and because it *ought* to be achieved, it *can* be achieved.

A new moral tonic was thus injected into the peace movement by Kant. It was lifted out of the realm of wishful thinking and grounded in the moral reason. It was given a perma-

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[47] *Perpetual Peace,* Appendix I, p. 131. The page reference is to the translation of this and other Kantian essays by W. Hastie in *Kant's Principles of Politics* (1891).

[48] *Ibid.*

nent place in the science or philosophy of both politics and ethics, and thus acquired a degree of intellectual respectability that had not previously been accorded it. In, however, maintaining the rationality and practicability of the peace ideal Kant did not expect its speedy realization. Indeed, he "warns us not to drag in the conditions of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal gradually as favorable circumstances permit." [49] The important question with him was not *when* the ideal would be realized, but *whether it was realizable.* The latter possibility was with him the presupposition of all truly moral politics.

Kant drew a rather sharp distinction between the political moralist and the moral politician. The former subordinates morals to politics and thus reduces morality to expediency, canceling the moral idea altogether. The moral politician, on the other hand, subordinates politics to morals in such a way that the principles of political expediency can coexist with the absoluteness of the moral imperative. Morality thus retains its distinctive character, and yet leaves a legitimate place for such imperfect and developing expressions of it as are necessitated by the physical and psychological limitations of human life in both its individual and social forms. Such an ideal as that of perpetual peace is, therefore, not to be attained suddenly through some sort of revolution, nor is the quest for it to be based primarily on its material attractiveness. It is to be sought because it is a moral and hence obligatory ideal. To seek its realization is first and foremost a duty, and because it is such the quest for it is capable of fulfillment. The conception of the peace ideal as a duty is, therefore, of fundamental importance. It is the only adequate protection against the corroding unbelief of the practical man who

[49] *Ibid.*

pretends to be able to foresee from the nature of man that men will never resolve to do what is required to bring about the result that leads to perpetual peace.[50]

If there be no human right which compels respect directly by its rationality, then all influences put forth to control the arbitrary will and liberty of men, will be found unavailing. But if along with the sentiment of benevolence, the principle of right speaks aloud, human nature will show itself not to be so degenerate that its voice will not be heard with reverence.[51]

2. The second basic element in Kant's philosophy of peace has to do with its political organization. And here the emphasis falls on "republicanism" or representative government. Kant distinguishes sharply between a republic and a democracy. The latter, he holds, is "necessarily a *despotism*," and in this respect differs from both an autocracy and an aristocracy, neither of which is *necessarily* despotic. The essence of despotism is "the irresponsible executive administration of the state by laws laid down and enacted by the same power that administers them." [52] This union of legislator and administrator is absolute in the case of a democracy, but not necessarily such in an autocratic or aristocratic government. The word "democracy," however, at present is seldom, if ever, used in its strict Kantian sense. With us it means essentially the same as republicanism and is the antithesis of despotism. Republicanism, according to Kant, is in principle "the political severance of the executive power of the government from the legislative power." [53] It thus makes law independent of and superior to any would-be tyrant.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[51] *The Principles of Political Right*, p. 62.
[52] *Perpetual Peace* (Second Section), I, 92.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

Underlying the republican form of government there are three principles or conditions of right: the liberty of the members of the civil state as men, their equality as subjects, and their self-dependency or independence as citizens. These principles place the authority of the state in the hands of the people or their elected representatives. Such a government, Kant argues, would naturally be loath to enter upon a war, because the people in this case would be bringing all its evils and horrors upon themselves. A despot, on the other hand, "need not in the least suffer personally by war," and hence he can "resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition." [54] The first definitive article, consequently, that Kant lays down as a condition of perpetual peace between states is that "the civil constitution in every state shall be republican."

Republicanism, however, does not simply predispose states in favor of peace. It also prescribes in a general way the method by which world peace may be securely established. That method might at first seem to require a world state. Such a state would seem to be the logical culmination of the republican type of government. As a national republic insures peace within a particular nation, so a universal republic would insure peace throughout the world. What is needed, therefore, to establish perpetual peace is to extend the republican principle from individuals to nations and to merge the latter in one great organization analogous to that of the present limited state. Such an organization would put an end to public war as effectually as the individual state now suppresses private war within its borders.

But while in theory a world state would seem to be the goal of man's political development and the one certain guarantee

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

of universal peace, it is itself an impractical ideal. It might "be even more dangerous to liberty than war by introducing the most terrible despotism." [55] A surrogate or substitute for it must, therefore, be found, and this we have in a federation of free states. Such a federation would be based on the right of nations, on justice and good will. It would exclude the use of force or violence in its establishment, and also in its maintenance except in so far as force might be needed to suppress unjust aggression—a need that would gradually disappear. That a federation of this kind was entirely practicable Kant thought could be easily shown. "For," he said, "if happy circumstances bring it about that a powerful and enlightened people form themselves into a Republic—which by its very nature must be disposed in favor of perpetual peace—this will furnish a centre of federative union for other states to attach themselves to, and thus to secure the conditions of liberty among all states, according to the idea of the right of nations. And such a union would extend wider and wider, in the course of time, by the addition of further connections of this kind." [56]

3. Kant, however, did not rest his case for perpetual peace merely on the human conscience and on the republican form of government. He found a basis for it also in the mechanism of nature or in what from the religious point of view would be called Providence. Nature, Kant argues, is so organized that it makes for ultimate peace. In other words, there is inherent in nature a principle of moral progress. This principle is implicit in the innate sense of duty, which prompts virtually everyone "so to act in reference to posterity that they may

[55] *The Principle of Progress*, p. 72.
[56] *Perpetual Peace* (Second Section), II, 98.

always become better." [57] And in default of positive disproof this sense of duty is to be accepted as valid. The moral progress of the race is possible. And not only is it possible; the belief in it is justified by history. But the perpetuity of this process through an indefinite future, in which we believe, cannot and will not depend so much on what we ourselves do as on what "human *Nature* as such will do *in* and with us to compel us to move in a track into which we would not readily have betaken ourselves." [58]

Nature, for instance, leads to the formation of the state as a protection against crimes within and wars from without. Men would rather be free from the restraints of government, but their own native selfishness and belligerency make these restraints necessary. Without them both life and property would be insecure. Men were, consequently, led by their instinct of self-preservation into a kind of "social contract" by which they surrendered much of their individual liberty. Nature thus wrought a change in their mode of life. It virtually forced them to prefer a just and orderly government to unrestrained freedom. It has been said that justice has always been men's second choice. What nature did was to compel them in their corporate capacity to make it their first choice.

Justice and peace were thus established within the different national groups through the agency of nature. The same agency has also been working for justice and peace in international relations, but more slowly and less effectively. Recalcitrant nations are more difficult to deal with than recalcitrant individuals. Then, too, social anarchy preceded international anarchy and had to be dealt with first. Indeed, there could be no international anarchy in the strict sense of the term

[57] *The Principle of Progress,* p. 68.
[58] *Ibid.,* p. 71.

until social anarchy had in principle been overcome by the organization of independent states. But since this was accomplished, the evils of war have pointed steadily to the need of a world state, analogous to that of a centralized national government. As the latter suppressed social anarchy within its borders, so the former would suppress international anarchy.

But a world state may easily lead to a soulless despotism, an evil greater even than that of war. So nature has provided an effective resistance to this tendency in the differences of language and religion. These differences tend to keep nations apart from each other and to prevent their political unification. On the other hand, nature utilized the commercial spirit to bind them together. Both political unity and diversity are thus being forced upon mankind by nature. And the union of these two apparently contradictory forces can be effected only in a federation of states.

It may then be concluded, according to Kant, that as the stars in their courses fought against Sisera, so nature fights against international anarchy. It has been said that this Kantian argument from nature has been "long realized as being philosophically untenable." [59] But that depends on what is meant by philosophy. If philosophy is identified with naturalism or atheism, the statement is no doubt true. The ascription of purpose to nature implies more or less of a theistic or religious world view. But such a world view is not unphilosophical; it was implicit in Kant's philosophy, and from its point of view his appeal to nature is a profound and convincing argument. The colossal evils of war and the general course of human history are such that war is certain eventually to be abolished. The moral structure of the universe points to this conclusion. We may, therefore, take heart.

[59] Hemleben, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

Universal peace is no chimera. We are warranted in struggling for it, for nature itself leads the willing and drags the unwilling toward its realization.

Since the time of Kant there have been several peace proposals that have attracted wide attention. Three of these may be mentioned. One was by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder of English utilitarianism with its principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." It was entitled "A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace" and was written between 1786 and 1789, several years before Kant's treatise.[60] But it was not published until 1843, so that it really belongs to the nineteenth century. Its chief characteristics were its substitution of public opinion for force as a means of maintaining peace, its advocacy of disarmament and of an international tribunal or court of judicature, its criticism of secret diplomacy, and its plea for the renunciation of colonies.

In 1840, three years before the publication of Bentham's peace proposal, there appeared another in *An Essay on a Congress of Nations* by William Ladd, the founder of the American Peace Society. This plan met with much favor in the United States and had considerable influence also in England. It agreed with Bentham's plan in laying the primary emphasis on public opinion. Public opinion was to be the executive branch of the international government, a congress of nations the legislative branch, and a court of nations the judicial branch. The court was to be organized and its members appointed by the congress, but otherwise it was to be independent. For this feature of the plan Ladd claimed originality. Previous plans had provided for a world court, but the judicial functions of the court were merged with the

[60] For the text see *The Works of Jeremy Bentham,* II, 546-60.

legislative and other functions of the congress or assembly. The separation of the court from the congress, however, was not especially significant, as neither had the power to enforce its decisions.

A third noteworthy peace proposal belonging to the nineteenth century dates from the year 1884. It was the work of James Lorimer of Edinburgh and was published in his *Institutes of the Law of Nations*.[61] This plan differed from earlier programs in that it provided for a separate executive branch of government whose functions were to be exclusively international. It also differed sharply from the peace proposals of Bentham and Ladd in that it made provision for an international army which would enforce the legislative enactments of the congress and the judicial decrees of the court. In this scheme we have quite distinctly international "government on a new and higher level."

The foregoing plans, published in the past century, and others similar to them contained some valuable practical suggestions and contributed not a little to the creation of peace sentiment. But they added very little, if anything, to the argument for peace. The essentials of this argument, as expounded by Kant, are still valid. The intervening history may have cast some doubt on the efficacy of the republican type of government as a peace agency. Nations, we now see, may at times "be infected with the madness which was once thought to be the monopoly of monarchs." As a result the realization of the peace ideal may seem more difficult to us than to Kant. But while this may be true, the course of events has made world peace far more urgent in our day than in his. The invention of the atomic bomb alone has increased this urgency a hundredfold. This fact more than offsets any

[61] Vol. II, chap. xiv, pp. 279-87.

lessened confidence we may have in the pacific character of republics or democracies. But however that may be, no treatise has appeared since the time of Kant that has displaced his as a basic philosophy of peace. His *Perpetual Peace* is still the classic philosophical treatise on that subject. "Every page of this precious essay," said Nicholas Murray Butler, "will bear reading and rereading in the light not only of the times, but also in the light of all that is going on at this very moment." [62] These words were written at the close of World War I, and they are equally true at the close of World War II.

[62] Introduction to Kant's *Perpetual Peace,* p. viii.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROAD TO WORLD PEACE

In the preceding chapter we considered the philosophy of peace in the light of its historical development. We noted three main stages in the evolution of the peace movement and took brief account of twelve representative plans for world peace that appeared during the past six centuries. In the present chapter we are to deal with the more important methods that have been proposed or employed in the effort to avoid war and to promote the cause of peace. This line of study will to some extent overlap that of the preceding chapter, but its material is sufficiently distinct to call for separate treatment.

Of the three chief stages in the history of the peace movement that we have pointed out one was the transition from primeval anarchy and virtually universal war to organized government and independent states. The newly formed states suppressed private warfare in their own midst but initiated international wars separated by periods of peace of varying length. This transition was effected gradually and with varying degrees of thoroughness in different parts of the world. But in principle it was coincident with the emergence of civilization. It gave a large degree of peace and security to human beings who before had been living under the curse of private wars, which really meant "the war of all against all."

The period of public wars, however, while it marked an important advance on the road to peace, left much to be desired. International anarchy took the place of social anarchy.

Men gave their love to their fellow citizens, but at the same time looked upon the rest of mankind as their enemies. Wars were frequent, and they were carried on with all the cruelty and brutality of primitive savages and on a scale that made them as single events "a thousand times more terrible" than the private feuds of earlier times. Under these conditions it was inevitable that the humane instincts of mankind should revolt against them and seek at least to mitigate their evils. This revolt first took on an organized and widely influential form in the Christian Church. Through the code of chivalry and the development of international law much was done and is still being done to moderate national animosities, to reduce the frequency and duration of wars, and to eliminate some of their more barbarous features. But the contributions thus made to the cause of peace have had their distinct limitations. And they have been to a large extent, if not completely, offset by the appalling magnitude of the recent world wars and by the still more appalling deadliness of the weapons of war. In view of these facts it has been increasingly evident to the more enlightened spirits in Christendom that this second stage in the history of the peace movement cannot be the final one. No conceivable restrictions that could be placed upon the methods of conducting war could make of war anything but a relic of barbarism and an unspeakable curse. The peace movement during the past two centuries has, consequently, become more and more a movement directed toward the total abolition of war.

This third stage on the road to peace is only in its beginning. But this beginning has been important. During the past two centuries the world peace movement has won for itself both intellectual and political respectability. In the

first half of the eighteenth century European philosophers generally ridiculed the idea of perpetual peace. And in 1815 when Alexander I of Russia, who was in Paris at the time, handed a copy of "The Holy Alliance" to Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, to be sent to the regent for signature, it was not without difficulty that the British minister and the Duke of Wellington, who happened to be with him, went "through the interview with becoming gravity." These were Castlereagh's own words used later in describing the interview. Here were two of the most influential men in English public life a little over a century ago who found it difficult to keep a straight face when talking with the Russian czar about a serious proposal to establish lasting peace in Europe. That sort of an attitude is now fortunately largely a thing of the past. Statesmen no longer smile superciliously at the peace movement, and philosophers no longer sneer at it. Since the time of Immanuel Kant there has been an increasing tendency to take the idea of world peace seriously and to accord it a recognized place both in philosophy and in politics. Certainly it is no longer dismissed as absurd by political and intellectual leaders, as it was until comparatively recently.

But the mere possibility or practicability of world peace leaves the problem of its realization still unsolved. It is with this problem that we are to deal in the present chapter. The problem is one of method or methods, and is a complex one. Many different methods of avoiding war have been tried or at least proposed. Here the following will be briefly considered: a universal state, the balance of power, mediation and arbitration, disarmament, the outlawry of war, absolute pacifism, a world federation of states, and the spirit of international co-operation.

A Universal State

We have already discussed in a general way the contributions of the early and medieval church to the cause of international law and peace. It was in Christian teaching that the peace movement had its historical rootage and its indispensable spiritual foundation. The organized church also through its councils, its canon law, and its claim to supreme and universal spiritual authority kept alive the idea of the rights and duties of nations and prepared the way for the later attempts to organize world peace on a political basis. But while considering these general ecclesiastical aspects of the peace movement in the pre-Reformation period, we devoted comparatively little attention to the medieval conception of the state as represented by the Holy Roman Empire and as an international peace agency.

When the Western Roman Empire was restored by Charlemagne in A.D. 800, it was not regarded as a new political creation, or the revival of a political entity that had been defunct since A.D. 476. It was thought of as the continuation of the one undivided Roman Empire which had had its seat in Constantinople from A.D. 476 to A.D. 800. The Roman Empire did not, then, come to an end in A.D. 476. It simply transferred its capital from the West to the East. Charlemagne, consequently, was listed in the annals of the time and for centuries thereafter, as the direct successor of the deposed Constantine VI of the so-called Eastern Empire. The latter was the sixty-seventh emperor in the line of succession from Augustus, and Charlemagne the sixty-eighth.

This fact has an important bearing on the medieval theory of the state. According to this theory the empire was one and indivisible, as was the church. The two were not in-

dependent of each other. They were rather two names for the same thing or for two aspects of it. Cemented by the coronation of Charlemagne in A.D. 800 and again by the coronation of Otto the Great in A.D. 962 they became a unit as the Holy Roman Empire. In this ideal unity one involved the other. The Christian Church implied the Christian state, and the Christian state the Christian Church. The two constituted a mystic dualism, corresponding to that of the two natures in the person of Christ. One could not be defined without reference to the other, yet each had its own distinctive sphere of working. The divine and eternal sphere belonged to the church and its head, the pope, who was intrusted with the care of men's souls; and the human and temporal sphere belonged to the state and its head, the emperor, who had the task of ruling over men's bodies and acts. The two authorities were in the abstract conceived as co-ordinate and as working harmoniously together. At least this was true at first and until bitter conflict between the two led to the assertion of supremacy on the part of the church.

In the light of the foregoing theory of the relation of church and state to each other it may be noted that there were three leading principles underlying the secular imperialism of the Middle Ages. The first was the conception of the state as a monarchy. Although this was less essential than the other two, it grew up inevitably out of the conditions and modes of thought of the time. The Middle Ages were dominated by the idea of authority, and authority was conceived as having its source above humanity, not within it. Applied to human government this would naturally suggest a divinely appointed ruler or emperor. Indeed, the existence of such a ruler was implied in the exact correspondence of earth and

heaven which was assumed by medieval thinkers. As God in heaven ruled over the blessed spirits in his immediate presence, so his vicar, the pope, ruled over the souls of mortal men below; and so also there must needs be another viceroy of Deity, the emperor, whose duty it was to rule over the earthly affairs of men. Monarchy was thus inherent in the very nature of the world state. But it was not a despotic monarchy, or rather whatever there was of despotism in it was a despotism, not of force, but of law. It was in the ethical sense of the term a paternal despotism. Its function was to promote peace and well-being in the world. Monarchy or empire, in other words, denoted a beneficent and divinely established rule. The name "Roman" was applied to it because of its historical associations and the influence of tradition.

The second basic principle of medieval imperialism was the parallelism of church and state in their spheres of activity, to which we have already referred. As soul and body operate in unison without one literally subduing the other, so it is with church and state. They are made for each other. They are both servants of the same King. Both have the same general purpose. Both are concerned with the welfare of Christendom as a whole. Both stand in the same direct relation to the Lord of the universe; and their own rulers are so related to each other that one could be defined in terms of the other. One might speak of the pope as a spiritual emperor and of the emperor as a secular pope. Both are bound together in a common mission, so that one is of necessity under obligation to support the other. Their duties run parallel to each other in one ordered whole. In the ideal there can, therefore, be no conflict between them. The state is committed to the same high aims as the church.

The third determinative principle in the medieval con-

ception of the imperial state was its universality. Here, too, the state resembled the church. As there was but one church, so there could be but one empire. Their limits were co-extensive, and their common universality had in each case both a historical and a philosophical basis. The historical basis in the case of the church was complex and need not here engage our attention. It was in part, however, the same as that of the universal Christian state, namely the abiding influence of the historic Roman Empire. This empire in its glory was one and universal, and so it was felt it must be with its successor or rather its continuation in the form of the Holy Roman Empire with its two arms of the church and the state.

A philosophical basis for the universality of both the state and church was found in the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic theory of ideas. According to this theory the universal is more real than the individual. Humanity is more real than a single person. In other words, reality is proportional to universality, and the same is true of worth. Reality and worth go together, and both have their highest expression in universal being. The ideal state is, therefore, the universal state, and in the nature of the case there can be only one such. Hence there can be only one empire and one emperor.

It was this political ideal that hovered above the medieval world. Reality, it is true, ruthlessly contradicted it. The existent empire was weak, and anarchy and brutal warfare were rife. But the ideal was nevertheless a living force, and the evils of the present in a way made it all the more such. They increased the sense of need and thus made more vital faith in the ideal of peace and security. And this ideal in view of traditional habits of thought took the form of a universal monarchy. Nothing else seemed in keeping with the

fundamental truths of political and religious philosophy. It was this point of view that formed the basis of Dante's *De Monarchia.*

With the Reformation, however, and the division of the church in the West, with the growing enfeeblement of the Holy Roman Empire and its final disappearance in 1806, and with the gradual decline of philosophical realism the idea of a world state lost its place in the considered judgment of mankind both as a practical objective and as a theoretical ideal. Napoleon, it is said, dreamed of a great European empire embracing—besides Europe—Egypt, India, and other parts of the East. Hitler also had a similar dream with virtual world domination as his goal. But neither of these aspirants to world rule could be said to have represented the true modern spirit. The modern world desires peace, but not at the cost of liberty. The only peace it will accept or permanently tolerate is the peace of free men. Such a peace as a Napoleon or a Hitler might conceivably have established would have been shattered before long by rebellion. Certainly Hitler's dream of a thousand years of Germanic peace could never have been realized. It came eight or nine hundred years too late. In the modern world linguistic, economic, cultural, religious, and other national differences are too highly prized as personal privileges and too firmly established to permit of a superstate imposed by force upon the sixty or so independent nations. Indeed, such a state even if freely assented to would be so vast and complex that it is very doubtful if it could be successfully administered. Napoleon said that "great empires die of indigestion," and this would probably be the ultimate fate of a universal state, whether organized by peaceful or coercive measures.

It is true that science and its application to mechanical

invention have remarkably unified the spatial and material world. Commerce has brought all nations together and made them interdependent in a way that would have been thought impossible in earlier times. In this respect Hitler's Third Reich had an advantage over the First Reich, which lasted from A.D. 800 to A.D. 1806 and probably suggested to Hitler the millenial reign of Nazidom. The Second Reich, which began in 1871, had less extensive territorial aspirations than the First and Third Reichs, and hence was disparaged by the Nazi ideologists. The Third Reich in its quest of universal sovereignty had ready at hand, as the First Reich did not, a large degree of international unity due to the extraordinary increase of trade and commerce and to rapid means of intercommunication on which it could build. These developments seemed to many to make possible for the first time a real world state.

But a state must have something more than a unified material foundation. It must be grounded in a unity and community of faith and culture, and this cannot be created by science alone. It has its rootage in a common history and in common spiritual experiences that give rise to a common ethic and a common outlook upon life. Such an ethical and spiritual unity, it is clear, does not at present exist as a basis for a world state, nor can it be artificially created. Yet without it there can be no universal state. A world state as a road to lasting peace is from the modern point of view an idle dream. Such a state could not under existing conditions be established peacefully, and if established by force it would probably lead to a despotism worse than war itself. Such is the prevailing conviction of our day. The modern mind looks askance at the idea of a universal empire because of its apparent impracticability and also because of its evil potentialities.

The only kind of government that would seem to us capable of being world-wide and durable would be one with a limited objective. Such a government would not be a full-fledged state or empire. It would concentrate its energies on the maintenance of peace, and its authority would be derived from the concerted will of a community of nations. These nations would retain their independence in most matters. The only thing they would renounce would be the assumed right to threaten the peace of the world and to go to war. This right, if such it be, would be surrendered to a world security organization, whose distinctive task would be to prevent its exercise by any state or group of states. This is as far as modern statesmanship would be willing to go in the direction of a world government, and it is only recently that it has indicated a willingness to go as far as this. It has no place in its visions of the near or even remote future for a universal empire.

Walter Lippmann in the recent symposium entitled *One World or None* has argued in favor of the formation of a world state. A mere league of nations, he maintains, will not suffice. It leads inevitably to war. The one way to insure peace is to establish a universal state. Such a state, he tells us, is "inherent and potential" in the United Nations organization, and its formation ought to be "the principal objective of American foreign policy." To this task the United States ought to dedicate its vast power and influence. For a world state is the only key to world peace. But while he professes in speaking of a world state to have in mind "the exact meaning of the term," it is obvious that by the word "state" as used in this connection he does not mean a state in the full historical sense of the term. He means, to use his own words, a "union of mankind under universal law" or "a universal order of equal laws," "designed to maintain the peace" and

applicable to individuals as well as nations. This, however, does not in principle go beyond the idea, above expressed, of a government with a limited objective, restricted to the maintenance of peace. A government so limited is not a state, as commonly understood, and to speak of it as such is misleading. A true world state would be some sort of universal republic or empire or other form of political organization with comprehensive powers and authority. And the hope or dream of such a state, long cherished in the distant past, is not likely to be revived in the foreseeable future.

The Balance of Power

The repudiation of the medieval ideal of a world state was followed in Europe by the adoption of the more realistic and less ambitious doctrine of the balance of power. This doctrine was accepted both by theorists and by practical statesmen not only as a road to peace but as a protection against the tyranny of an overgrown, if not universal, power. The latter is the respect in which it achieved its most conspicuous successes. One need but recall the position of overweening power, acquired by Spain under Charles I (1500-1558) and his son Philip II (1527-98), by France under Louis XIV (1638-1715) and Napoleon (1769-1821), by Russia under Nicholas I (1796-1855), and almost attained by Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler, and by Japan, in order to realize what a potent factor the principle of the balance of power has been in the long struggle for the maintenance of liberty in the modern world. For it was this principle that justified and inspired the alliances and coalitions which brought eventual defeat to all of these threats to human freedom.

To what extent the balance of power has contributed to the peace of Europe, it would be difficult to say. From the begin-

ning of the sixteenth century to the early part of the nineteenth it was the generally accepted basis of European diplomacy. After the close of the Napoleonic wars it was for a time obscured by various national upheavals, but toward the end of the past century it was revived, and early in the present century the attempt to establish a balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was the prelude to the first World War. In the light of these four centuries of European history it is evident that the principle of the balance of power has not succeeded in maintaining peace for any great length of time. Wars have succeeded wars with distressing frequency and with an alarming increase in their violence and destructiveness. It is possible, indeed probable, that conditions would have been still worse without the policy of equilibrium. But this fact is frequently overlooked, and the result has been a tendency to berate the idea of the balance of power as though it were wholly evil.

It is, for instance, said to be "a doctrine of might, not of right." But to make it deliberately and exclusively such is to misunderstand its essential nature. What the balance of power seeks to establish is "such a just equilibrium between nations as shall prevent any one of them being in a position to dominate the rest." [1] It advocates "mutual cooperation for national independence." [2] Such cooperation, it is clear, has no necessary kinship to "power politics." It is unselfish in its aim. Its purpose is to prevent aggression and to promote the common welfare. What it proposes is to use might in the interest of right and thus maintain peace. The principle on which it operates is simply this: if one or more states contemplating aggressive action are confronted by forces equal to their own,

[1] *Encyclopedia Britannica,* 14th ed., II, 953.

[2] Colonel Maurice, *The Balance of Military Power in Europe,* p. 3.

they are likely to prefer a peaceful way of settling their disputes. There can hardly be any doubt that this policy has often been effective, and that many wars have been prevented by "the balance of power."

This phrasing of the principle was not employed in antiquity, but the principle itself was familiar. Greek writers frequently referred to it.[3] Indeed, it was this principle that to a large extent governed the relation of the Grecian states to each other and to other states. Said Polybius: "Such a force ought never to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighboring states from defending their rights against it."[4] Rather is it the duty of all states to see to it that the power of every neighboring state or group of states is so limited or regulated by alliances, coalitions, or other means, that their own liberty and the liberty of other states is not imperiled by it. This is a dictate of common sense, enlightened by experience and guided by the instinct of self-preservation and by regard for the common good. As such it must have suggested itself as a wise maxim to political leaders from the beginning of human history. The one great instance in which it failed to operate successfully was that of the Roman Empire. For some reason the Romans were confronted with no such general confederacy or coalition of hostile states as might have been expected in view of their conquests and avowed ambition. The result was that one state after another was subdued until virtually the whole civilized world came under Roman dominion. Hence the balance of power did not figure in their political history the way it did in that of the Greeks. Universal empire pretty much stamped it out both in theory and in practice.

[3] See David Hume's essay on "The Balance of Power" in his *Essays, Literary, Moral and Political,* pp. 198-203.

[4] *Histories,* Book I, chap. 83.

The theory of the balance of power is directed primarily against the rise of an aggressive and tyrannical state. Whether a state is too powerful or not for the common good is not determined simply by its physical strength but also by its respect for the rights of others. "The state," said Friedrich von Gentz, "which is not prevented by any external consideration from oppressing a weaker, is always, however weak it may be, *too strong* for the interest of the whole; the state which can be made to respect the rights of the weakest, though perhaps in itself the most powerful of all, is not *too powerful.*" [5] It is, then, not the superior power of one state or group of states that is inconsistent with the system of political balance, but the misuse of such power as a state or group of states may have. No doubt the possession of superior power may lead to its misuse, but the two do not necessarily go together. Nor is a causal relation between them assumed by the balance of power. The true balance of power lays stress not merely on equality of power but on fairness and justice in its exercise.

It is, however, true that there is peril in the excessive power of any one state or group of states. A sound realism, therefore, seeks to avert this peril by equalizing, so far as possible, the power of rival states or groups of states. This was the chief purpose of the traditional principle of the balance of power. Through the process of equalization or equilibrium it was hoped that states would see the futility and folly of their mutual rivalry and so co-operate in the maintenance of peace. In the theory of a political balance there was thus implicit both as a background and as a goal the idea of a peaceful union of all states. The theory was not then opposed, as is often assumed, to the plan of a European or a world federation. It was

[5] *Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe* (1806), pp. 111 f.

rather a step in that direction. The "balance of power" pointed forward to what Mr. Asquith and Woodrow Wilson called a "community of power."

As a final method of dealing with the problem of peace the balance of power has obvious limitations.

1. It does not seek the abolition of war. Its contribution to the cause of peace consists in preventing wars, so far as possible, by making them unprofitable. This it does by creating among peace-loving nations a body of resistance to aggression sufficiently strong to make war a dubious, if not a foolhardy, enterprise on the part of any state or group of states. The plan has not been wholly unsuccessful, but its immediate objectives have been too limited to meet the needs of the modern world and to solve the problem of war.

2. The proper balance of power in a particular case is often difficult to determine, for the international scene is continually changing. New alliances are being formed and old alliances dissolved. Hence a balance of power sufficient to make war improbable at one time may be wholly inadequate a few years later. This method of preventing war is, therefore, at the best only a temporary expedient.

3. The figure of a balance is unfortunate in several respects. It suggests an exact equilibrium of power as the ideal relation of nations or groups of nations to each other, and this implies that a nation or group of nations, whenever it secures a military advantage over its rivals, may be expected to employ it in aggressive action. The result is mutual fear and suspicion. Undue stress is laid on the niceties of a perfect balance. Minor matters are emphasized out of all proportion to their importance. Secret diplomacy is encouraged, and a state of mind thus generated that defeats the very purpose of the principle underlying a true balance of power. The fact is that a strict

equilibrium of power is itself in unstable equilibrium. Winston Churchill had this in mind when in criticizing "the old doctrine of the balance of power" in his Missouri address he said that we cannot afford, if we can help it, "to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength." Only when the nations that stand for peace and order have superior strength can the balance of power be secure and achieve its true end. Balance in this case, when properly understood, means, not equality, but international stability.

4. The expression "balance of power" is also unfortunate in that it admits of an undue emphasis being placed on "power" and thus obscures the moral motive underlying the principle itself. Military power alone, however it may be distributed, cannot guarantee a truly balanced relation of nations to each other. International stability must be based not only on physical might but on such imponderable factors as justice, good will, and mutual understanding. These spiritual factors cannot be weighed in a scale but they are essential to the establishment of a true balance of power. A dynamic equilibrium is more or less secure in proportion to the degree in which it incorporates within itself the above moral forces.

This truth should be borne in mind in the interpretation and appraisal of the theory of the balance of power. But along with it there must go a recognition of the importance of military force as a means of maintaining world peace. This is the truth emphasized and perhaps overemphasized by the theory of a political equilibrium and also by that of a universal state. Both theories are in this respect realistic. A superstate would by virtue of its supreme authority deal with war in the same effective manner as the national state does with acts of violence on the part of individuals. Superior power would suppress bloody strife between states as it does crime within states.

This does not mean that other means of a moral and educational character would not be employed; but it does mean that where these fail, peace will be enforced by the strong arm of the superstate as it is by the civil authorities in the relations of individuals to each other. Force, in other words, is in both cases the final, though not the only, court of appeal.

It is force also that is the outstanding factor in the principle of the balance of power. According to this principle the nation or nations who are threatening the peace of the world are to be confronted by other nations of superior or at least equal physical strength opposed to their designs. Other peace measures are essential as supplements and as guides to the use of force, but they cannot under existing conditions be accepted as complete substitutes for it. Fear of defeat is still indispensable as a deterrent of military aggression, and even it is not always sufficient to weight the balance in favor of peace.

Mediation and Arbitration

We now turn to two peace measures, mediation and arbitration, which make their primary appeal to reason, not to force, and which seek through moral and rational considerations to settle disputes that might otherwise lead to war. These two lines of procedure suggest themselves so naturally to the human mind as effective means of dealing with cases of serious friction between both individuals and states that they must to some extent have been employed from the earliest times. But it is only in the last two or three centuries that they have acquired a semilegal status.

In principle, mediation and arbitration amount to about the same thing. They are both efforts to maintain peace through the spirit of compromise and good will, through reason and mutual understanding. The differences between them are for

the most part formal. In the case of mediation a third power at the request or with the consent of two other powers intervenes in order to establish friendly relations between the latter before they have recourse to arms or even after war has broken out between them. A mediator may thus have the function of terminating as well as averting war. In the case of arbitration, on the other hand, the differences between two nations are referred to one or more selected persons who act as a kind of court. The arguments of both sides are presented and judgment is then passed on the questions at issue. It is here that we have the main point of difference between arbitration and mediation. In the latter the third party renders no decision. It simply gives advice and makes suggestions to those who have invoked its help or accepted its proffered aid. By way of distinction from this, arbitration is a judicial or semijudicial act. Its award is not directly enforceable in the international field, as a civil award would be if made a rule of court, but there is implied a moral obligation on the parties concerned to accept it.

It has been said that "the eighteenth century was the century of mediation, and the nineteenth that of arbitration." [6] This is, of course, only relatively true, but as a relative truth the reason for it is worth noting. The preference for mediation as over against arbitration in the eighteenth century was due to the fact that nations were then unduly sensitive on the point of their own sovereignty. They disliked the idea of a court or council of arbitration endowed with authority to pass judgment on international disputes submitted to it. This seemed to them an encroachment on their own supreme authority. Arbitration was rare, consequently, not only in the eighteenth but in the two preceding centuries. Mediation, on

[6] S. J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace,* p. 189.

the other hand, limited itself to friendly advice and conciliatory suggestions. It contained no mandatory element, and hence was more acceptable to the statesmen of the day and more frequently employed by them.

But even mediation had its obstacles with which to contend. Nations hesitated to seek it when most needed for fear that under these circumstances it would be a reflection on their honor. And, on the other hand, they were at times reluctant to offer their services as mediators for fear it might give offense. Then, too, it was often difficult to find a mediator on whom both parties could agree. But in spite of these drawbacks mediation has maintained a place for itself along with arbitration as an important peace agency.

Two developments may be noted in the history of mediation during the past century and a half. One is the differentiation of its field from that of arbitration. There has been a tendency to limit arbitration to such disputes as can be settled on the basis of international law, while disputes of a political character lying outside the recognized domain of international law are assigned to the sphere of mediation or conciliation. Disputes of the first kind are commonly called "justiciable," and those of the second kind "nonjusticiable." The distinction is not one that can be sharply drawn in every instance, but it is sufficiently clear to warrant at least for the present an independent place for mediation alongside of arbitration. Eventually it may be that there will be less stress on the differences between the two and that virtually all serious disputes between nations will be regarded as "arbitrable."

The second development that international mediation has undergone has taken the form of a movement in favor of the establishment of a permanent international council to which

political or nonjusticiable disputes may be referred for settlement. This council might be one devoted exclusively to the work of conciliation or one which has this responsibility along with other duties, such as was provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations. In either case there would be a double advantage over the older method of mediation. The difficulty involved in securing a satisfactory mediator for every dispute would be avoided; and the conclusions reached would as a rule carry far greater weight with the disputants than would the opinions of a single individual or a single state, especially as they would likely be supported to a larger degree by the pressure of public opinion. The probability is, therefore, that an international council of conciliation of some kind will ultimately supersede the older individualistic method of mediation. There is, however, no necessary conflict between them, and the two might continue to operate indefinitely as independent agencies.

But while mediation or conciliation is of permanent value as a peace measure, arbitration has an advantage over it in that it assumes the existence of international law binding on all states. In the eighteenth century, statesmen in general were not ready to recognize such a law as an obligatory standard of national conduct. But after the Napoleonic wars sentiment changed. It was now felt that some moral restraint must be placed upon nations as well as individuals, and hence international arbitration became increasingly the order of the day. From 1820 to 1840 there were eight such cases, and from 1880 to 1900 the list had grown to ninety. There was, consequently, an obvious need of a permanent court of arbitration; and such a court was established at The Hague in 1899. Its establishment "marks a momentous epoch in the history of interna-

tional arbitration."[7] Since then it has come to be generally recognized that such a court with its authority strengthened and expanded constitutes the firmest and most promising foundation for the structure of world peace.

Reference has already been made to the distinction between legal, justiciable, or arbitrable disputes on the one hand, and political, nonjusticiable or nonarbitrable disputes on the other hand. This distinction is fluid and may eventually to a large extent disappear. But there are two aspects of it of fundamental importance concerning which there has been and still is considerable difference of opinion. One has to do with disputes affecting the honor and vital interests of a nation, and the other with the question as to whether arbitration should be made compulsory. On both of these questions the peace conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 adopted the conservative point of view. Under existing circumstances this was probably wise. But the need of going further was soon felt. In July, 1914 arbitration was proposed by Serbia and mediation by Britain, but neither proposal was accepted, and soon thereafter the world was engulfed in war. At its close there was a strong conviction that arbitration ought to be made compulsory and extended to include all serious differences between nations, whether they involve national honor and vital interests or not.

This introduces us to a new period in the history of the peace movement. But before taking it up there are three peace proposals of minor significance that have in recent times attracted wide attention and that call for brief consideration. These are disarmament, the outlawry of war, and absolute pacifism.

[7] *Enc. Brit.*, 14th ed., II, 222.

Disarmament

The word "disarmament" has two distinct meanings—one absolute, the other relative. In the former sense it means the total destruction and permanent abolition of all military armament and equipment. This is obviously an ideal that has and can have no vital place in the practical politics of our day. Relative disarmament, however, has been a live issue for half a century past. What it aims at is a general reduction and limitation of armaments agreed to by most, if not all, states. This movement had two main causes: the financial burden of increasingly heavy armaments, and the fear that excessive military preparedness would by creating a powerful military caste and by stimulating the greed of munition makers strengthen the war spirit and make war more likely. Disarmament had thus the double purpose of lessening the peril of war and the cost of preparation for it. It rapidly became a popular movement. The first Hague conference was called primarily to deal with and promote it. But the objections of the German military delegate caused its abandonment. Before long it came to be generally recognized that disarmament in and by itself is an impracticable procedure. There can be no general disarmament without security. The two must go together, and the assurance of security must come first. It is not disarmament that creates security, but security that makes disarmament possible.

It used to be said a few years ago that "the way to disarm is to *disarm*." This was a popular slogan of the peace movement. But the matter is not so simple as that. Disarmament presupposes a solution of the problem of security. And not only that; the problem of reducing and limiting armaments is in itself an extremely complex and difficult one. An immense

amount of earnest and patient labor was devoted to the subject in the interwar period, but with rather disappointing results.[8] The only real success was that achieved by the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22, a conference that owed its inception to partisan politics. The Republicans felt the need of having a substitute for the rejected League of Nations, and this conference was their answer to Woodrow Wilson and his League supporters. The reduction of naval armaments effected by the Washington Treaty relieved for a time the dangerous tension between the United States and Japan, and brought about a great saving in naval expenditures. But it was limited in its scope, and its chief value was nullified when Japan condemned the treaty in 1936. This took place outside the League.

Within the League there was extended discussion of the subject of disarmament, and a General Disarmament Conference was held covering a period of three years—1932-35. This conference failed to achieve its immediate objective, as did also the preceding discussions in the League Assembly. But the conference and the League discussions were not on that account fruitless. The various proposals and debates connected with the subject of disarmament brought out three points in particular.

One of these we have already emphasized; the utter futility of disarmament as a peace measure when taken by itself alone. Disarmament involves a political disadvantage, and no nation will voluntarily consent to it without receiving some adequate compensation in return. This compensation must take the form of some other means of security. But the need of this

[8] See Salvador de Madariaga, *Disarmament* (1929); and the symposium on *World Organization* (1942) published by the American Council on Public Affairs.

security would vary with different nations, for a proportionate disarmament would mean a greater political loss to some than to others. How to adjust security to disarmament thus becomes a serious and difficult problem. Indeed, it was the basic problem of the League. France, for instance, demanded certain guarantees of security in return for disarmament, while Great Britain and the United States, the only countries able to pay the price, were unwilling to do so. This was the chief obstacle to the success of the disarmament conference, and no one can deny that the French demand was in principle just. A considerable reduction and limitation of armament cannot be asked of a nation without some adequate compensating provision for its security. The League clearly taught the world this lesson.

Another point brought out by the deliberations of the League was the complex character of security. National security must have a spiritual as well as a physical foundation. It must be based on arbitration as well as on military power. Indeed, arbitration must be the basis of both security and disarmament. This point of view was brought boldly and effectively before the League Assembly in 1924 by Ramsay MacDonald, and from that time on arbitration was treated as a fundamental factor in the discussion of disarmament. Disarmament, which began as a single and independent issue, now became the third member of a triple alliance. The first was arbitration, and the second was security. The three succeeded each other in logical order. Arbitration was seen to be necessary to security, and both of these were obvious presuppositions of disarmament. To seek disarmament directly would, consequently, be to put the cart before the horse.

The problem of disarmament became thus primarily political. But of course it remains also a technical military problem. The technical questions may, as Madariaga said, be "only po-

litical questions in uniform." But they are nevertheless distinct questions, and questions of both vital importance and great complexity. The disarmament conference spent an immense amount of labor on them, and with what is generally regarded as quite satisfactory results, so that their solubility may now be taken for granted. "In fact, as the authorities agreed, all the technical work for a reduction and limitation of armaments has been done. If and when the political situation makes it possible, a general treaty could be concluded in a very short time." [9] But such a treaty, it must be borne in mind, would be of no avail without arbitration agreements and adequate guarantees of security, ratified by some sort of world community.

The Outlawry of War

America or at least some segments of the population had a bad conscience over the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations. And in order to allay this feeling or to justify the Senate's action two different peace measures were widely endorsed and actively propagated during the 1920's. One was disarmament, which was not new but which was, as we have noted, given a new impetus by the political party in power. The other had its origin in Chicago and is known as the outlawry of war. Its author was S. O. Levinson, a Chicago attorney, but its most ardent exponent and its true prophet was C. C. Morrison, editor of *The Christian Century,* who devoted an entire volume to an eloquent exposition and advocacy of it.[10] The movement won the adherence of such distinguished men as William Borah, Frank B. Kellogg, and John Dewey. Through the influence of Mr. Kellogg its basic doc-

[9] Laura P. Morgan in *World Organization,* p. 130.
[10] *The Outlawry of War* (1927).

trine was incorporated in a multilateral treaty, signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by representatives of fifteen states. Forty-nine other states were invited to adhere to the treaty. Thirty of these and the original fifteen ratified the treaty by the midsummer of 1929, and on July 24 its formal proclamation took place in Washington. Eventually it was ratified by nearly all states of the world.[11] This treaty or pact was at first known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, but is now generally referred to as the Kellogg Pact. Dr. Morrison hailed Mr. Kellogg's part in bringing about the adoption of this pact as "the natal day of peace." "The peace movement," he said, "has at last, been born. There has been no peace movement until now."[12]

The outlawry of war proclaims itself a revolutionary doctrine. It differs from all other peace measures in three main respects. 1. It defines war as a legally established "institution," brands it as a "public crime," and puts it absolutely beyond the pale of law. 2. It repudiates all politico-military means for the establishment and maintenance of peace. Such means imply the use of force and belong to the outlawed war system. War is outlawed by being declared to be such by the united will of the nations without involving any of them "in any political entanglement or military commitment whatsoever." 3. The outlawry of war sets up a world court which is purely juridical in character. Its decisions are based, not on arbitration, but on an accepted code of international law. They have, therefore, as their foundation "the plighted honor of the nations and a decent respect for the good opinion of mankind," and need no other sanctions.

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[11] See the biography of Frank B. Kellogg by David Bryn-Jones, pp. 222-51; see also John E. Stoner, *S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris* (1943).

[12] Quoted by Madariaga, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

In this doctrine there is expressed a high ideal of international relations. But as a practical measure for bringing about world peace there are few who today would put much, if any, faith in it. Nations do not as a rule go to war because war is a legalized institution, nor would they abstain from war simply because it was "outlawed." The legal status of war is not the cause of wars but their effect. No doubt laws may tend to perpetuate evil institutions, and they may promote reforms. But the value of a law either for or against an institution may be easily exaggerated. Unless the outlawry of war were supported by a large majority in all the great nations of the world, it would almost certainly fail of its objective. And this proved to be the case with the Kellogg Pact. This pact may serve as a model for some later world community, but it certainly did not at the time of its adoption have the wide and deep-seated backing claimed for it by the outlawrists.

Two further defects in the outlawry theory may be noted. One is its recognition of the right of self-defence and its apparent failure to see that this implies the existence of defensive and just wars to which outlawry does not properly apply. As most wars are wars of this type or are alleged to be such by the warring nations themselves, it is obvious that the technique of outlawry leaves the larger part of the war problem unsolved. Another serious defect of the theory is that it rejects the idea of a league of nations; and yet the initiation of its own plan and the successful operation of its court are manifestly dependent upon some sort of a world community. Without such a community or league of nations the whole structure would be suspended in the air. That such an unrealistic peace proposal should have won the kind and degree of public support that it did cannot but be a source of surprise to later genera-

tions. Its simple-minded optimism reminds one of Saint-Pierre's project.

The temporary vogue achieved by the theory was probably due chiefly to psychological and political causes. It bore the stamp of being made in America, and was offered as a substitute for the European League of Nations, thus appealing to the isolationist sentiment in this country. But this fact made the theory of doubtful value, if not of positive disvalue, from the international point of view. Such a distinguished representative of the League as Madariaga characterized it as "a red herring, the best meaning red herring that ever navigated the waters of international thought and politics, but a red herring for all that and one most disturbing for the true cause of disarmament." Its propagation he declared to be an "international calamity."[13] According to Sumner Welles it represented a "means of evading rather than accepting responsibility," and "marked a high point in isolationist thinking in this country."[14] But however that may be, the course of events during the past fifteen years has to a large extent exposed its futility as a practical peace measure and nullified its influence, except as a possible legal basis for the trial of war criminals, and also as a possible legal warrant for halting in its earlier stages any movement that threatens the peace of the world.

Absolute Pacifism

Another antiwar measure of subordinate significance in the history of the peace movement is that represented by pacifism in its more extreme form. Absolute pacifism, as we have called it, is for the most part religious in its origin. It consists in the refusal to participate in any war on the ground that war is not

[13] *Op. cit.*, pp. 282, 286.
[14] *The Time for Decision* (1944), p. 48.

only an evil, but is in its very nature morally evil so that participation in it is a sin. Taking this view the only morally consistent attitude toward war is that of the conscientious objector. He refuses to have anything whatsoever to do with it, because he regards it as inherently criminal and sinful in character, as "utterly and irremediably unchristian." [15] For him to have any part in it would, therefore, be a violation of his conscience, and his own conscience he rightly places above the authority of both state and church. Neither of these institutions and no external authority, either human or divine, has in his opinion the right to compel him to do what he sincerely believes to be wrong. His fundamental and primary concern is thus with his own rectitude. He seeks above everything to fulfill the Christian moral ideal and to keep himself unspotted from the world. In other words, a species of individualistic perfectionism underlies his pacifism. This at least would seem to be true of many, if not most, conscientious objectors.

But absolute pacifism is not merely an individualistic movement. It claims to be a means and the only adequate means of bringing about world peace. G. J. Heering, for instance, one of the most distinguished pacifists of this type, says that "there is only *one* thoroughly moral and therefore effective pacifism, the pacifism which *really and on principle* outlaws war, the pacifism that *really and on principle* condemns war ethically, and therefore will never regard it as anywhere admissible." [16] To the same effect the Society of Friends in 1920 issued a manifesto "to the Christian Churches of all lands," in which

[15] S. Eddy and K. Page, *The Abolition of War* (1924), p. 64.

[16] *The Fall of Christianity*, p. 234, a book which on its translation from the Dutch into English in 1930 was welcomed in pacifistic circles as "the standard and authoritative work on the all-compelling subject of Christianity and World Relations." P. 8.

they said, "We are profoundly convinced that peace can only be attained by refusing to take any part in war, for the simple and wholly sufficient reason that war by its whole nature is in opposition to the message and spirit of the life and death of Jesus Christ." [17] Experience, however, hardly justifies this optimistic conviction. Absolute pacifism may flourish in times of peace, but in the presence of the immediate threat and reality of war it tends to fade away. Its strict adherents are reduced to a "microscopic and politically negligible minority." [18] Such at least seems to be the lesson of history thus far.

Still the doctrine persists, and various considerations are offered in support of the belief in its possible effectiveness as a peace measure. It is, for instance, occasionally said that if a whole nation were to turn "pacifistic" and allow its territory to be overrun by an invading enemy without forcible resistance, this self-sacrifice on its part would send a moral thrill of inestimable value throughout the world. But in response it may be safely said that no such act of self-immolation on the part of any nation capable of effective resistance would ever commend itself either to mortal man or moral man. Self-defense is a privilege and a duty which no self-respecting nation would forego. Again, it has been urged that a strong pacifistic movement in a country would prevent its rulers from adopting a warlike policy. But to this it may be retorted that such a movement in one country may encourage belligerency in another, as was the case in the relation of England and Germany to each other before the second World War. To avoid this by so regulating the growth of absolute pacifism as to have about the same proportionate number of conscientious

[17] Quoted by Heering, pp. 93 f.

[18] Norman Angell, *Human Nature and the Peace Problem*, p. 8.

objectors in each of the great powers would obviously be an impossible task.

It is further argued that every great spiritual movement had its beginning in a small minority. "The only way," we are told, "the Kingdom of God can ever come is to have a nucleus of people who practise it here in this very difficult present world, who have faith enough in it to make a venture and experiment of trying it." [19] But while this may in a general way be true of the Kingdom of God, conceived in individualistic terms, there is no adequate theoretical or experimental ground for believing that it would hold true of absolute pacifism with its political implications. If this doctrine were to be at all widely accepted and put into practice in any great state, it is practically certain that this state would before very long be overthrown and its people subjugated. So self-evident is this that no responsible statesman would think of proposing such a policy; and under these circumstances it would seem impossible that absolute pacifism as a political program should ever play anything but a minor role in the great movement toward universal peace.[20]

This, however, does not mean that it may not be and is not a movement of very considerable spiritual value. Several facts may be noted to its credit. But before taking them up there is one spiritual aspect of the movement that is open to criticism. This is a tendency toward an irrational mysticism on the part of some of its adherents who apparently claim for themselves a unique degree of enlightenment. G. J. Heering, for instance, to whom reference has been made, says of his own attitude to war that on this point after long and sore strife his eyes were

[19] *Friends and War* (1920), p. 15.

[20] Cf. Kirby Page, *Must We Go to War?* (1937); *The Will of God for These Days* (1945), pp. 132-49.

opened, that he received a revelation which to him was "holy and complete," that in this way his spirit was released "from a sinful delusion in which Christianity has been ensnared ever since its fall," and that the best in his own book on the subject of Christianity and war was not his own but the work of Him who compelled him to write.[21] He concedes that this absolutist position would hardly have been justifiable two or three centuries ago. "An upright Christian like Cromwell could say, without seeming profane, 'Trust in God and keep your powder dry.' "[22] But that time, he maintains, has now passed. The development of Christian humanitarianism, on the one hand, and of the methods of warfare, on the other, has since then been such that at present no alliance whatsoever between Christianity and war is morally permissible. This conclusion he bases not on history or reason, but on a special revelation that has somehow come to himself and others like-minded. There is thus in his absolute pacifism an obvious mysticism that with some people might lead to fanaticism, and that in his case is associated with a species of irrationalism similar to that into which abstract idealism and an abstract theological ethics are prone to fall.

But despite the mystical and irrational tendency in absolute pacifism and the illicit abstractionism in its ethics there is no denying an element of moral heroism in the movement. The conscientious objector exposes himself to the charge or suspicion of cowardice. He defies public sentiment, and this brings upon him the disapproval of the community and at times of his own family. He puts himself in a class so small that he is likely to be thought of as "queer," as more or less defective either mentally or morally, as self-centered and more inclined

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 278.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

to spiritual pride than to humble self-sacrificing service. Of all this the conscientious objector is probably aware. Yet he persists in his refusal to participate in war in any way on the ground that such participation would be sin. This action on his part manifestly requires courage, though not that of the battlefield. It also involves remarkable moral determination, no matter how mistaken his judgment may be. This attitude of mind deserves respect, and constitutes a valid reason for exemption from military service. Both state and church have with us adopted this point of view.[23] An added reason for such exemption is, of course, to be found in the fact that conscientious objectors are because of their convictions psychologically unfit for combat service, as much so as others may be physically unfit for it.

More important, however, than the personal virtues or qualities of conscientious objectors and absolute pacifists in general are the contributions they have made as a group to the moral criticism of the modern state. They have seen in the mounting authority of the latter a serious menace to the rights of the individual, especially the rights of the individual conscience. These rights they have, consequently, championed with a vigor and boldness unsurpassed by any other group. They have also by their renunciation of war both in theory and practice helped to keep the ideal of a warless world before the public mind, and in this way have served as a spiritual tonic in the body politic. Their program of action as a practical peace measure has achieved comparatively little. And their theory of nonresistance, if accepted in its absolute sense and literally carried out, would lead to anarchy, as Tolstoi clearly

[23] See E. S. Brightman, "About Conscientious Objectors" in *Zions Herald,* Aug. 8, 1945.

saw.[24] But in spite of this they have played a considerable role in religious circles, and assisted in the creation of peace sentiment and in the development of a more humane conception of the state.

Some pacifists try to escape the anarchistic implications of the doctrine of nonresistance by drawing a sharp line between the use of force by policemen within a state and its use by soldiers in war. The former, we are told, is justifiable because it is "under law and responsible to civil authority." Furthermore, it is essential under existing conditions as a means of preventing social anarchy. The use of force in war, on the other hand, is said to be "outside of law." There is no central authority to control the relation of nations to each other, and hence there is no "moral analogy between police force and war." But this line of argument implies a virtually Machiavellian conception of war, except that a directly opposite purpose is attributed to it. Machiavelli put war beyond the moral law in order to justify its independent existence. The pacifists here referred to, on the other hand, assign to war a lawless status in order to brand it as morally unjustifiable.

Taken seriously this mediating pacifist position assumes that statutory law can do what neither the universal moral law nor international law can do—it can justify coercion. But why should it have this exclusive authority? Why should it be morally permissible to apply coercion to offending individuals and not to offending nations? Why should the idea of a just war be ruled out? Why should armed resistance to an invading foe be morally unwarranted? To ask these questions is to answer them. The considered moral judgment of mankind recog-

[24] *The Kingdom of God Is Within You* (1893). "Christianity in its true meaning," it is argued here, "destroys the state." P. 242. See Knudson, *The Principles of Christian Ethics*, pp. 227-30.

nizes no fundamental difference between the coercion exercised by the police force and that exercised by the army. Both have the same basic function—the defense of the organized community. If one is morally legitimate, so is the other. And if one is to be morally condemned, so is the other. The most consistent form of absolute pacifism is that represented by Tolstoi, who put both kinds of coercion on the same plane and condemned them both, frankly accepting anarchy as the logical consequence. The attempt to avoid this conclusion by admitting the ethical justification of physical coercion within a state and denying it in international relations impresses most people as an apologetic device, arbitrary in character and without support in the unsophisticated conscience. Mere legality has no such ethical significance as is here assumed. Absence of statutory law does not absolve a nation from its moral obligations. In view of this and other facts mentioned above it is not strange that the general tendency has been to look upon absolute pacifism as temperamental rather than rational in its basis. Its high aims and noble spirit are acknowledged, and so also is the inspirational value of the movement. But as an independent and practical program for the abolition of war and the establishment of world peace it has in the nature of the case exercised comparatively little influence. Its real significance lies elsewhere. This is apparently coming to be recognized by many absolute pacifists, and the result is that the cleavage between them and moderate pacifists seems at present to be considerably less marked than it was before the war.

A World Federation

We now return to the point reached at the close of the section on mediation and arbitration. Neither the principle of the balance of power nor the principle of arbitration could be re-

garded as complete in itself and as final. Both required a world federation for the fulfillment of their aims. Such a federation also was the only alternative to the medieval ideal of a universal state, rejected by the modern world. Disarmament, the outlawry of war, and absolute pacifism have, it is true, been proposed as short cuts to universal peace. But none of them, as we have seen, offered a sound basis for the attainment of their objective. They all attracted considerable attention during the interwar period, and by emphasizing certain aspects of world peace no doubt had some value. It would be unfair to describe them as "pills to cure an earthquake." But they did confuse many people by diverting their attention from the main issue. The only real progress toward organized world peace is through some sort of league of nations. For this there can be no substitute; a world community is the one key to universal peace.

This has become increasingly clear in the modern world. Ever since the medieval ideal of a universal state began to fade away, progressive political thought in the West turned more and more to the idea of a federal union of European states and eventually of all nations. This was illustrated in our survey of the history of the peace movement in the preceding chapter. Not only the visions of idealists but the alliances formed by practical statesmen and their steadily increasing efforts to settle international disputes by mediation or arbitration pointed toward a world federation. This normal line of development, however, was impeded by national jealousies and especially by the rival ambitions of the great powers and their sensitiveness to any restriction of their own sovereignty. Arbitration to be an effective guarantee of world peace would obviously have to be compulsory and applicable to all disputes between nations. But both the compulsory element in arbitration and its

universal scope met with stout resistance on the part of military and political leaders of the old school, especially in Germany. And before this obstacle could be overcome the first World War intervened.

With the defeat of Germany in 1918 it was thought that the world was ready for a new era in the field of international relations, and the League of Nations was set up in 1919-20. This League was not new in principle. It was the natural culmination of developments that had been taking place for upwards of six centuries. But in its synthetic or universal character it was new. It was far more comprehensive geographically and in the number and variety of its activities than anything heretofore attempted. It was also new in that it broke with the conservative military and political tradition with regard to sanctions and to disputes affecting national honor and vital interests. The Covenant of the League provided for compulsory arbitration. Lord Balfour, speaking for the British Government, so interpreted it in an address on July 6, 1925:

> Arbitration is the thing; there is no question which can arise which will not be submitted to arbitration. If arbitration be really observed, war will be impossible. If either party to a dispute refused to arbitrate or to carry out a decision of arbitration, our obligation and that of the other parties would be to throw in our whole strength to defend the aggrieved party.[25]

This position was reaffirmed by the powers most immediately concerned in the Locarno Pact agreed upon in October, 1925. But while the general idea of compulsory arbitration was thus endorsed, there was still a distinct reluctance to agree on specific measures for implementing it. The Geneva Protocol, adopted October 2, 1924, provided for such measures by am-

[25] Quoted in *Enc. Brit.*, 14th ed., II, 224.

plifying the coercive clauses of the League Covenant, but the influence of Great Britain prevented its ratification. The result was a general feeling of uncertainty as to whether and how far the League would go in applying sanctions to an offending member.

The lack of a firm and consistent policy at this point has been regarded as responsible for the weakness of the League. But the reverse would probably be nearer the truth. The weakness of the League was the cause of its halting policy with respect to sanctions. At the very outset the League received a crippling blow when the United States refused to become a member of it, and from this blow it never recovered. The added strength which American membership in it would have given the League would almost certainly have led to firm action on its part in the critical cases with which it was forced to deal. And this might very well have prevented the second World War. Certainly no single thing did more to weaken the League and defeat its main purpose than the refusal of America to participate in it.

Among other causes that contributed to this end there are three of a general character that may be mentioned. One was the efforts of some states and their representatives to utilize the League for their own selfish advantage. They failed to realize that the League called for a new type of diplomacy, and hence they persisted in the older diplomatic methods with their resort to secrecy, deception, and power politics. The result was distrust and suspicion.

Another source of weakness within the League was a rather sharp difference of opinion with respect to revision and security. Some in the interest of security opposed any serious revision of the *status quo* of 1919, and others discounted the importance of security in the interest of revision. The revisions

proposed had to do chiefly with territorial and related changes.

A third internal cause of weakness was the conflict between political leftists and rightists. From 1920 to 1932 the League was regarded by communists generally as a plutocratic organization, and much was done by so-called liberal forces to sabotage it. From 1933 to 1939 the leftists "seemed to capture the League," [26] and tried to employ it against the unruly and rebellious "fascist" nations. But the conservatives refused to give their assent to such action for fear that Bolshevism would benefit from it.

The League was thus handicapped by disintegrating forces within as well as by lack of adequate strength with which to cope with the outside world. It is, therefore, not strange that it failed of its main objective. It did not solve the problem of world peace. But the causes of its failure, it should be noted, did not grow out of defects in the organization itself. Its basic principles and juridical structure were sound and so also in general were its methods of procedure. Its weaknesses were due to the accidents of American politics and to the failure of its own members to live up to the principles of the League and to utilize properly its machinery. So far as the need of such an organization is concerned, the course of events instead of lessening has enormously increased it. Never did the nations of the world see so clearly as they now do the necessity of a federal union of states. Only through such a union can wayward and bleeding humanity be saved from the barbarism of international anarchy and the awesome peril of atomic warfare. If a league of nations had no other function than to control the atom bomb, its existence would seem to be fully justified, if not imperatively demanded.

The Charter of the United Nations, adopted at the San

[26] Pitman B. Potter in *World Organization* (1942), p. 9.

Francisco Conference in 1945 by representatives of fifty nations, represents an advance in several respects beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations. The fatal defect of the latter, as we have pointed out, was its military weakness. It lacked the direct support of the United States and, until 1934, of Russia. It depended too much on public opinion and too little on the application of sanctions. It was too idealistic or at least not sufficiently realistic. It failed to realize adequately the obligation to use force and the necessity of doing so if aggressor nations were to be halted in time to avert war. This fact was made so clear by the brief history of the League that the framers of the new world federation determined to guard, if possible, against this radical defect.

The primary emphasis in the Charter, consequently, does not fall on disarmament or on arbitration. These receive due recognition, but they are secondary. The primary need is recognized to be security. So much so is this the case that a permanent Security Council is provided for and the whole federation is frequently referred to as the International Security Organization. Without security and the military strength necessary to guarantee it other devices to insure peace would at present carry comparatively little weight with the peoples of the world. The use of force, if necessary, is therefore made basal in the Charter. Every member pledges itself to make its contribution to the armed forces of the United Nations, if or when it is needed. Special obligations devolve on the great powers to maintain world peace, and unity of action on their part is regarded as essential. Hence, any one of them may veto a proposed plan for military measures.

There was a good deal of opposition to this provision on the part of some of the smaller nations. But, as General Smuts said, it was "a precaution and a necessary precaution for keep-

ing the great powers together." The Soviet Union almost certainly and the United States very likely would have refused to ratify the charter if this veto provision had not been included in it; and without their support the United Nations organization would have been a failure from the outset, or perhaps would not have been established at all. The success of such an organization is dependent on its broad and representative character and on the unity of its most powerful members.

Then, too, it may be noted that the restriction of the veto right to the five great powers and the investing of the Security Council with the authority to take military action against a recalcitrant state marked a significant advance beyond the Covenant in that it facilitates and expedites such action in an emergency. The Covenant virtually gave the right of veto in such a case to every member of the League, and also provided for such a complicated preliminary procedure that there was always danger of military action being deferred until it was too late. According to the Charter the five permanent members of the Security Council, representing the five great powers, and two others out of its eleven members may institute such action to meet an immediate need. The use of force is still further facilitated by the Charter in that it encourages, as the Covenant did not, the formation of smaller regional groups of states authorized under certain conditions to resort to "enforcement action" in the settlement of disputes and in the interest of peace within their own area.

Some, as for instance Walter Lippmann in the symposium on *One World Or None* previously referred to, have taken the view that the privilege of veto accorded each of the great powers practically nullifies the principle of "collective security." Instead of making more certain and expediting military action against an aggressor nation it has in fact made it legally

impossible except in the case of some state so insignificant as not to be "the ally or client of any one of the great powers." This provision of the Charter would, consequently, seem to be reactionary in character; but, according to Lippmann, it is not to be so construed. It really marks an advance in that it prepares the way for a shift of emphasis in international agreements from sovereign states to individuals. To punish large states for acts of aggression and other violations of international laws means war. And this is so crude, so expensive, and usually so repulsive a method that it has become impracticable. The only way to maintain peace is "to make individuals, not sovereign states, the objects of international agreements." Laws, to be effective, must operate upon individuals. This principle is illustrated by the Nuremberg trials; and if it were generally endorsed, it would make possible the enforcement of peace without recourse to war. It would mean that incitements to war and belligerent activities in general would be treated like piracy and brigandage. They would no longer be considered pure matters of state, but offenses by individuals who would be properly dealt with under both national and international laws.

But while this individualizing of legal responsibility for war is a significant development in the field of international relations and is destined to become increasingly such, it is a serious error to treat it as antithetical to the principle of collective security. The two belong together. It is only through the defeat or punishment of aggressor states that conditions can at present be created which make it possible to deal effectively with individual war criminals. Collective security is a precondition of the operation of international laws upon individuals.

If the enforcement of sanctions against transgressor nations were actually nullified by the exercise of the veto right, the

latter would greatly weaken the United Nations as a peace agency, and its abolition would be highly desirable. That it will, however, have such a paralyzing effect on the police and military functions of the United Nations is improbable, though the possibility must be recognized and needs to be guarded against. The primary purpose of the veto privilege was to keep the great powers together, and it served this purpose well in the formation of the international organization. But since then it cannot be denied that it has been to a large extent a divisive instrument.

At San Francisco the Big Four in urging the acceptance of the veto proposal said reassuringly: "It is not to be assumed that the permanent members would use their veto power willfully to obstruct the operations of the Council." But as a matter of fact it has been so used almost continuously by Russia either directly or indirectly as a threat ever since the United Nations began in London last January. This has given rise to serious concern and led to a widespread demand for the abolition of the veto altogether. Such a proposed change in the Charter, however, would almost certainly be vetoed by the Great Powers. They would not as a group or individually consent to be drawn into the use of military force against their own will or judgment. An exception to this rule is regarded as necessary by the Western Powers in the case of a threatened use of atomic bombs by a recalcitrant state, and Russia may eventually accede to this point of view if it is provided for by special treaties instead of by an amendment of the Charter. But apart from this limitation of the veto, the right to its use is likely to be insisted on by the Great Powers. And when restricted to rare and vital occasions, it would probably not seriously impair the efficiency of the United Nations. It was such a restriction of its use that was aimed at in the Charter,

and from this point of view by limiting the veto to the Big Five it marked a step forward. It is the abuse rather than the use of the veto right against which the present criticism is chiefly directed.

In comparing the Charter with the Covenant we have emphasized its greater realism and the more effective provision for its own enforcement. This superiority to the Covenant appears also in its plans for promoting human welfare and removing the economic and social causes of war. Two items in this connection may be noted. One is the establishment of an Economic and Social Council of eighteen members, whose duty it is to study carefully and report on conditions within their jurisdiction, making such recommendations as they see fit for appropriate action by the General Assembly. The other is the creation of an International Trusteeship System, applicable to "territories now held under mandate," "territories which may be detached from enemy states," and "territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration." [27] To assist the General Assembly in fulfilling its functions under this system a representative Trusteeship Council is to be appointed. In this connection it is worthy of note that trusteeship carries with it the obligation to encourage the progressive development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories "toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." [28] This represents a distinct advance beyond what has been termed "the discredited and unworkable mandate system" of the League of Nations.[29]

[27] Article 77.
[28] Article 76.
[29] Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

Another point of special importance in the Charter is that it provides for its own revision at the end of ten years, if experience shows that such a step is advisable. It thus disclaims finality for itself in its present form. It recognizes the necessity of accommodating the Security Organization to the changing needs of the world. In so doing it seeks to prevent the Security Organization from becoming a tool of conservative and reactionary forces, as the League for a while seemed to be, and endeavors to make it a permanent instrument of social and political progress.

The Spirit of Co-operation

The Charter of the United Nations has no doubt its defects, but few would deny that it is the most advanced and wisest document of its kind that has been formulated since the idea of a European or world federation was first given currency six centuries ago. The international organization for which it provides gives greater promise of achieving its objective than any similar union of states planned in the past. Changes in the organization will be necessary, and at an earlier date than was anticipated by its original framers. We have spoken of the veto power and the change needed at this point. Another and more difficult change that will soon become imperative will be one providing for universal inspection to guard against the secret manufacture of atomic bombs. The only way in which an atomic arms race can be prevented is by the international control of atomic energy, and this will be possible only by means of a thorough and universal system of inspection that will cut across the traditional ideas of absolute state sovereignty. To bring about this change will be no easy task. But grim necessity demands it, and that not far hence.

Other important changes will also have to be made from time to time.

But no matter what these changes may turn out to be and no matter how completely they may perfect the external structure of international government, no mere organization can of itself guarantee permanent peace. There is no such thing as a fool-proof system of world peace. To be successful a peace organization must be sustained by what Rousseau called "the general will," the spirit of international co-operation. And to create and maintain such a spirit is a very different and a far more complex and difficult task than to set up the machinery of a world federation. The spiritual basis, on which the latter depends, cannot be constructed by formal treaties, nor can it be welded into unity by legislation, national or international. It is too subtle, too elusive, for that. And yet it is the foundation and dynamic of the whole peace enterprise. Without it all leagues and covenants would come to naught.

This, of course, does not mean that an international organization is not of vital importance. Its use of force and its appeal to fear and self-interest are essential factors in the establishment of a pacific world order. Domestic peace and the co-operation implied in it are made possible only by the use or threatened use of force by the national state. And the same will also hold true of international peace when it is finally established. It will be maintained by the use or threatened use of force by an international government of some kind. Under existing conditions force is indispensable as an antidote to anarchy on both the national and international plane.

Such use of force is not confined to human governments. It is, according to Kant, as we have previously noted, a law of nature. Natural law in the long run will force nations into the paths of peace. This is the way of Providence. Wars in

the course of time will become so destructive that in self-defense humanity must put an end to them.

This is strikingly illustrated by the atomic bomb. Invented as a weapon of war it has become one of the most powerful arguments for the abolition of war. Most thoughtful people would agree with what King George said on this point in his address before Parliament on August 14, 1945: "The devastating new weapon which science has now placed in the hands of humanity should bring home to all the lesson that the nations of the world must abolish recourse to war or perish by mutual destruction."

Scientists are generally agreed that there is and can be no effective military defense against atomic bombs. It is also clear that no reliance can be placed on the outlawing of their use by an international tribunal. Experience makes it practically certain that in the event of another world war legal restrictions would be swept away and atomic bombs would be freely used. Nothing can prevent the next great war from being an atomic war. If atomic bombs were like poison gas, the fear of retaliation might prevent their use, as it did the use of poison gas in the last war. But a sudden and unexpected attack by atomic bombs might be so destructive as to cripple all attempts at immediate retaliation. This would at least be a possibility and a sufficient possibility to tempt a desperate foe. Eventually no doubt effective retaliation would come from the peace-loving nations of the world, but by that time the "mutual destruction" predicted by King George would have been effected. There must, it would then seem, be some way of putting an end to war. The preservation of our civilization, if not of the race itself, would seem to require it.

But while international peace is apparently being forced upon mankind by the course of events, it is clear that a peace

thus imposed upon the world would not be all that we mean by the term. True peace is a peace of the heart. It is not mere abstention from bloody warfare, and still less is it such abstention induced by fear. Such a peace would not even be secure. There would be ceaseless plotting against it, and despite all efforts at suppression this plotting would probably continue until it breaks out into open rebellion.[30] Ultimately, outward peace, it would seem, must be established. The very conditions of human existence demand it. But when will this demand be so strongly impressed upon the nations of the world that they will make the sacrifices necessary for its realization? Will there have to be another world war, and that an atomic war, before the minds of men are sufficiently illumined and their wills sufficiently subdued to make universal peace possible? This is the great question at present confronting mankind; and if it is to be answered in the negative, it may be safely said that the peace now being imposed by force must also be or become a peace of justice, mutual understanding, and good will—a peace of voluntary and cheerful co-operation. The peace of might must become a peace of right. External peace must become one with internal peace—a peace within the minds and hearts of men. The complete cementing of the two may never be achieved, but it is the goal toward which the peace movement must ceaselessly strive. For peace is not a circle with a

[30] How insecure a peace would be which is based on mere fear is illustrated by a six-volume work *The Future of War* published in 1897 in Russian. Its author, I. S. Bloch, sought to prove by strictly scientific data that a great war was henceforth "absolutely impossible" because of its destructiveness of life and its economic and political consequences. Fear would prevent it. German and French editions of this work appeared in 1899 and also an English translation of the last volume with a long prefatory conversation with the author by W. T. Stead.

center but an ellipse with two foci. Both might and right, both force and faith, both body and soul, both mechanism and spirit, are essential to its being.

But as it is the function of the soul to control the body, so it is the function of faith and reason to control the use of force. The primacy, therefore, belongs to the spirit. Under certain conditions, it is true, the emphasis must fall on superior might. This is at times the only language that the enemies of peace seem to understand. But for the most part and in the long run the peace movement must make its primary appeal to reason, conscience, and faith. These are the pillars of perpetual peace. They have their foundation in armed might, either actual or potential; this must not be forgotten. But under existing circumstances they are the factors that most need emphasis in international relations. If world peace is to be made secure, these relations need to be rationalized, moralized, and spiritualized—not terrorized by atomic bombs.

As "the principal cause of war is war," so it may be said that the principal guarantee of peace is peace. This does not mean that as war breeds war, so peace breeds peace. It has a subtler meaning. It means that as war is the quest for power and hence is its own chief cause, so peace is the quest for international co-operation and hence is its own chief guarantee. As Erasmus put it, "The first and most important step toward peace is sincerely to desire it." [31] In other words it is the moral attitude of the nation that is chiefly responsible for the maintenance of peace, as it is also for the outbreak of war. A co-operative spirit in the one case and a selfish ambition in the other is the determining factor. The problem of peace is, then, the problem of co-operation, and the key to co-operation is the key to peace. To some extent

[31] *The Complaint of Peace*, p. 60.

superior military might has produced co-operation, and self-interest in the field of trade and commerce has done so to a still larger degree. But true and spontaneous co-operation must have a deeper and purer rootage. Bunyan said that he who takes up religion for the sake of the world will give it up for the sake of the world. And so the nation which takes up international co-operation for its own sake alone is likely to give it up for the same reason. The co-operation that insures permanent peace must be based on something more than self-interest and might or fear. It must have a moral and religious basis.

Fundamental to true co-operation are justice and good will. And in order to be truly effective in international relations these virtues need to be grounded in a profound faith in the sacredness of personality and the brotherhood of man. Nothing short of such a faith can break down the barriers created by differences of nationality, race, color, creed, economic status, and culture, and impart to the social and political life of mankind the needed moral dynamic. Without such an underlying faith no true unity of mankind can be realized and no international security organization can fully achieve its peace aims. Such an organization needs a religious basis. It can derive adequate inspiration from no other source. Except the Lord build the temple of peace, they labor in vain who build it.

But while it may generally be admitted, at least by the religiously minded, that peace and co-operation in the full meaning of these terms have their foundation in and derive their dynamic from the basic principles of morals and religion, it is obvious that these principles in their application to concrete international problems do not fulfill themselves. They need to

be guided by wisdom, sympathy, and patience. And it needs also to be recognized that there may be honest differences of opinion as to what is required by justice, good will, and mutual respect in any particular dispute between nations. As a rule the general direction in which the just settlement of such a dispute lies is likely to be fairly clear so that a compromise arrangement can be agreed upon. And if not, the sense of justice and good will would naturally suggest the reference of the dispute to mediation or arbitration. Through such conferences, direct and indirect, between the disputants mutual understanding will in most instances be arrived at and peaceful relations established. The sincere desire for co-operation will produce co-operation.

It is in this way that differences will be overcome and true peace will be made a reality in the world. Some maintain that the only solution of the problem created by the dependent and backward peoples in various parts of the globe is either complete domination by their imperialistic overlords or the complete withdrawal of the latter. But neither of these methods would solve the problem; neither would bring about permanent peace. The only way this can be done is through mutual understanding, through some such arrangement as that embodied in the trusteeship system of the United Nations' Charter. The road that leads to peace is not through separation or domination but through learning how to live together by a sympathetic adjustment of economic and political differences. The same is also to be said of racial differences. The problem here varies in different lands and between different peoples, but nowhere can it be permanently solved by enforced segregation or subjugation. A *modus vivendi* must be worked out everywhere that meets to a reasonable degree the demands of

justice, good will, and mutual respect. The sacredness of personality and the principle of brotherhood cannot be persistently violated in any social system without eventually stirring up the spirit of revolt.

A special problem arises in connection with the treatment of defeated peoples following a great war. To what extent and in what manner may these peoples be punished by the terms laid down in the peace treaties? Conditions vary so greatly in different wars that only the most general answers can be given to this question. In replying to it the first thing to be fixed clearly in mind is the true purpose of a peace treaty. This purpose is not to satisfy the claims of abstract justice nor to wreak vengeance on the vanquished foe. This function does not belong to man. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." [32] Nor is it the chief purpose of a peace treaty to render the conquered country or countries impotent from a military point of view. This aim is negative and in most instances would be effective for only a limited period of time. The true aim of a peace treaty should be to establish conditions under which it will be possible for the defeated nations to co-operate voluntarily and cheerfully in the maintenance of universal peace.

With this end in view the true peacemakers will not blind their eyes to the different degrees of guilt incurred by the vanquished and victorious powers. They will not deny the existence of any moral responsibility for war. They will not, for instance, put the Axis powers and the Allies on the same moral or non-moral level by saying, as some do, that the only real difference between them was that the former were "revisionists" in their world policy and the latter "conservatives." But they will not draw a hard and fast line between the bel-

[32] Rom. 12:19.

ligerents. They will not paint one side wholly black and the other wholly white, and lay down corresponding terms.

The victorious powers, if they are wise, will not impose unduly severe terms upon the defeated peoples, terms so impoverishing or humiliating that a self-respecting nation could not accept them as just and fair. They will not, for instance, so alter the eastern frontiers of Germany as to deprive her of one fourth of her total arable land, as has been proposed. Such action, as Winston Churchill said in Parliament, would not be "a good augury for the future." It would make real peace impossible. True peace is founded on mutual confidence; and confidence may be destroyed by unjust or unwise treaty *making* as well as by treaty *breaking*. The latter was Germany's sin, the former may turn out to be the sin of Poland and Russia, and their allies.

To distinguish between what is just and unjust and wise and unwise in the making of a treaty following a world war is no easy thing. To do so requires in many instances an ability to forecast the future that very few, if any, possess. But at least it should be clear that peace making has a different aim from that of war. Military victory is won by conquest, but the victors must be "more than conquerors" if they are to win the peace. They must prove themselves to be guided by something more than the will to power. They must put the good of humanity above their own selfish national aims, and must seek to transform their former enemies into friends. This must be the goal of every true peace treaty, and such a goal can be achieved only through a mingling of stern justice and sympathetic understanding. To treat the Germans and the Japanese as though they were morally incorrigible and by nature sinners above all other nations, as some have proposed, would be colossal ignorance and folly. And it would also be a betrayal

of our professed faith in the dignity of our common humanity.[33]

A serious peril that threatens the great powers, especially the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, in their relation not only to the defeated countries but to the world in general and to each other, is that of national pride—pride in their own military achievements, in their wealth, real and potential, and in their culture. Such pride would only be natural under the circumstances; but unless it is balanced by true humility, there is danger that each of these great powers will be viewed with fear and envy by the rest of the world. Only a deep sense of responsibility on their part for the peace and prosperity of mankind and a corresponding spirit of humility can create and maintain the degree of international accord that is needed in the world. If there ever was a time when these nations needed to sing and resing such a hymn as Kipling's "Recessional," that time lies in the period immediately ahead of us. Each of them will need to pray to be saved from "such boasting as the Gentiles use" and from a "heathen heart that puts her trust in reeking tube and iron shard" or atom bomb.

The postwar period has brought a rude shock to the Allied nations or at least to the Western democracies. Hardly had the Axis powers been defeated when a rift in the Allied ranks manifested itself—a rift between East and West. The rift has continued to grow in seriousness, and at present threatens the world with a lapse into a unique and frightening dualism with Russia representing one side and the United States and Britain the other. This rift is due in part to ideological differences, to a conflict of economic and political systems, but still more to an upsurge of Russian nationalism and a consequent expansionist policy. The latter policy cuts athwart the British

[33] Cf. E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (1942), pp. 214-40.

life line and threatens the balance of power in Europe and elsewhere. It is, furthermore, accompanied by cultural and political ideas repugnant to the Western World. The "dictatorial democracy" of Russia, to use Vishinsky's phrase, its manipulation of puppet states, and the "iron curtain" behind which it screens its activities are phases of its policy, which cannot but awaken fear and suspicion in the rest of the world. Whatever historical explanations they may have, they are serious barriers to Allied unity. How to overcome or circumvent them and thus re-establish harmony in the United Nations is a problem whose solution calls for the highest type of statesmanship on both sides. The threatened use of force by either side, if persisted in, would almost certainly lead to disaster. The dispute must be kept on a higher level.

On the other hand, appeasement of the aggressor is more likely to whet his appetite than to bring peace, as the world learned from Hitler. Somehow the spirit of aggression must be changed into that of co-operation, no matter how slow and how difficult the process may be.

In developing this responsible and objective type of national mind it is evident that religion and especially the Christian religion will have an important role to play.[34] "The problem," as General MacArthur said in his Tokyo address on September 2, 1945, "basically is theological, and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character. . . . It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh." As the peace movement had its origin in Christian lands and derived its chief inspiration through the centuries from a spiritual source, so it will reach its consummation only through a spir-

[34] Cf. Paul Hutchinson, *From Victory to Peace* (1943). Note the various peace proposals and messages in the Appendix. See also Walter Van Kirk, *A Christian Global Strategy* (1945).

itual faith and a spiritual ethic. There must be a profound faith in world peace as the divinely appointed goal of human history. There must be such a faith in the divine guidance of nature and history toward this end as Immanuel Kant expounded and justified. There must be a deep-seated recognition among all peoples of man's obligation to promote universal peace. This obligation must be grounded not only in a natural aversion to pain and suffering. It must have its basis in a sincere conviction with respect to the dignity and sanctity of human life everywhere. It must be founded on the belief in the spiritual nature and destiny of man and in a universal human brotherhood. All these high ethical and religious beliefs are implicit in the peace movement and are essential to the realization of its aims. They constitute its life-giving spirit. As such they operate to some extent through the World Security Organization and through national governments. But their chief organs are the churches and schools. Through these and other spiritual agencies they permeate public thought and life, and thus become the creative and sustaining force back of the many individual and group activities that make up the peace movement.

Plato said that war is undertaken for the sake of peace. Since his time this saying has been quoted and commented upon by distinguished thinkers such as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, and by countless others. Its significance lies in the fact that it is applicable not only to individual wars but also to war in general. It is a statement not only of a fact but also of a philosophy. War, it tells us, is subsidiary to peace. It is not a necessary or permanent phase of human life. It does not exist in its own right; it is a mere means to an end. Its true function is to inaugurate a reign of peace. Peace is the natural, the normal, the truly rational and ethical state of

society. To say that war and peace are "two necessary and, in a certain sense perhaps, equally justified forms of human life" [35] is completely to misunderstand their relation to each other. From the standpoint of what society ought to be, war is abnormal. When international harmony is disrupted by greed, enmity, and spiritual strife, war may intervene with seeming necessity; but it does so with the avowed purpose of re-establishing peace. Its function is thus at the best temporary and relative. It has no abiding value of its own, and in no sense of the term can it be placed on a level with peace and regarded as equally justified.

Indeed, the pacifying effect of war is limited in quality as well as duration. The peace following war is often hardly more than a truce. What we call peace might often be described as expected war or as undeclared war. One war has usually sown the seeds of another. Victory and defeat have not removed the basic cause of armed conflict. This cause is spiritual and as such has persisted, often in accentuated form. War has thus failed and failed egregiously in its professed objective. It has not achieved peace. Even temporary peace, to say nothing of permanent peace, has remained beyond its grasp. True peace is a thing of the spirit. It means the cessation of spiritual warfare, and this cannot be brought about by the mere exercise of force. True peace requires the free assent of the will, and this can be effected on a national scale only through the establishment of international standards that are fair and just and through the maintenance of a corresponding international order. In other words, justice, good will, and the spirit of cooperation are essential conditions of permanent peace, and these can be made effective in human life only as they are grounded in a profound moral and religious faith. In the last

[35] Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

analysis the prophetic word that came to Zerubbabel still holds true, and as expressive of the ideal might well serve as a motto for those who sit in our international councils of peace: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of hosts." [36]

[36] Zech. 4:6.

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